Abstract: Since the time of Plato, the experienced world and its pole, the lived experience of the sensory-cognitive subject have been introduced as spheres of immense tensions and deep antinomies. More than a genuine attempt at resolving these tensions, Kant's transcendental philosophy seems to be a hasty patch that at once occlude the deep-seated status of the antinomies inherent to experience and inhibit the theoretical and practical capacities of transcendental powers. Reason as the totality of practical and theoretical cognitions, consequently, is still confined to the provincialism of the experience, its ambitions and promises are haunted by absurdities wreaked by the tensions of the latter. Seen through the prism of critical philosophy, Lyotard's concept of the immaterials can be viewed as an attempt to capture a new phase in tackling—and in a sense, exposing through intensification—the antinomies of experience. This is a phase where the sensory core of experience is itself sculpted by the powers of abstraction which are now applied not by the forces of the a-priori but technoscientific interventions. The potential positive outcome of this phase is the mitigation of the particularism of the individual sensory experience and the advent of a new experiential common, more in tune with the ideals of collective resistance and self-consciousness (particularly, the consciousness of collective disorientation). From this perspective, Lyotard's thesis on the immaterials is an accelerationist gesture that depending on its emphasis—whether it is given to the technological abstraction or the possibility of building a new common subject—can be aligned with the right or the left. The claim of this presentation is that while the experiential common afforded by the immaterials can be seen as a philosophical attempt at mitigating or transcending the antinomies of experience, it is by no means a sufficient condition for thinking resistance, particularly the resistance of reason. To overcome and resolve the deep antinomies of individual experience so as to construct the collectivity without which resistance is unthinkable, reason must be unshackled from the conservatism of experience. But this process of emancipation is an anguishing historical struggle at once aimed at renegotiating the transcendental structure of experience through diverse modes of inquiry and practice (philosophy, art, technoscience, …) and reclaiming the transcendental powers of reason not in virtue of today's hegemony of technoscience but in spite of it.

Antinomies of experience and the question of the transcendental struggle

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It is rather ironic—and not in Socratic way—that we are discussing the issue of resistance in private, behind the closed doors, in a move that is so dear to the theoretically and practically corrupt mentality of elites whose clutches over art, philosophy, politics and science has never been stronger and more insidiously covert than what we are witnessing today. If the thought of the resistance is to be entertained, it ought to be public, based on an absolute expropriation of cognitive privacy, a myth that is merely a justification for forcing thought back into parochialism, idleness and complacency, which always go hand in hand in complete collusion with the systematic exploitation and injustice that has been plaguing this planet. But there is no need to be more unreasonably odious here than what is necessary. We are after all seeking comfort in a luxurious reclusion of thought afforded to us by the system, for we have admitted long ago that in all likelihood we have minimal traction—if any at all—on the real world.

Revisiting Lyotard in the twenty-first century, having witnessed the diremptive tendencies of continental philosophy and encountered first hand the actual politically, philosophically and aesthetically debilitating consequences of a post-structural theory that are now fodder for a conception of the left which is in reality the methodically individualistic machinery of neolineralism in disguise, is not by any means an easy task. It is not easy not because its medium of presentation now strikes us as something akin to a rococoesque house with uncomfortable and useless albeit spectacularly ornate furniture, but because given the extremity of the symptoms of what is happening here and now in this world—so extreme and grotesque that even the mightiest forms of individual and collective self-deception cannot offer us a moment of self-deluded bliss any longer—we have no longer any excuse to not admit that our analyses of the causes leading to symptoms have not only been flawed but also have been systematically confusing causes and symptoms all along. That the critique afforded by post-structuralist theory—in which Lyotard is both a bastradizer and a peddler—despite all of its cogently framed premises and diagnoses has contributed decisively to the impotency of the left and its ideals and that it has occasioned the wriest conclusions far removed from its ethos and initial ambitions.

