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KANT WITHIN THE TRADITION OF MODERN LOGIC: THE ROLE OF THE "INTRODUCTION: IDEA OF A TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC"

RICCARDO POZZO

IT IS A MATTER OF FACT that logic in the modern age was concerned to a much greater extent with the workings of the mind, that is, with epistemic and even doxastic themes, than with formal problems. Under the heading of 'logic' scholars from Ramus to Kant conceived a sort of melting pot containing not just formal logic but also methodology, theory of knowledge, psychology, rhetoric, grammar, aesthetics, hermeneutics, and so on. From the point of view of formal logic all these were informal disciplines. Yet they were also part of the core of logic as a whole. It is necessary, then, to put some question marks upon the arguments adopted for privileging formal against epistemic logic by Bochenski, the Kneales, and Risse in their contributions to the history of logic in the modern age.[1] Kant's distinction between general and transcendental logic provides us with the most crucial case study. One would say, it is a book on the theory of knowledge containing many metaphysical sections as well as logical ones.[2] Yet,

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[1] Joseph Marie Bochenski, *Formale Logik* (Freiburg: Alber, 1956); William Wharton and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962); Wilhelm Risse, *Die Logik der Neuzeit*, (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1964–70).

[2] Giorgio Tonelli was clear on this point: the *Critique of Pure Reason* is "a treatise on logic as much as on metaphysics." See "Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* Within the Tradition of Modern Logic" (1974), reprinted in: Giorgio Tonelli, *Kant's* Critique of Pure Reason *Within the Tradition of Modern Logic: A Commentary on its History*, ed. David H. Chandler, Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 37 (Hildesheim: Olms, 1994), 1. Moreover, Richard Velkley has suggested that the *Critique of Pure Reason* "develops a notion of metaphysics which incorporates ontology into logic," and that "transcendental logic" should be interpreted as "the meta-logic which is the critique of logical thought, that is, of formal logic's extension beyond its own competence into questions of metaphysics." See Richard

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of which kind of metaphysics? Of which kind of logic? The aim of this paper is to give evidence for Kant's concern to give a presentation of his new philosophy within the tradition of early modern logic and metaphysics. For this reason I am going to speak of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and particularly of the section named "Introduction: Idea of a Transcendental Logic."[3]

I

An Academic Program. A decisive clue for the hypothesis that Kant actually thought of teaching directly from his *Critique of Pure Reason* can be found in the "Introduction: Idea of a Transcendental Logic." This is a section of the *Critique of Pure Reason* which, on account of its length (a total of 14 printed pages without the frontpiece, that is, approximately a sheet to be folded *in octavo* for 16 pages if one considers the frontpiece and an empty page at the back) and of the propaedeutic approach adopted by Kant, would have fit perfectly as a separate publication in the genre of the *Programs* (*Programme, Einladungsschriften*). Academic programs were very frequent in the eighteenth century and served as a means by which university professors invited students to their courses evidencing some provoking and novel elements. It does not seem unjustified, therefore, to think of a planned and never published program dealing with such an unusual question as the difference between general and transcendental logic which Kant years later incorporated in the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a section with an introductory function.

My hypothesis is that Kant could have prepared the "Introduction" sometime during the seventies with the explicit aim of making a program out of it. From a philological point of view, the separate origin of this section is supported by the interpretation advanced by Hans Vaihinger and Norman Kemp-Smith which consider the *Critique*

Velkley, "Kant on the Primacy and the Limits of Logic," *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, New School for Social Research* 11 (1988): 147–148.

[3] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (hereafter referred to as "*CPR*"), trans. Norman Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan Publisher, Ltd., 1933), 92–101, A50–64/B74–89. References to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are to the pages of the first (A) and second (B) editions.

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of Pure Reason as a 'patchwork' of different layers in Kant's thought.[4] It is further supported by Erich Adickes' sententious remark that this section was not even worth a commentary because of its heterogeneity with the rest of the book.[5] From a systematical point of view, however, the hypothesis encounters obstacles, first of all Kant's explicit remark that we "do not enlarge but disfigure sciences, if we allow them to trespass upon one another's territory."[6] It finds a mighty ally, though, in the contention set forth by Tonelli that "transcendental logic in particular, and the *Critique of Pure Reason* in general, belong to the class of special logic. More precisely, they are a special logic for metaphysics."[7] In fact, Tonelli specified, "the *Critique* is a work on methodology and, more exactly, on the methodology of metaphysics."[8] The distinction between general and special logic (that is between *Categoriae*, *De interpretatione*, *Analytica priora* and *Analytica posteriora*, *Topica*, *Sophistica*), though made popular by Zabarella, goes back to Averroes' edition of the *Organon*.[9] Kant was clear on the point that the object of general logic is to have no object at all, since general logic considers only the "absolutely necessary rules of thought without which there can be no employment whatsoever of the understanding. It therefore treats of understanding without any regard to difference in the objects to which the understanding may be directed." On the contrary, the object of a special logic appears confined to a special kind. In fact, the logic of the "special employment of the understanding contains the rules of correct thinking as regards a certain kind of objects."[10]

