Philosophy as Rigorous Science*

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From its first beginnings philosophy has claimed to be rigorous science, and in fact to be the science that satisfies the highest theoretical needs and enables, in an ethico-religious respect, a life governed by pure rational norms. This claim has been made sometimes with more, at others with less energy, but has never been completely abandoned. Not even at those times when interests in and capacities for pure theory were in danger of atrophying, or religious powers stifled the freedom of theoretical inquiry.

In no epoch of its development has philosophy been able to satisfy the claim to be rigorous science. Not even in the last epoch, which despite all the variety and contrariety of its philosophical trends has proceeded in an essentially unitary line of development from the Renaissance to the present. Admittedly, it is precisely the prevailing ethos of modern philosophy that, instead of surrendering naively to the philosophical drive, it wants to constitute itself as rigorous science by means of critical reflection, in ever more penetrating inquiries into method. Yet the only mature fruit of these efforts was the founding and the gain in independence of the rigorous natural and human sciences, as well as of the new purely mathematical disciplines. Philosophy itself, in the special sense that only now came to be distinguished, still lacked the character of rigorous science as much as ever. Even the sense of this distinction remained without scientifically secure determination. How philosophy is related to the natural and human sciences, whether that which is specifically philosophical about its work, essentially related as it is to nature and spirit,

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requires principially new attitudes with which principially peculiar goals and [290]
methods are given, thus whether that which is philosophical leads us, as it were, into a new dimension or plays itself out on one and the same plane as the empirical sciences of nature and of the life of spirit—all that has remained controversial to this day. This shows that not even the proper sense of philosophical problems has been scientifically clarified.

Thus philosophy, by its historical intention the highest and most rigorous of all sciences, philosophy, which defends the inalienable claim of mankind to pure and absolute knowledge (and what is inextricably one with that: the claim to pure and absolute valuing and willing), is incapable of giving itself the form of actual science. The called preceptress in the eternal work of humanity is not at all capable of teaching: of teaching in an objectively valid way. Kant loved to say that one cannot learn philosophy but only to philosophize. What is that if not an admission of the unscientific character of philosophy? As far as science, actual science, reaches, that is how far one can teach and learn, and everywhere in the same sense. Nowhere is scientific learning, after all, a passive reception of material foreign to the mind; everywhere it is based on self-activity, on an inner re-production, in accordance with grounds and consequences, of the rational insights gained by creative minds. One cannot learn philosophy because there are no such objectively comprehended and justified insights here, which is to say, because there is still a lack here of problems, methods, and theories that have been delimited in a conceptually definitive way and whose sense has been fully clarified.

I am not saying that philosophy is an imperfect science; I am saying quite simply that it is still not a science, that it has yet to begin as science, when measured by the standard of whether it possesses a piece, even if a small one, of objectively justified theoretical doctrinal content. All sciences are imperfect, even the much admired exact sciences. On the one hand, they are incomplete, they are faced with the infinite horizon of open problems that will never again let the drive for knowledge rest; on the other hand, they have a number of defects in the doctrinal content they have already developed, remnants of a lack of clarity or perfection appear here and there in the systematic order of proofs and theories. But however that may be, doctrinal content is on hand, growing and branching out ever farther. No rational man will doubt the objective truth, or the objectively justified probability, of the wonderful theories of mathematics and the natural sciences. Here there is—by and large—no room [291]
for private "opinions," "views," or "standpoints." Insofar as there are indeed such in some part of a science, that science has not yet become a science, but is a science in the making and will generally be judged as such.[1]

1. Needless to say, I am not thinking here of the disputed questions in the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of nature, since, considered precisely, they do not concern merely isolated points of doctrinal content, but rather the "sense" of the entire scien-

Now the imperfection of philosophy is of a completely different kind than that of all the sciences just described. It does not merely have a doctrinal system at its disposal that is incomplete and imperfect in one respect or another, but has none whatsoever. Anything and everything is controversial here; every position-taking is a matter of individual conviction, of a view advocated by a school, or of a "standpoint."