This is all to say that revisiting Lytorad or for that matter the entire system of post-structural theory and the deeply influential model of popularized intellectualism promulgated by the French model of continental thought is the very hard and discomforting task that is beset upon those of us who even though have come through this trajectory are now disillusioned by its purported achievements. In short, in revisiting Lyotard or for that matter the model of continental thought that has been given currency to by the French post-structuralist theory, we have to admit—if we indeed have an iota of theoretical and practical integrity—that we cannot adhere to the same rhetoric and dodgy analyses, we cannot repeat the same mistakes and we cannot endorse the same judgements toward the same conclusions, nor can we stay indefinitely in the same comfort zone that we have been inhabiting and safeguarding for decades. We ought to engage in an objective analysis of those causes which have riddled the world so encompassingly that there is no longer any opportunity to adhere to the purist status of the theoretical observer, for this world as it stands here and now is a place in which we are no longer just impotent theorists, philosophers or artists but also—as it has always been the case despite our best arguments to the contrary—enslaved inhabitants.

It is precisely from the perspective of this world in which the revolutionaries have inherited the ruins of the left, continental philosophers have inherited the ruins of the post-structural theory, the analytics the ruins of quietism and amidst all of this, people disillusioned by unfulfilled promises and intellectual and political destitution of the left have been migrating *en mass* toward the ruinous right, that we ought to revisit Lyotard and his dramatic account of unresolvable disputes (the differend) and resistance. Anything but this starting point would be not just an expression of irrefragable disingenuity but also a testament to the extent of our cognitive and ethical enfeeblement. Having vaguely portrayed the ambient space surrounding our reflection on Lyotard but also a version of thought that we might have at some point held so dear, I will now attempt to focus on Lyotard's peculiar form of political agnosticism and sketchily identify its roots. I said

‘peculiar’ because this is not exactly the political agnosticism that is advanced by Socrates as the theoretical and practical courage of truth qua an objective force of the determined and determination that no sham politics can appropriate without reeling from its consequences. Lyotard’s political agnosticism, on the other hand, is more of a late capitalist interdetermination of knowledge rather than an unwavering form of knowing—which is the power of reason—that never gives up the inquiry into the knowledge of its realization and whose manifestation is a politics that is the concrete determination of the good and the true. Disillusioned by the right and the left, their political knowledge of what ought to be done as the result of their interminable ignorance of what the actual causes are, Lyotard is a strange breed of philosophy’s most celebrated and accursed, determined and indecisive moments. Having identified the traps of history and grand narratives under the rubric of the differend, the very source of injustice, he falls in that most intricate trap of history: that is, the naivety of a complete disillusionment of every trap in history, which also happens to be a sure path toward indeterminacy and despair amounting to either political resignation or an inept politics crippled by the perpetual fear of tragedy, and thus a debilitation that unconsciously perpetuate the status quo.

Lyotard is a thinker of ambiguity, his works display down to the levels of style, method and structuration an indiscreet charm of ambiguity. But ambiguity in what sense? First, in the sense of a reified ambiguity that results in a pathological indeterminacy propped up as the marker of theoretical profundity. Next, in the sense of a systematic engagement with conflicting and tension-riddled philosophical discourses. It is in the latter sense that ambiguity is indeed a token of his profundity: a methodic way of presenting opposed thoughts side-by-side (the very meaning of the prefix, *ambi*-) so as to determine differences between the conclusions arising from the clashes between conflicting philosophical claims and narratives, and in that marking out the limits of reasons belonging to their respective jurisdictions, thus exposing not only the consequences of the illegitimate extension of reason but also shaking philosophy from the slumber of fictitious convictions. This is a methodological ambiguity that Kant calls antinomy, or in Kant’s words, “a decisive experiment, which must necessarily expose any error lying hidden in the assumptions of reason”. Being sources of unresolvable tensions and absurdities, antinomies (such as the antinomy of pure reason) arise not because of an attempt to transcend all phenomena but to *complete* them. It is the attempt to search for absolute completeness on the basis of spatially and temporally limited experience that leads reason into antinomies.