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[4] Hans Vaihinger, *Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Stuttgart: Spemann, 1881–86); Norman Kemp-Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's* 'Critique of Pure Reason', (London: Macmillan Publisher, Ltd., 1923).

[5] Erich Adickes, ed., *Immanuel Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Berlin: Meyer und Miller, 1889), 183.

[6] *CPR*, Bviii.

[7] Tonelli, *Kant's* Critique, 81.

[8] Tonelli, *Kant's* Critique, 4.

[9] Riccardo Pozzo, *Kant und das Problem einer Einleitung in die Logik: Ein Beitrag zur Rekonstruktion der historischen Hintergrunde von Kants Logik-Kolleg*, Europäische Hochschulschriften, sect. 20, vol. 269 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1989), 166–9.

[10] *CPR*, A52/B76.

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II

Kant Projecting Textbooks. Let me ask a simple question: When Kant started to work on the *Critique of Pure Reason*, did he want to write a textbook for logic or one for metaphysics? The correct answer to this question lies probably in the middle. One could say that when Kant, shortly after his appointment as an ordinary professor and following academic usage, decided to write a more complex treatise than the ones he had written before, he might have envisaged a textbook useful for both logical and metaphysical courses. Contrary to most commentators and especially to Conrad,[11] I think there is no evidence which can exclude the hypothesis that Kant thought of using the *Critique of Pure Reason* at his own University. My conviction is based on several different grounds.

According to a document hidden in a thick volume at the *Secret Prussian State Archive* in Berlin-Dahlem, which Tonelli could not consider, the *Indications for the Students of the Philosophical Faculty*, approved in 1770 at the University of Königsberg, the program for the first semester included, "a) Philosophical and General Encyclopaedia; b) Logic; c) Aesthetics," while that for the second semester included only, "a) Metaphysics."[12] Considering that the "Architectonic of Pure Reason"[13] could have been the text—as Johann Heinrich Lambert thought it did[14]—for the first part of a course on philosophical and general encyclopaedia, it is amazing to realize that each of the

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[11] See Elfriede Conrad, *Kants Logikvorlesungen als neuer Schlüssel zur Architektonik der Kritik der reinen Vernunft: Die Ausarbeitung der Gliederungsentwürfe in den Logikvorlesungen als Auseinandersetzung mit der Tradition*, Forschungen und Materialien zur deutschen Aufklärung, sect. 2, vol. 9 (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1994), 29.

[12] University of Königsberg, *Methodologische Anweisungen für die Studierenden in allen 4 Facultaeten*, part 4: *Anweisung wie die Philosophie, Philologie und diejenigen Wissenschaften, worin die Philosophische Facultät den Unterricht gibt, und in welcher Ordnung und Verbindung sie auf der Universität zu betreiben* (Königsberg: Hartung, 1770), 17–20, reprinted in: *Vorlesungsverzeichnisse der Universität Königsberg 1720–1804: Mit einer Einleitung und Registern*, ed. M. Oberhausen and R. Pozzo, Forschungen und Materialien zur Universitätsgeschichte, sec. 1, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1999), xxxii–xxxiii.

[13] *CPR*, A832–51/B860–79.

[14] Johann Heinrich Lambert, *Anlage zur Architektonic, oder Theorie des Einfachen und des Ersten in der philosophischen und mathematischen Erkenntniß* (Riga: Hartknoch, 1771).