What the world's literature of scientific philosophy has offered us in ancient and modern times in the way of projects may well be based on serious, even immense work of spirit; what is more, it may to a large extent prepare the way to the future establishment of scientifically rigorous doctrinal systems; but for the time being nothing in them can be accepted as a fund of philosophical science, and there is no prospect of, so to speak, cutting out a piece of philosophical doctrine here and there with the shears of critique.

This conviction must once again be expressed brusquely and honestly, and precisely here, at the inauguration of *Logos*, which intends to bear witness to a significant revolution in philosophy and to prepare the ground for the future "system" of philosophy.

For with the brusque emphasis on the unscientific character of all former philosophy the question immediately arises as to whether philosophy still wants to continue holding on to the goal of being rigorous science, whether it can want it and must want it. What is the new "revolution" to mean to us? Perhaps the turn away from the idea of rigorous science? And what is the "system" to mean to us for which we yearn, which as ideal is to light the way in the depths of our inquiring work? A philosophical "system" in the traditional sense; as it were, a Minerva that springs already completed and armed from the head of a creative genius—in order then in later times to be preserved in the silent museum of history alongside other such Minervas? Or a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the colossal preparatory work of generations, actually begins from below with an indubitable foundation and rises up like any sound edifice, wherein stone is set upon stone, each as solid as the other, in accordance with guiding insights? On this question minds and paths must part. [292]

The "revolutions" that are decisive for the progress of philosophy are those in which the claim of preceding philosophies to be science crumbles under a critique of their supposedly scientific procedure, and now the fully conscious will

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tific achievement of the disciplines. Those questions can and must remain distinct from the disciplines themselves, just as they are, to be sure, matters of complete indifference to most representatives of the latter. Perhaps in connection with the name of any science the word 'philosophy' means a genus of investigations that provide that science, so to speak, with a new dimension and thereby its ultimate completion. Yet the word 'dimension' indicates at the same time that rigorous science remains science, doctrinal content remains doctrinal content, even when the transition into this new dimension still has yet to be made. [291]

to form, in a radically new way, philosophy in the sense of rigorous science is the will that guides and determines the order of the works. All the energy of thought is at first focused on achieving, through systematic considerations, decisive clarity on the conditions of rigorous science, which have been naively overlooked or misunderstood by former philosophy, in order then to attempt the new construction of an edifice of philosophical doctrine. Such a fully conscious will to rigorous science dominates the Socratic-Platonic revolution in philosophy and likewise the scientific reactions against Scholasticism at the beginning of modernity, especially the Cartesian revolution. The latter's impulse passes to the great philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; it is renewed with the most radical power in Kant's critique of reason and still dominates Fichte's philosophizing. Again and again inquiry is directed to the true beginnings, the decisive formulations of the problems, and the right methods.

It is only in romantic philosophy that a shift occurs. However much Hegel insists on the absolute validity of his method and doctrine, his system nevertheless lacks the critique of reason that first makes possible the scientific character of philosophy. Connected with this, however, is that Hegel's philosophy, like romantic philosophy in general, acted in the ensuing years in the sense of either a *weakening* or a *falsification* of the drive for the constitution of rigorous philosophical science.

Concerning the tendency towards falsification: with the increase in the strength of the exact sciences, Hegelianism gave rise, as is well known, to reactions as a consequence of which the *naturalism* of the eighteenth century gained an overpowering impetus and with its skepticism, which abandoned [293]
all absolute ideality and objectivity of validity, has determined the worldview and philosophy of recent years.