When it comes to Lyotard’s philosophy, particularly his account of what counts as resistance (a term which should be taken as both singular and plural), it is impossible to fully separate these two senses of ambiguity. And being faithful to his work, there is no reason to privilege one over another. And this is exactly, what I would like to do here, to cursorily show how these two accounts of ambiguity go hand in hand in Lyotard’s work. But in this respect, I would like to restrict my commentary to a particular species of antinomies of human experience that linger in all of his works and become the analytical scaffolding from which Lyotard launches his critique of reason, formulates his account of the differend, frames the concept of the immaterials, and draws the cipher

of the inhuman under the aegis of time. The philosophical methods by which Lyotard exposes the antinomies of experience within the transcendental struggle of reason are far too many and far too nuanced to be dealt with here. But suffice to say that one of Lyotard's most favored philosophical weapons of choice is phenomenology which he effectively utilizes in his discussions around sense and reference and the transcendental conditions of experience (both of which are central to the development of Lyotard's account of the differend and resistance). Even though Lyotard eventually provides a critique of phenomenology, he never severs ties from the main phenomenological claims through which Husserl challenged the legacy of Kant and Hegel. From this standpoint, the early Lyotard can be seen as a maverick phenomenological rationalist and the later Lyotard as someone who has left the doors of reason open for phenomenology for too long, so that now in the room there is only a thin phenomenology and no reason.

Whereas for Kant antinomies result from the overextension of reason out of the bounds of reason in an attempt for completeness—an attempt that ultimately results in undecidability—for Lyotard antinomies demarcate the very fact of the human experience. Rather than arising from the illicit extension of the finite reason, they demarcate the hypostasized limitation of reason—its constitutive indetermination—arising from the very conditions necessary for the possibility of experience, be they normative or material, social or individual, linguistic-functional or causal-structural. This is because, according to Lyotard, the meaning of truth is not given ultimately provided by thought or formal rules but by preconceptual experience whose contingency – which is the contingency of the body endowed with memory, matter with retention—usurps the content of truth from the authority of reason. As Lyotard states, "Consequently, in order to verify a judgment-that is, to explain the meaning of truth-we must proceed to a regressive analysis leading to a precategorial (prepredicative) experience which constitutes a fundamental presupposition of logic in general. This presupposition is not a logical axiom, but a philosophical condition of possibility, constituting the ground into which all predication sinks its roots."

Accordingly, the differend is the expression of this particular form of antinomy—signifying the constitutive indetermination of reason—registered in its most problematizing form at the level of linguistic representational capacity. Although, Lyotard by no means restrict this indetermination to the domain of linguistic representation or phrases. The phrase universe can be extralinguistic, semiotic and gestural.

Now insofar as according to Lyotard, judgements qua truth-establishing rational activities are ultimately founded on representation (specifically linguistic representation) qua correspondence with an extra-linguistic event, then the antinomic indetermination of the latter terminates in the theoretical and practical indetermination of the former, namely, reason. The purported power of reason to transcend beyond the scope of human experience through the act of legislation of its own normative maxims is sabotaged by the very conditions of possibility that realize the sovereignty of reason in claiming and establishing truths qua the representational fidelity to what lies beyond the surd particularism of the human experience. In this respect, it is not only the attempts of reason to attain completeness that leads to absurdities, but also the transcendental struggles of reason. To the

extent that the normative truth-seeking enterprise of reason falters on the antinomic nature of its representational capacities, the transcendental ambitions whose veracity is also anchored in reason's claims over truth flounder and collapse. The transcendental ideas of reason and social forces behind them are unmasked as the illegitimate moves of the finite reason just in the same way that the striving of reason for absolute completeness has been exposed as a ficticious conviction.

The transcendental ideals can be seen as intimations of an infinite teleology of reason—that is purposiveness without manifest purpose rather than an Aristotelian final cause. It is this teleological function—the regulative power of transcendental ideals whose temporal-modal possible world is the future—which is the ultimate safeguard against the irruption of antinomies and tensions here and now. But since the dialectical configuration of the transcendental and the experienced is itself antinomic and the claims of reason regarding a future resolution under the rubric of transcendental ideas are illusory effects of this antinomy, our entire system of oughts and obligations whose possibility rests on the possibility of what yet to come—a transcendental future understood as another set of revised oughts or more just legislated laws—becomes diremptive in every aspect. The transcendental redemption promised by reason turns out to be the diremption of reason materialized as the cause of injustice happening always here and now.