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courses just mentioned finds a corresponding, ample exposition in the *Critique of Pure Reason.*[15]

Although Kant never referred to the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a textbook for logic and metaphysics, at a certain point things actually took that direction. Despite the fact that the elderly Kant did not seem interested any longer in the enterprise, his disciple Karl Ludwig Poerschke actually used the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a textbook for both logic and metaphysics. An examination of the *Lecture Catalogues* of the University of Königsberg shows that in the summer of 1788, in the winter of 1788–89 and in the summer of 1795, Poerschke announced courses upon "the book of the excellent scholar Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (*Librum Viri Excellentissimi Kant, Critic der reinen Vernunft*)."[16] In the summer of 1798 Poerschke also announced courses upon "Criticam rationis purae ad *Beckium*," this time following the commentary in three volumes of Jacob Sigismund Beck.[17] Being a nontenured professor, Poerschke also felt the need to teach institutional logic and metaphysics. From the summer of 1788 until the summer of 1795 he read metaphysics following the second part of Johann August Heinrich Ulrich's textbook of logic and metaphysics (this was the first textbook of logic and metaphysics which considered the transcendental philosophy).[18] In the winter of 1789–90

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[15] In Kant's *Enzyklopädienachschrift* as well as in his *Reflexionen über die Logik*, in his *Vorlesungen über die Logik*, and in his *Vorlesungen über die Anthropologie*, there are relevant correspondences in form and in content with the sections on the "Architectonic of Pure Reason" of the *Critique of Pure Reason*—for example, the passages on the genius working with *cognitio ex datis* and *ex principiis* in the *Enzyklopädievorlesung.* See Kant's *Vorlesungen über die philosophische Enzyklopädie*, in *Kants Gesammelte Schriften: Ausgabe der königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (hereafter "*AK*," given with volume and page number) ed. Gerhard Lehmann (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900–), 29:10; the *Reflexion 1651* in Kant's *Reflexionen über die Logik*, *AK*, 16:65f; the *Nachschrift Blomberg* in Kant's *Vorlesungen über die Logik*, *AK*, 24:53f; the *Nachschrift Busolt* in the *Vorlesungen über die Logik*, *AK*, 24:615; and the *Nachschrift Friedländer*, in Kant's *Vorlesungen über die Anthropologie*, *AK*, 25:557f, with regard to *CPR*, A836/B864.

[16] *Vorlesungsverzeichnisse 1720–1804*, 547, 554, and 630.

[17] *Vorlesungsverzeichnisse 1720–1804*, 665. See Jakob Sigismund Beck, *Erläuternder Auszug aus den critischen Schriften des Herrn Prof. Kant auf Anrathen desselben* (Riga: Hartknoch, 1793–6).

[18] *Vorlesungsverzeichnisse 1720–1804*, 547, 560, 566, 572, 578, 584, 607, 618, 654, and 665. See Johann August Heinrich Ulrich, *Institutiones Logicae et Metaphysicae* (Jena: Crocker, 1785).

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Poerschke changed textbooks and began to read the part on logic out of Ludwig Heinrich von Jakob's thoroughly Kantian textbook of logic and metaphysics.[19] From the summer of 1796 onwards Poerschke used Jakob's textbook for metaphysics too.[20]

On the contrary, the logic textbook edited by Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche with the explicit subtitle "a handbook for courses," which Kant reluctantly allowed to be published for the so called "general logic," proved to be a complete failure as a textbook.[21] In Königsberg it was used only four times: in the summer of 1801 by the editor, Jäsche, who left Königsberg a few months later, and by Kant's former *amanuensis* Johann Friedrich Lehmann, who used it also in the winter of 1801–02 and in the winter of 1802–03. However, in the summer of 1803 Lehmann went back to reading Jakob's handbook.[22] After that, no one in Königsberg read Kant's textbook on "general logic." The main reason for this collective refusal very probably was due to the perception that Kant's logic textbook, although "Kantian" in its essence, was not "critical" enough. The *Jäsche-Logik*, in fact, exhibits positions Kant held long before beginning to work at the *Critique of Pure Reason* and it gives very scarce clues for a better understanding of the distinction between general and transcendental logic. The "Kantian" textbooks of the eighties, starting with those of Ulrich and Jakob, were incomparably more modern. Evidently, the students and the learned public desired to be taught and informed on the newest developments originated by the *Critique of Pure Reason* in the fields of logic and metaphysics.

III

Kant on General Logic.[23] By identifying under "analytic" and "dialectic" the two largest parts of his masterpiece on theoretical philos-

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[19] *Vorlesungsverzeichnisse 1720–1804*, 566. See Ludwig Heinrich von Jakob, *Grundriss der allgemeinen Logik* (Halle: Hemmerde, 1788); Jakob, *Grundriss der allgemeinen Logik und kritische Anfangsgründe der allgemeinen Metaphysik* (Halle: Hemmerde und Schwetschke, 1791).

[20] *Vorlesungsverzeichnisse 1720–1804*, 654.

[21] Immanuel Kant, *Logik: Ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen*, ed. G. B. Jäsche (Königsberg: Nicolovius, 1800); *AK*, 9:1–150.