On the other hand, in the sense of a weakening of the drive to philosophical science: Hegelian philosophy had after-effects due to its doctrine of the relative legitimacy of each philosophy for its time—a doctrine whose sense, of course, differed completely in a system that pretended to absolute validity from the historicistic sense in which the doctrine was adopted by the generations that had lost the belief not only in Hegelian philosophy but in any absolute philosophy whatsoever. With the sudden turn of Hegel's metaphysical philosophy of history into a skeptical historicism, the emergence of the new "*worldview philosophy*" was essentially determined that precisely in our days seems to be spreading rapidly and that, incidentally, judging by its largely antinaturalistic and occasionally even antihistoricistic polemics, by no means wants to be skeptical. However, insofar as it shows itself to be, at least regarding its whole intention and procedure, no longer dominated by that radical will to scientific doctrine that constituted the great march of modern philosophy to Kant, the talk of a weakening of the drive for philosophical science referred specifically to it.

The following expositions are guided by the thought that the highest interests of human culture demand the elaboration of a rigorously scientific philosophy, therefore by the thought that if a philosophical revolution is to prove itself in our time, it must always be animated by the intention to found philosophy anew in the sense of rigorous science. This intention, however, is by no means foreign to the present. It is very much alive precisely within the prevailing naturalism. From the very beginning naturalism has resolutely pursued the idea of a rigorously scientific reform of philosophy and even believed at any given time, both in its earlier and in its modern forms, that it had already realized this idea. Yet all this occurs, considered principially, in a form that is theoretically miscarried from the ground up, a form that thus spells, considered practically, a growing danger for our culture. To subject naturalistic philosophy to a radical critique is an important affair nowadays. What is especially needed in contrast to the merely refuting critique based on consequences is a positive critique of foundations and methods. It alone is suited to maintain undiminished the confidence in the possibility of a scientific philosophy, confidence threatened by the knowledge of the countersensical consequences of a naturalism based on rigorous experiential science. The expositions making up the first part of this treatise are devoted to such positive critique. [294]

Concerning the oft-noted revolution in our age, however, while it does—and that is its right—indeed have an essentially antinaturalistic orientation, under the influence of historicism it seems to want to lead away from the lines of scientific philosophy and into mere worldview philosophy. The second part of this treatise is devoted to a principial discussion of the distinction between these two philosophies and a consideration of the relative legitimacy of each.

Naturalistic Philosophy

Naturalism is a consequence of the discovery of nature, of nature in the sense of a unity of spatiotemporal Being subject to exact laws of nature. With the step-by-step realization of this idea in ever newer natural sciences that justify a superabundance of rigorous cognitions, naturalism too spread out ever farther. In much the same way historicism later arose as a consequence of the "discovery of history" and the founding of ever newer human sciences. In keeping with their respective habits of interpretation, the natural scientist is inclined to regard everything as nature, whereas the investigator in the human sciences is inclined to regard everything as spirit, as a historical construct, and thus both thereby misinterpret whatever cannot be so regarded. Hence the naturalist, to focus particularly on him for the moment, sees nothing but nature and first and foremost physical nature. Everything that is is either itself physical, belonging to the unitary nexus of physical nature, or it

is indeed something psychical, but then something changeable that merely depends on the physical, at best a secondary, "parallel accompanying fact." All beings are of a psychophysical nature, that is, univocally determined in accordance with firm laws. Nothing essential to us changes in this interpretation when, in the sense of positivism (whether the variety that relies on a naturalistically interpreted Kant or one that renews and consistently builds on Hume), physical nature is resolved sensualistically into complexes of sensations, into colors, tones, pressures, etc., and by the same token the so-called psychical is also resolved into complementary complexes of the same or still other "sensations."

What characterizes all forms of extreme and consistent naturalism, from popular materialism on down to the most recent sensation-monism and energeticism, is, on the one hand, the *naturalization of consciousness*, including all [295]
intentionally immanent givens of consciousness, and, on the other hand, the *naturalization of ideas* and thus of all absolute ideals and norms.