Since the resistance of reason on the transcendental ground have now been shown to be untenable, reason then must resist its tendency to have the first and the last word, for any appeal to the transcendental as what anteriorly (via the a priori) or posteriorly (via transcendental ideals) determines the now can only register as the cause of the present injustice. Abstractly then reason must resist itself, but concretely this resistance should be realized by reinvesting in a horizon of experience which is liberated from its subjugation to the a priori that was in fact a source of antinomic tensions. This is the horizon of the lived experience where the sensible body and sensations (Kant's account of outer sense), retention and memory (Kant's inner sense) which in Lyotard's terms respectively stand for the mind without memory and body with memory reign. Truth no longer needs to be established by resorting to reason and its conceptual resources, but can only be defined in terms of the lived experience of truth qua its circumstantial evidence. In Lytoard's words, "Yet this experience is not simply a sentiment, for it is clear that sentiment provides no guarantee against error; evidence is the originary mode of intentionality, the moment of consciousness where the thing is said to be given in flesh and blood to consciousness, where the intuition is 'filled.'"

At the level of the lived experience qua the originary mode of truth, the determined thought of truth qua the tribunal of cognition is annulled and its formally encapsulated judgements, the logical laws of thought are voided. This is because the representational correspondence between the phrase and the referent, the designator and the designated and the logical space for linking phrases are imbalanced by the intrusion of different senses qua meanings that ultimately establish and determine the reference as the truth of correspondence with the event. But from Lyotard's phenomenological standpoint, insofar as individual senses can only be traced back to their originary mode qua lived experiences, the flesh and blood of consciousness, the inferential-logical linking of

phrases or in Lyotard's own term 'phrase regimentation' that should provide us with a locus of certitude, a stable narrative or a uniform reference is also destabilized by the intrusion of the contingency of the sense (and not merely the contingency of the event). Demonstrating the encroachment of the lived experience via the contingency of the sense upon the stability of the referential core of reason, Lytoard then concludes that this contingency of sense is precisely the contingency of the body with memory, matter and time.

But the question is how does exactly this sort of contingency affect the stable truth of the reference and the certitude of the laws of thought? Lyotard's answer is simple, sense as in contrast to reference is always a "possible sense". The opening of truth to the intrusion of individual senses, the logical space to the space of the possible sense is the opening of stability, uniformity and certitude to the intrusion of possibility. This possibility is understood comprehensively "as a modality axed on the future, a hollowness which is also time considered as the condition of modalizations". If previously under the patronage of the representational reason, reality was defined by the denial of the contingency of possible senses, which is to say, by the affirmation of the reference which can only be derived through thought as negation, now with the expropriation of the referential truth in favor of possible senses and their contingency, reality is defined in terms of the lived experience which is but the complefixation of matter as the space of the possible or infinite modalizations conditioned by time.

From here it is easy to see that how the conclusions reached by Lyotard's thesis on the differend and the resistance of justice through the prioritization of the lived experience and the accommodation of their competing narratives side-by-side lends themselves to his observations on the evolution of technoscience in *The Inhuman*. If mind is ultimately body with memory, and memory is matter equipped with retention, then the complexification of mind is in the last instance the problem of emancipation of matter by means of new transformers that increase the liberty of the matter to act, and reforge the experience by their own abstraction – a family of transformers which we call technoscience. Human mind represents a limited transformation of matter, its epistemic-conceptual monopoly over what the mind is and what it can be is in reality the sign of its aborted complexification, that is its inability to grasp or experience mind as the infinitude matter, the infinity of which lies in its increasing retention, or creative interactions with time. The complexification of mind then is understood as the self-liberation of matter by the ever more sophisticated family of transformers that creatively interact with—rather than react to—time.