[22] *Vorlesungsverzeichnisse 1720–1804*, 699, 704, 715, and 720.

[23] See *CPR*, A50–5/B74–9.

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ophy, Kant evidently chose to stay within the path of modern logic. With some reason, because, as a matter of fact, modern logic was in no way purely formal. Giorgio Tonelli observed once:

> It must be kept in mind that our time's view of logic, as formal logic, or as symbolic logic, was completely foreign to philosophy until the beginning of the nineteenth century. Certainly, the elements of logic now called formal were studied, and some logicians also developed a symbolic approach: but the point is that logic was never dissociated from the methodological consideration of the *substance* of thought, that is, from subjects which we assign today to the theory of knowledge, and from others as well.[24]

The increased knowledge we now have of the conditions under which logical literature was produced requires a careful reassessment. In order to understand the proper goal of Kant's works, it is necessary to consider not only the debates on given problems, but also the conditions of teaching in high schools and universities, without forgetting the development of literary genres such as dissertations, treatises, handbooks, programs, drafts, and notebooks.

How did a German philosopher, writing on logic in the last decades of the Age of Enlightenment, for example, Immanuel Kant, place himself within the tradition of modern logic? Which tradition would he have envisaged? It was the tradition of both modern Aristotelianism and modern Ciceronianism combined with Ramism, Cartesianism, and Wolffianism. One must refer especially to the renewed interpretation of the Analytic by Jacopo Zabarella and Cornelius Martini, combined with the conversion of logic into dialectic by Rudolf Agricola, Philipp Melanchthon, and Petrus Ramus, and take into account, of course, the modernization of the theory of ideas reintroduced by Marsilius Ficinus and developed further by Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, and—last but not least—Georg Friedrich Meier.

Transcendental Logic as a Special Logic.[25] One did not need to wait for Tonelli to see the ambivalence of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* between logic and metaphysics, and to conclude that transcendental logic would have to be seen as the first of the special logics for the generality of its object. The first premise is: transcendental logic differs only slightly from general logic, but in its core; the former has no object at all, the latter has an object, a very general one, but always

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[24] Tonelli, *Kant's* Critique, 2f.
[25] *CPR*, A55–7/B79–82

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an object, since it deals with "the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*."[26] The second premise is: there could be "a logic in which we do not abstract from the entire content of knowledge."[27] The conclusion is: this special logic, which contains "solely the rules of the pure thought of an object" and also treats "of the origin of the modes in which we know objects, in so far as that origin cannot be attributed to the objects,"[28] is transcendental logic.[29] This is my interpretation of the issue. Richard Velkley has proposed a different interpretation in terms of intentionality, arguing that the "study of thinking with concepts (conceiving)," is common to both formal and transcendental logic, but, since the "I think" is the ground of every conceiving, the primacy of transcendental logic over formal logic is justified in as far as the former "studies the conditions which make formal logic possible."[30] In this context, though, I do not need to enter into the famous discussion between Kemp-Smith[31] and Paton[32] on the reciprocal preeminence of general and transcendental logic,[33] because my question is fundamentally about Kant's ambivalence towards logic and metaphysics.

Kant's Development. In addition to Norbert Hinske and many others, Kuno Fischer, Karl Vorländer, and Giorgio Tonelli have distinguished some principal phases in the development of Kant's thought. Fischer tried to periodize this development according to the main influences Kant was exposed to.[34] After the rationalistic beginnings of the forties and fifties, when he appeared to follow Knutzen and Teske discussing Newton, Leibniz, Wolff, and Crusius, Kant in the sixties appeared to have turned to empiricism by considering Locke; by reading

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[26] *CPR*, B25

[27] *CPR*, A55/B80

[28] *CPR*, A55/B80

[29] Pozzo, *Problem einer Einleitung*, 179.

[30] Velkley, "Primacy and Limits," 152–3.

[31] Kemp-Smith, *Commentary to Kant*, 181–7.

[32] Herbert J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience: A Commentary on the First Half of the* 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft.' (London: Allen & Unwin, 1936), 1:187–242.

[33] See Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Harry J. Gensler, "Logic and the First Critique," *Kant-Studien* 76 (1985): 276–87; Velkley, "Primacy and Limits," 147–62; Pozzo, *Problem einer Einleitung*, 179–185.

[34] Kuno Fischer, *Immanuel Kant und seine Lehre*, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, vols. 4 and 5 (Heidelberg: Winter, 1909–10), 4:147.

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Rousseau he would have become aware of the depths of the human feelings and eventually, in 1769, having perceived "the great light" spreading from Hume's writings, he would have seen the need of going to work on the project of that "completely new science" he called transcendental philosophy.