In the latter respect naturalism cancels itself out, without noticing it. If we take formal logic as an exemplary index of all ideality, then, as is well known, the formal-logical principles, the so-called laws of thought, are interpreted by naturalism as the natural laws of thought. That this involves a countersense of the variety that characterizes every theory that is skeptical in a pregnant sense has been proved in detail elsewhere.[2] One can also subject naturalistic axiology and theory of practice (including ethics), as well as naturalistic practice itself, to a similar radical critique. For theoretical countersense is inevitably followed by countersense (evident inconsistency) in active theoretical, axiological, and ethical conduct. The naturalist is, one can say ultimately, an idealist and objectivist in his conduct. He is filled with the aspiration to bring to knowledge scientifically, thus in a way that binds every rational being, that which is everywhere genuine truth, the genuinely beautiful and good, how it is to be determined in its universal essence, and the method by which is it to be gained in the individual instance. Through natural science and natural scientific philosophy, he believes, the goal is achieved in the main, and with all the enthusiasm to which this awareness gives rise he now takes a stand as teacher and practical reformer for what the natural sciences consider the true, good, and beautiful. Yet he is an idealist who advances and supposedly justifies theories that negate precisely what he presupposes in his idealistic conduct, whether constructing theories or simultaneously justifying and recommending values or practical norms as the most beautiful and the best. Presupposi-

2. See my *Logical Investigations*, vol. I (1900). [*Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik* (1900), ed. Elmar Holenstein, Husserliana XVIII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975), which includes the A (1900) and B (1913) editions; English translation of the latter: *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, in *Logical Investigations*, trans. J. N. Findlay, ed. Dermot Moran, 2 vols. (London: Routledge, 2001), I: 1–161.]

tions, namely, that he makes insofar as he at all theorizes, insofar as he at all objectively asserts values with which valuing is to accord, and likewise at all asserts practical rules by which everyone is to will and to act. The naturalist teaches, preaches, moralizes, and reforms.[3] But he denies what every sermon, every demand as such presupposes by its very sense. Only unlike the ancient skeptic he does not preach *expressis verbis* that the solely rational deed is to deny reason—theoretical, axiological, and practical reason. Indeed, he would even emphatically reject that kind of thing. In his case, the countersense is not [296] out in the open but is concealed from him because he naturalizes reason.

In this respect the dispute is decided objectively, even if the tidal wave of positivism and the pragmatism that outdoes it in relativism were to rise still higher. Of course, precisely in this circumstance it is manifest just how slight the practically effective force of arguments from consequences is. Prejudices are blinding, and whoever sees only experiential facts and inwardly accepts only experiential science will not feel particularly disturbed by countersensical consequences that cannot be shown in experience to be contradictions of facts of nature. He will brush such arguments aside as "Scholasticism." However, arguments from consequences also can all too easily have an undesirable effect in the other direction, namely on those who are receptive to their convincing force. Because naturalism appears to be fully discredited, the naturalism that wanted to form philosophy on the basis of rigorous science and *as* rigorous science, its methodical goal itself now also appears to be discredited, and this all the more so as even among those receptive to such arguments the inclination is also widespread to think rigorous science only as positive science and a scientific philosophy only as one founded on such science. However, that too is only a prejudice, and to want to depart from the line of rigorous science *on that account* would be completely wrong. It is precisely in the energy with which naturalism seeks to realize the principle of rigorous scientificity in all

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3. Haeckel and Ostwald can serve here as exceptional representatives. [Husserl is referring to Ernst Haeckel, the zoologist, Darwinist, and author of the hugely popular *Die Welträthsel* (*The Riddles of the World*), first published in 1899, and the chemist and Nobel laureate Wilhelm Ostwald. Their common cause was what Haeckel termed 'Monism', which regarded only one "substance" as being "common to nature and God," whereas the "dualists" admitted of two. The reformatory impulses of the monists congealed into the German Monist League, which was founded on January 11, 1906 in Jena. Haeckel was only named honorary president of the League due to his age. Ostwald headed the Monist League from 1911 until 1915. See Daniel Gasman, *The Scientific Origins of National Socialism: Social Darwinism in Ernst Haeckel and the German Monist League* (New York: Elsevier, 1971), esp. 20–21. Gasman notes on p. 23 that "the League conceived its work to be the development and fostering of a complete social, cultural, religious, and political program for Germany. 'The German Monist League,' its official program stated, 'desires to be effective on behalf of a unified *Welt- und Lebensanschauung* (world- and life-view) based on natural knowledge,' and it appealed to all segments and social classes of German people, especially those who felt themselves to be free from traditional clerical beliefs and loyalties."] [295]