But what is this other than an endorsement of a hackneyed Aristotelianism elegantly wrapped in the phenomenological critique of rationalism and a metaphysical dogmatism glitzed up with complexity sciences? Having identified the transcendental aims of reason as too antinomic in their origin and too diremptive in their tendencies, Lyotard's substitutes the goals of reason with infinite complexification, the opening of the space of possibilities in matter. But this progressivist reading of the evolutionary history inscribed at the heart of matter is a far worse teleogical sin. The progression of life – evolution – is a random motion from simple beginnings that can be characterized as a tendency to deviate from strict symmetries. But progression from simple

beginnings is not the same as progression toward ever more complexity. Deviation from the former does not imply convergence upon the latter. Lyotard hypostasizes the space of possibility afforded by random movements away from simple beginnings into a necessary tendency toward ever more possibilities of material liberation qua complexification. If this not an Aristotelian teleology presented in the guise of openness and infinitude then what is it?

When this spiritualist-vitalist teleology is complemented with the phenomenological-vitalist valorization of the lived experience, we essentially get the chameleonic neoliberal subject. But if anything, today's political, social and cognitive debilitation is not the result of following transcendental ideals of reason but living by an account of what is true and what is good that is fully in conformity with one's lived experience, that is to say, with the preconceptual account of truth. The valorization of the lived experience is not the solution to the injustice of the differend, but the very cause of it. Its revered subject is exactly, as it is becoming more obvious, the methodologically individualistic subject of neoliberal capitalism, a subject that populates both the left and the right but with vastly diverging consequences, on one pole this subject becomes the proponent of extremist narratives of race, gender and territory and at the other pole, it becomes an eternal guardian for the authenticity of the lived experience, or what at some point used to be called to the beautiful soul. Political action for these two kinds of purportedly different subjectivity amounts to the conservation of dividedness either through brining divisions under fabricated global constructs that unite through exclusion or by resigning to the pigeonholed localism of individual narratives for which collectivity is always tainted by fears of tragedy. Resistance for this latter subjectivity is exactly what we are dealing today: It is a social gossip in which we gather not by virtue of common transcendental goals—that should be as relevant to us as they at to the future generations who might neither share our experience nor our particular life-form—but by virtue of the mundane fact that we all have infinite tales of our lived experiences, each supposedly more authentic than the other precisely insofar that they are always viewed from the solipsistic tunnel-vision of the ego.

So what did go wrong with Lyotard's analysis and where did it happen? It is hard to say, but I think the antinomy of the transcendental and the experienced is one of the most decisive moments, a moment where he delivers his critique of reason. Lyotard mistakes truth for representation as correspondence, confuses reason with representational faculties, dogmatically believes in a preconceptual account of truth. His neo-Fregean analysis of the sense and reference is put in terms of the correspondence between the event and the phrase (qua reference), but in order for the reference or phrase to be determined it needs to be linked with other phrases. In the absence of any pre-established rule of linkage or judgement and also given the contextuality sense qua meaning, reason's referential veracity is incapacitated. All that is left is the contextuality of meaning or sense, the contextuality of which is ultimately the matter of the situationality of the lived experience. However at this level, there is no unified rational dictum, no transcendental maxim, no shared reference, only different lived experiences competing with one another in their narrative authenticity either rooted in the myths of metaphysical immediacy or sociopolitical victimhood. But in living in accordance with the impersonal ideals of reasons, we are afforded the capacity to rise

above our victimhood, for the criteria of rational collective self-determination—which is the very condition of our intelligibility as autonomous agents—demands us to rise above our particular narratives, of trauma and suffering, and to intervene universally with those very conditions of experience which have made us individual victims, pariahs, unwaged laborers and the wretched of this earth.

The normative correctness of reason is not a matter of an objectivity that is objective because it is uniformly shared among all the individual subjects. What is required for this objectivity to be established is not the commonality of all individual senses – the requirement of them being shared among all groups and individuals – but only the requirement of them be shareable, that is to say, the existence of shared procedures for arriving consilience or agreement regarding judgements. This objectivity is the only objectivity from which the inter-subjective enterprise of reason bootstraps itself. It is properly speaking a stable communal consilience with regard to the acceptability in virtue of which objective representings constitute the unitary shared "critical stance" logically demanded by the existence of any norms. With regard to this objectivity, truth is no longer a matter of representational correspondence but the socially realized linguistic norms of what it means to take an assertion, a saying as true and the norms qua principles of what ought to be done to utter something, a claim, an assertion, a maxim.