Karl Vorländer's two biographies, periodized along the steps of Kant's academic career, threw new light on the context of the philosopher's sources.[35] A further renewal was accomplished by Giorgio Tonelli when he pleaded for an approach to Kant under the perspective of the "sociology of knowledge," aiming at nothing less than "a possibly complete reconstruction of the sources and the context of the studied thought."[36] Indeed, Tonelli succeeded in producing evidence to show the livelihood of Aristotelian philosophy in Königsberg during the thirties and forties of the eighteenth century, that is, the decades during which Kant attended school and university.[37] Finally, Norbert Hinske, foretelling the results of his *Kant-Index*,[38] set forth the analysis of the terminology recorded by Kant's university courses as the closest recorded approach to Kant's development.[39]

Returning to Kant within the tradition of modern logic and metaphysics, several approaches are available, each one, however, having advantages and disadvantages. In his major work, *Kant's* Critique of Pure Reason *within the Tradition of Modern Logic: A Commentary on its History*, Tonelli took up the problem of finding out motivations and sources from the history of concepts such as *organon*, *canon*,

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[35] Karl Vorländer, *Kants Leben*, Philosophische Bibliothek, vol. 126, ed. Rudolf Malter (Hamburg: Meiner, 1974); Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant: Der Mann und das Werk*, ed. Rudolf Malter (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977).

[36] Giorgio Tonelli, *Elementi metodologici e metafisici in Kant dal 1745 al 1768: Saggio di sociologia della conoscenza*, Studi e ricerche di storia della filosofia, vol. 29 (Turin: Edizioni di Filosofia, 1959), v, x.

[37] Giorgio Tonelli, "Conditions in Königsberg and the Making of Kant's Philosophy," in *Bewusst sein: Gerhard Funke zu eigen*, ed. A. A. Bucher, H. Drüe, and T. Seebohm (Bonn: Bouvier, 1975), 126–44.

[38] Norbert Hinske, *Kant-Index*, vol. 6: *Stellenindex und Konkordanz zur 'Logik Pölitz'*, Forschungen und Materialien zur deutschen Aufklärung, sect. 3, vol. 10:1/2 (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1995).

[39] Norbert Hinske, "Kants neue Terminologie und ihre alten Quellen: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der elektronischen Datenverarbeitung im Felde des Begriffsgeschichte," *Kant-Studien* 65 (1974): 68–85; Hinske, "Kant by Computer: Applications of Electronic Data Processing in the Humanities," in *Estudios de historia de la logica*, ed. Ignacio Angelelli and Angel d'Ors (Pamplona: Eunate, 1990), 193–211.

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discipline, and *doctrine*, which caused Kant to incline for the rather peculiar partitioning of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[40] Tonelli's immense knowledge satisfies the reader in everything but one point, his being forced to make recourse to the tentative dating established by Erich Adickes[41] and Gerhard Lehmann[42] respectively for Kant's *Reflections* and for his students' *Notebooks*.[43] Lothar Kreimendahl's brilliant reconstruction of Kant's encountering Hume on the eve of the seventies has met with the same difficulty.[44] Establishing these datings represents in fact a major task. Elfriede Conrad for instance, has convincingly suggested in her dissertation that the whole system constructed by Adickes on the basis of "position identifiers" for the dating of every reflection noted by Kant in the pages of his own copy of Georg Friedrich Meier's *Summary of the Doctrine of Reason* should be postponed by about twelve months. In fact, Kant most probably began to read Meier's *Summary* in the winter of 1756–7 and not, as assumed by Adickes, in the winter of 1755–6.[45] For many years Norbert Hinske has been pointing out the considerable problems connected to Kant's logical *corpus*, divided as it is in reflections, notebooks, a few short publications (the *Announcement of His Courses for the Winter of 1765–66* and the *False Subtlety*), and the printed textbook edited by Jäsche,[46] together with the corresponding sections of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[47] One could as well, then, give up the idea of making recourse to any dating at all, confining oneself to the interpretation of a relevant problematic context of Kant's logic and at-

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[40] Tonelli, *Kant's* Critique, 92–190.

[41] In his edition of Kant, *Reflexionen über die Logik*, *AK*, 16 (1914).

[42] In his edition of Kant, *Vorlesungen über die Logik*, *AK*, 24 (1966).

[43] For a description of the transcripts of Kant's *Lectures on Logic*, see the translator's introduction by J. Michael Young, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), xxiii–xxvii.