spheres of nature and of spirit, in theory and in practice, and with which it strives to solve scientifically—in its opinion, after the manner of the "exact natural sciences"—the philosophical problems of Being and value, that its merit and at the same time a major part of its strength lies in our age. In the whole of modern life there is perhaps no idea that is more powerful, whose advance is less resistible than that of science. Nothing can check its triumphant march. It is indeed, in accordance with its legitimate goals, all-encompassing. Thought in ideal completion, it would be reason itself, which could no longer have any authority before or above it. Thus in the domain of rigorous science there certainly also belong all the theoretical, axiological, and practical ideals that naturalism falsifies by reinterpreting them empirically.

However, general convictions mean little if one cannot justify them, hopes for a science mean little if one is incapable of seeing any paths to achieving their goals. Thus if the idea of a philosophy as a rigorous science of the problems designated and all others that are essentially akin to them is not to remain powerless, we must have in view clear possibilities of realizing it; [297]
through clarification of the problems, through immersion in their pure sense, the methods must press towards us with complete clarity, methods that are adequate to such problems because they are required by the very essence of those problems. That is what must be achieved, and thus coincident with it the vitally active confidence in science must be gained and at the same time the actual beginning of science. In this respect the otherwise useful and indispensable refutation of naturalism based on its consequences achieves very little for us. Matters are completely different if we subject its foundations, its methods, and its achievements to the necessary positive and thereby ever principial critique. By distinguishing and clarifying, by compelling one to investigate the proper sense of the philosophical motifs that usually are formulated so vaguely and ambiguously as problems, the critique is suited to awaken ideas of better goals and paths and to further our enterprise positively. In keeping with this intention, we shall discuss in greater detail the character stressed above of the philosophy combated here, namely the *naturalization of consciousness*. The more profound connections will come into view in what follows on their own and likewise the whole expanse in which our second objection concerning the naturalization of ideas is meant and is to be justified will become comprehensible.

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We begin our critical analyses, of course, by attending not to the more popular reflections of philosophizing natural scientists but instead to the scholarly philosophy that comes forward in actually scientific armor. In particular, however, we shall attend to a method and discipline through which this philosophy believes it has finally ascended to the rank of an exact science. It is so

sure of this that it looks down on every other mode of philosophizing with contempt. The other modes of philosophizing, it contends, are related to its exactly scientific philosophizing as the murky philosophy of nature of the Renaissance was related to the youthfully vigorous exact mechanics of a Galileo, or as alchemy to the exact chemistry of a Lavoisier. Now if we ask about this exact, even if still only limitedly developed philosophy, that analog of exact mechanics, we are referred to psychophysical and especially to *experimental psychology*, to which surely no one would want to deny the rank of rigorous science. We are told that it is the exactly scientific psychology that has been sought for so long and that now has finally become deed. Through it logic and epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, and pedagogics have finally gained their scientific foundation; and in fact they are already well on their way to [298]
transforming themselves into experimental disciplines. Furthermore, rigorous psychology is obviously the foundation of all human sciences and no less of metaphysics as well. Concerning the latter, it is admittedly not the preferred foundation, since in the same measure physical natural science too is involved in laying the foundation of this most universal doctrine of actuality.