The enterprise of reason does not start from a canonical conception of truth or a fixed correspondence with reality, but from the minimum conditions required to take true something that is said, asserted, claimed or believed in spite of what the sensible components of the experience and particular circumstances under which the experience takes place. Starting from these minimum conditions, reason does not stand against individual lived experiences but provides an avenue for transcending them in a determined and concrete manner and to ultimately in a Hegelian fashion treat what is contingent in experience as a resource for bringing about what is necessary. And what is necessary, in this sense, is simply another name for the rational rule through which the elective force of the individuals with their particular lived experiences coincide with the legislated obligation of the collective, and the legislated rule becomes the horizon for more transcended elective choices. It is only by subsuming the elective sociality of the individuals under the self-realizing power of reason—as the legislative force of what is truly collective, communist, singular yet impersonal—that the liberal reification of democracy qua the power of the elective as an end-in-itself can be avoided. The elective democracy, that very democracy that bottoms up in the vague maxims of free expression and free choice for all, has always been the subject of suspicion for the children of Socrates. As a desideratum for a rational communism, democracy is nothing but a means for synchronizing the personally elective and the impersonally legislative, a springboard to go beyond the trivial albeit necessary ambits of democracy which by itself can never be a vehicle of collective self-determination.

In abiding by the narratives of a refried democracy where all narratives regardless of their content matter to the extent that the rational judgement and the will which determine what is true and good with regard to such narratives are now obsolete, Lyotard's prescription for going beyond barbarism

and socialism is hardly anything more than a sophistic move to preserve the inhabitable world in which we already inhabit. This is a system for which there is never an alternative other than what is prescribed by what is already given. And what is given in this case is a world of socially prescribed subjectivity which is at the core both individualizing and sociopathic, stuck forever in the purported givenness of its experience as the only locus of thought and action. It seems for Lyotard, the only alternative for this world committed to the liberal pluralism of individual experiential narratives, is to extricate experience—the flesh and blood of it which is the sensible body endowed with memory—from its anthropomorphic husk through technoscience and the art of the sublime.

In reducing truth as the logico-linguistic norms of reason for taking something true to truth as the contingency of sense which is ultimately for him the space of the possibility of the sensible body with memory, namely, the interaction of matter and time, Lyotard confuses awareness with knowledge. The intuited content provided by the inner and outer senses make up the structure of the awareness. But awareness is not knowledge, for the latter is derived primarily from reason's own retrospective recognition of its power of knowing, which is a historical systematic inquiry into the conditions of its realization. It is through this process that reason progressively amplifies its power of knowing by progressively mitigating its reliance on perception and instead moving toward a thinking that is realized in and through concepts alone. It is this account of rationality and thought that inferentially reveals different aspects of sense through which we come into cognitive contact with reality. The complexification of mind, accordingly, is a process of maturation of reason through which reason retrospectively recognizes its own theoretical power of knowing and practical power of the autonomous will. This processes coincides with reason's full subsumption of the sensible by the conceptual, the substantive heteronomy of thought by the formal autonomy of thought. The outcome of this process—which is a matter of a tedious and toilsome labor rather than a technoscientific miracle performed on matter—is the intelligible unity of the objectivity of the world in its irreducible foreignness and the autonomy of reason in its irreducible transcendental powers.

By refuting the account of truth as a representational correspondence so as to debunk the sovereign claims of reason over truth, Lyotard inadvertently promotes the epistemically impoverished relational theory of meaning in which meaning is taken to be a relation between a word and a nonverbal entity. The source of the error in treating meaning and conceptual cognition as "fundamental kinds of relations-to-entities" is a confusion over what is actually a completely reasonable thought. This is the idea that, when it comes to standard cases of successful empirical reference, in order for names or basic descriptive predicates to name or mean what they do, certain "empirically definable relations" should be in place between the relevant linguistic and non-linguistic items. For example, as Sellars argues, of the word 'red' would not mean what it does if it were not regularly used in statements made in perceptual response to the presence of red objects, such as the 'red light is on'. Therefore, meaning statements do indirectly express the information that "appropriate psychological-social-historical relations"—specifically certain reliable causal relations at the level of outer and inner senses, the question of a causal structure adequate for