[44] Lothar Kreimendahl, *Kant: Der Durchbruch von 1769* (Köln: Dinter, 1990).

[45] Conrad, *Kants Logikvorlesungen*, 71, and 146–54.

[46] Terry Boswell, *Quellenkritische Untersuchungen zum Kantischen Logikhandbuchs* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1991), 107, 131.

[47] Norbert Hinske, "Prolegomena zu einer Entwicklungsgeschichte des Kantschen Denkens: Erwiderung auf Lothar Kreimendahl," in *De Christian Wolff à Louis Lavelle. Métaphysique et histoire de la philosophie: Recueil en hommage à Jean École à l'occasion de son 75e anniversaire*, Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 39, ed. Robert Theis and Claude Weber (Hildesheim: Olms, 1995), 102–21.

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tacking it with some exemplary question related to us by the tradition of modern logic. With this approach in mind, I selected the passages concerning the introduction to logic and looked for an answer to all four questions (*de natura*, *de subjecto*, *de fine*, and *de divisione*) asked by Zabarella in his famous writing of 1578, *On the Nature of Logic* (*De natura logicae*).[48] Yet this is in no way a neutral procedure. It means working *per synthesin* rather than *per analysin*. The fact of working from the point of view of the history of the problems (*Problemgeschichte*) justifies nevertheless some approximation concerning the history of the development.[49]

I am convinced that it has now become possible to trace an innovative perspective, with respect also to Tonelli and Hinske, by contrasting the usual image we have of Kant as a reader of other philosophers, such as Newton, Locke, Rousseau, and Hume, with whom he feels connected by spiritual ties, with the less usual image of Kant as a student attending courses and studying textbooks, or as a teacher forced to either choose someone else's textbook or write a new one himself.

IV

Analytic and Dialectic as Preliminaries to Logic and Metaphysics.[50] According to Tonelli,[51] Kant shows a conspicuous tendency to differentiate the new philosophical concepts he introduced by avoiding the fashionable Wolffian terminology and going back to the traditional Aristotelian terminology. The latter proved advantageous because it was unusual and at the same time because of the authority provided by its antiquity. The distinction between the Aristotelian and the Kantian understanding of the concepts, concluded Tonelli, was striking enough to prevent confusion between same words—for example, category, analysis, and synthesis—and different concepts.

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[48] Jacobo Zabarella, "De natura logicae," in *Opera logica*, ed. Wilhelm Risse (Hildesheim: Olms, 1966), 1–102.

[49] Pozzo, *Problem einer Einleitung*, v.

[50] *CPR*, A57–64/B82–8.

[51] Giorgio Tonelli, "Der historische Ursprung der kantischen Termini 'Analytik' und 'Dialektik'," *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 7 (1962): 139.

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The pair of concepts analytic and dialectic is particularly interesting for my argument because in the *Introduction: Idea of a Transcendental Logic* Kant placed it in parallel with general and transcendental logic. The parallelism is made explicit in the titles of the last two paragraphs of that section: (a) "On the division of general logic in analytic and dialectic;" (b) "On the division of transcendental logic in analytic and dialectic."

In his paper on the history of analytic and dialectic, Tonelli indicated that the partitioning of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, "was undoubtedly undertaken according to the model of Joachim Georg Darjes."[52] This was an obviously mistaken source attribution, according to Hinske in his commemoration of Tonelli, since Kant was certainly exposed to this distinction in the handbook of logic he used every week, that is, in section 6 of Meier's *Summary of the Doctrine of Reason*.[53] My suggestion was to look for an even more obvious source, namely the scholarly trend in Königsberg, where strong remnants of the local Aristotelianism still shone on the academic scene. Until the winter of 1729–30 Johann David Kypke, one of the teachers Kant had while he was studying philosophy at the Albertina, announced his courses on logic following Aristotelian usages as a twofold *collegium dialecticum-analyticum*.[54] Furthermore we are entitled to believe that Kant was acquainted with the Aristotelian distinction as a boy, because the textbook of logic commissioned by the King of Prussia for the *Fridericianum* (the King's School in Königsberg) had been written by the Aristotelian Paul Rabe with this title: *Dialectic and Analytic: The Most Useful Two Horse-carriage of the Sciences, Highly Necessary to All Who Tend to a Solid Scholarship*.[55] Kant could have been taught, then, that the dialectical part of logic had to be considered as an art, a ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικὴ, a productive habit according to true reason, whose direct

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[52] Tonelli, "Analytik und Dialektik," 135, 139. See Johann Georg Darjes, *Introductio in artem inveniendi seu logicam* (Jena: Buch, 1742), praecognita, sec. 212.