differential responsiveness—do indeed obtain in this way between utterances of 'red' and red objects. However, this is not the same as the idea that utterances (like the word red) or semantic statements assert any kind of relation of any kind between themselves and things. It would be fundamental mistake to infer a relation between •red• and red things (or the property of redness) in naming or meaning statements like ‘rouge’ means red. Here, the functional role of ‘means’ qua sense only tells that the truth of a meaning statement requires certain kinds of empirical-causal relations to be in place between persons' utterances (and thoughts) and various non-linguistic items, without there being any such thing as a problematic meaning relation holding between those utterances (and thoughts) and those entities in a way that we can equate truth with representational correspondence.

Despite the porous structure of Lyotard analysis and the shakiness of his method at arriving his conclusions, I think his engagement with the antinomy of the transcendental and the experienced shouldn’t be dismissed out of hand. In fact, for today’s rationalism – whether you are a Platonist, a Hegelian, a Sellarsian or a Brandomian – this antinomy is more striking, a more pressing issue than it has ever been. For me the solution is neither in ejecting the transcendental goals of reason in favor of the lived experience nor in dismissing the import of the lived experience, the scope of its constitutive significance, in favor of the transcendental ideals of reason. If ultimately resistance is meaningless without collectivity and collectivity is untenable without a procedure of consensus-building, then we cannot solely adhere to either the transcendental obligations of reason or the interests of the lived experience. Instead we ought to find out how we can fuse the particular tendencies of the former with the universal tendencies of the latter. But at least based on the evidence and implications of the present world, I am fundamentally skeptical that this task is possible in this world as it currently stands. Still a lot can be done in this world – our world – but we ought to admit its limitation when it comes to what collectivity and consensus are.

My cryptic proposal is that this is exactly the reason why we ought to posit an otherworldly experience, or more accurately, postulate the possibility of worlds that are in every sense otherworldly to the inhabitable world in which we currently live and dream. But the postulation of these otherworldly spheres is a matter of positing Archimedian vantage points through which we can finally map the structure of cognition onto the collective conscious, attaining that esoteric faculty that Kant calls productive imagination: looking at our world from the postulated sphere of another world in which the antinomies and paradoxes of this world if not totally absent are at least drastically mitigated. In this scenario where we can finally turn collective consciousness into a collective productive imagination which is simply collective understanding in a different guise, concepts of the otherworld becomes cognitive vehicles through which we finally begin to not only apprehend why our individual experiences are so particular but also recognize that in their very particularity and difference, these individual experiences are conditioned and realized by transcendental generalities. Whereas in the Kantian schema of productive imagination, the categories of understandings that are brought to bear on the intuited are derived from the *manner* by

which the conscious mind organizes the materials provides by senses, in our otherworldly scenario, these categories originate from the concepts of reason alone (*Begriff*).

The experience in this world which is contingent through and through in its flesh and blood proves to be necessary for a transition to a possible world which demands the transformation of these very conditions of experience in accordance with the impersonal self-legislative demands of reason.

The postulation of an otherworld is nothing but the token of our resistance against the refusal of thinking the possibility of a world defined by the impersonal communism of transcendental ideals of reason. To find the causal link between our world and the otherworld is the matter of understanding and imagining what ought to be done in our world from the perspective of the postulated possible world, this is the very first defining step of resistance today.

Where tensions wreaked by our particular lived experiences lead us to postulate new individual senses, the tensions brought about by the antinomy of the transcendental and the experienced should lead us to postulate the possibility of a world – an otherworld – in which the gap between the personalism of the lived experiences and the impersonality of reason's interests is finally overcome. To reach there first we ought to soberly hypothesize or imagine the possibility of another world, then to rethink philosophy, art and technoscience as the concrete transports for arriving there. So far philosophers have attempted to find new concepts suiting the experience, perhaps it is now time to think what it means to steadily and concretely—through a certain thoroughgoing attenuation of the forms of intuitions, of individuality and selfhood, corporeality and mundane consciousness—tailor experience to the needs of the Concept.