[53] Norbert Hinske, "In memoriam Giorgio Tonelli: 10.6.1928–28.4.1978," *Kant-Studien* 69 (1982): 247–51, translated in Tonelli, *Kant's* Critique, 27–34. See Georg Friedrich Meier, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre* (Halle: Hemmerde, 1752), 2.

[54] Riccardo Pozzo, "Catalogus Praelectionum Academiae Regiomontanae 1709–1804," *Studi Kantiani* 4 (1991): 174. See *Vorlesungsverzeichnisse 1720–1804*, 62; see also 56.

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goal (*finis cuius*) is opinion (δόξα) or generally accepted opinions (ἔνδοξα) and whose indirect goal (*finis cui*) is the student, who needs reason (λογοῦ δεόμενος).[56] Concerning the analytical part, Rabe maintained it was a science, a ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, a demonstrative habit, whose direct goal (*finis cuius*) is truth (ἀλήθεια) and whose indirect goal (*finis cui*) the student who has already been taught (πεπαιδευμένος).[57]

Canon and Organon. The connection between general and transcendental logic, on the one hand, and analytic and dialectic, on the other, implies the mediation of a third pair of concepts, that of "canon" and "organon." The text of *Reflection 1602* is quite explicit: "*General* Logic considered as *Canon* is analytic (of common understanding), as *organon* it is dialectic."[58] A passage in the *Notebook Pölitz* (which goes back to an archetype datable shortly before or after the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason*)[59] states moreover that, "Logic as Canon is a science, though logic as Organon is an art."[60] For these terminological choices Kant bore in mind section 1 of Meier's *Summary*, which defined logic as: "The Doctrine of Reason or the Art of Reason [*logica, philosophia instrumentalis, philosophia rationalis*],"[61] but he could not forget the lesson of the local Aristotelians: analytic is a general science concerned with formal truth, dialectic is a special art concerned with opinion. Everything going beyond these goals does not belong to general logic: "But further than this logic cannot go. It has no touchstone for the discovery of such error as concerns not the form but the content."[62] Here the field of special logics begins, and particularly of the most general among them, transcendental logic.

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[55] Riccardo Pozzo, "Catalogus," 175. See Paul Rabe, *Dialectica et Analytica: Scientiarum biga utilissima, omnibusque ad solidam Eruditionem contendentibus maxime necessaria: In Usum Scholae Novae Regiae, Regiomonti Prussorum, Sacra Regia Majestate in Prussia, Clementissime Fundatae atque Confirmatae, Scientifica Methodo Adornata, & Brevissimis, sed Luculentis atque Perspicuis, Aphorismis Comprehensa* (Berlin: Schlechtiger, 1703).

[56] Rabe, *Dialectica et Analytica*, 1:1–7.

[57] Rabe, *Dialectica et Analytica*, 2:1–9.

[58] *AK*, 16:32—dated by Adickes to 1769–70

[59] Hinske, *Kant-Index*, 1.

[60] *AK*, 24:505. See Pozzo, *Problem einer Einleitung*, 51.

[61] Meier, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 1.

[62] *CPR*, A60/B84

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The borderlines, however, were very thin, even for Kant. The *Notebook Pölitz* contains an important parallel between general and transcendental logic. After having dealt with the six perfections of knowledge (amplitude, quantity, truth, clearness, certainty, and practicality) exposed by Meier in the first section of the *Summary of the Doctrine of Reason*,[63] Kant tells his students that one can also interpret these perfections by means of the categories of transcendental logic, "The logical perfection of knowledge is considered according to four chapters: (1) according to quantity, when it is general; (2) according to quality, when it is distinct; (3) according to relation, when it is true; (4) according to modality, when it is certain."[64]

The Role Played by the Repetitoria. The passage I just quoted is particularly important because of its Latin repetition, which in the *Notebook Pölitz* appears transcribed on the margin.[65] This repetition was not dictated by Kant in his lecture room, but in a separate seminar, called *Repetitorium*, for which a supplemental fee was required. In fact, Kant, as was the case for most of his colleagues, used to work out finely polished Latin definitions which he kept for his best students and especially for those better off among them.[66]

Here lies the key to the understanding of this last aspect of Kant within the tradition of modern logic with which I would like to conclude this paper. Because of the *Repetitoria* Kant was compelled to be constantly ready to repeat his most impressive thoughts in Latin. Kant repeated or translated everything which could suit him, but eventually he translated his own speech, and this explains the difficulty encountered by those who try to look for direct sources for Kant's Latin passages.

A third quotation of the *Notebook Pölitz* may be useful to illustrate this procedure of foreign-acceptance and self-translation. After having defined several times the logic in vernacular, Kant repeated his definition in Latin: "logic is the science of the general rules of usage of understanding and reason (*Logica est scientia regularum vniversalium usus intellects et rationis*)."[67] It is not difficult to find out no

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[63] Meier, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 1.

[64] *AK*, 24:517

[65] *Nachschrift Pölitz*: "Perfectio logica consistit 1) respectu quantitates in vniversalitate. 2) qualitatis in perspicuitate. 3) relationis in veritate. 4) modalitatis in necessitate"; Kant, *Vorlesungen über die Logik*, *AK*, 24:517.

[66] Pozzo, "Catalogus," 179–82.

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less than five sources referred to by Kant putting together this definition: (a) Usage (*Gebrauch*) is in the title of Wolffs *German Logic*, "Rational thoughts upon the forces of human understanding and their correct *usage* in knowing truth" (*Vernünfftige Gedancken von den Kräfften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkäntniss der Wahrheit*);[68] (b) science (*scientia*) is also found in Wolff, sec. 61 in the preliminary discourse of the *Latin Logic*, "Logic is said to be what we until now define as the science of directing the faculty of knowing in knowing the truth" (*Logica dicitur: quod adeo definimus per scientiam dirigendi facultatem cognoscitivam in cognoscenda veritate*);[69] (c) a science of the rules (*eine Wissenschaft, welche die Regeln*) is part of the definition of logic in sec. 1 of Meier's *Summary*, "The doctrine of reason or the art of reason . . . *is a science dealing with the rules* of philosophical knowledge and speech" (*Die Vernunftlehre oder die Vernunftkunst . . . ist eine Wissenschaft, welche die Regeln der gelehrten Erkentniss und des gelehrten Vortrages abhandelt*);[70] (d) the coupling of "understanding and reason" (*intellectus et ratio*) is very frequent in the *Acroasis logica* of Baumgarten;[71] (e) but the largest part of Kant's definition apparently goes back to the *Doctrine of Reason* of Hermann Samuel Reimarus, "a science of the correct usage of reason . . . to use reason means to apply the general rules of reason (*eine Wissenschaf von dem richtigen Gebrauche der Vernunft . . . Die Vernunft zu gebrauchen heisset: die allgemeinen Regeln der Vernunft . . . an*[*zu*]*wenden*)."[72]

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[67] *AK*, 24:505.

[68] Christian Wolff, *Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit*, Christian Wolff, Gesammelte Werke, sec. 1, vol. 1, ed. Hans Werner Arndt (Hildesheim: Olms, 1978).

[69] Christian Wolff, *Philosophia rationalis sive logica*, Christian Wolff, Gesammelte Werke, sec. 2, vol. 1, ed. Jean Ecole (Frankfurt: Renger, 1740), 30.

[70] Meier, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, 1.

[71] Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Acroasis logica in Christianum L. B. de Wolff*, Christian Wolff, *Gesammelte Werke*, sec. 3, vol. 5. (Hildesheim: Olms, 1983).

[72] Hermann Samuel Reimarus, *Vernunftlehre als eine Anweisung zum richtigen Gebrauche der Vernunft in dem Erkenntnisse der Wahrheit, aus zwei ganz natürlichen Regeln der Einstimmung und des Widerspruchs hergeleitet* (Hamburg: Bohn, 1756), 17, and 36.

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One can only welcome the occasion when institutional usages force a philosopher to look for a clearer terminology by addressing himself to the sources provided by the authors he knows best. Though the last choice was Kant's own, it placed him within the tradition of modern logic. Particularly, the *Introduction: Idea of a Transcendental Logic*, if one accepts the hypothesis that Kant planned it as an academic program, gives evidence for Kant's constant preoccupation of giving to his contemporaries a presentation of his philosophy according to a terminology they could understand. Kant's distinction between general and transcendental logic provides us with the most crucial case-study. In conclusion, one would say that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is indeed a book on the theory of knowledge containing many metaphysical sections as well as logical ones. What has been delineated so far proves beyond any doubt that Kant had no double life, that is, he did not divide himself in order to meet the expectations of his colleagues in the *République des Lettres* and the needs of his students. He tried to meet both of them, and for this reason, at sometime during the seventies, he prepared an academic program; but he was eventually forced to acknowledge that the *Critique of Pure Reason* was far too difficult to be taught in a classroom, he gave up the idea of adopting the *Critique* as a textbook, and he no longer had a need to publish a program.[73]

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