Now to our objections to the foregoing. First, one must see, as a brief reflection would show, that psychology in general, as a factual science, is not suited to supply foundations for those philosophical disciplines that have to do with the pure principles of all normation, thus with pure logic, pure axiology, and theory of practice. We can spare ourselves a more precise exposition here: it would obviously lead us back to the skeptical countersenses already discussed. However, concerning *epistemology*, which we, of course, separate from pure logic in the sense of the pure *mathesis universalis* (which is not concerned with knowing), much can be said against epistemological psychologism and physicism, of which we shall give a few indications here.

All natural science is naive by virtue of its starting point. The nature into which it wants to inquire is simply there for it. Physical things obviously *exist*, exist as resting, moving, changing in infinite space, and as temporal things in infinite time. We perceive them, we describe them in simple experiential judgments. To know these obvious givens in an objectively valid, rigorously scientific way is the goal of natural science. Much the same holds of nature in the extended, psychophysical sense, or of the sciences inquiring into them, thus especially of psychology. The psychical is not a world of its own; it is given as an ego or egoic lived experience (in a quite different sense, incidentally), and that kind of thing shows itself in experience to be bound to certain physical things called bodies. That, too, is something obviously pregiven. Now the task of psychology is to inquire scientifically into this psychical within the psychophysical nexus of nature in which it obviously exists, to determine with objective validity, to discover the laws of its formation and transformation, of its

coming and going. Every psychological determination is *eo ipso* psycho-physical, namely in the broadest sense (which we shall maintain henceforth) that it has an accompanying physical significance that is never absent. Even where psychology—the experiential science—aims at the determination of mere occurrences in consciousness and not at psychophysical dependencies in the usual, narrower sense, these occurrences are nevertheless thought as belonging to nature, that is, as belonging to human or animal consciousnesses, which in turn have an obvious and co-interpreted connection to human or animal bodies. The exclusion of the relation to nature would deprive the psychical of the character of an objective-temporally determinable fact of nature, in short, of a psychological fact. We stress therefore: Every psychological judgment contains the existential positing of physical nature, whether explicitly or not. [299]

Thus the following is clear: Were there to be decisive arguments that show that physical natural science cannot be philosophy in the specific sense, can never ever serve as a foundation for philosophy, and can gain philosophical value for the purposes of metaphysics only based on a preceding philosophy, then all such arguments would have to be equally applicable to psychology.

Now there is by no means a lack of such arguments.

It suffices to recall the "naiveté" with which, in keeping with what was said above, natural science accepts nature as given, a naiveté that in natural science is, so to speak, immortal and that is repeated, for instance, at every point in its procedure where it has recourse to simple experience—and *every* method of experiential science ultimately leads back precisely to experience. Natural science is, to be sure, after its fashion very critical. Mere individual experience, even if extensive, is worth very little to it. In the methodical arrangement and combination of experiences, in the interplay of experience and thought which has its logically firm rules, valid and invalid experiences are distinguished, each experience obtains its relative degree of validity, and objectively valid knowledge, knowledge of nature, is worked out. Yet however much this kind of critique of experience may satisfy us, as long as we stand *in* natural science and think in its attitude an entirely different critique of experience is still possible and indispensable, a critique that simultaneously places in question the whole of experience as such and the thought proper to experiential science.

How experience as consciousness can give an object or hit it; how experiences can reciprocally legitimate or correct one another, and not only cancel one another out subjectively or reinforce one another subjectively; how a play of experiential-logical consciousness is to mean something objectively valid, something valid for physical things existing in and of themselves; why, so to speak, the playing rules of consciousness are not irrelevant for physical things; how natural science is to be comprehensible in every respect and for everyone insofar as it intends at each step to posit and know nature existing in itself, existing in itself over against the subjective flux of consciousness—all [300]

this becomes a riddle as soon as reflection is seriously directed to these questions. As is well known, epistemology is the discipline that intends to answer such questions, but thus far, despite all the thought that the greatest investigators have devoted to them, it has not answered them in a scientifically clear, univocal, and decisive way.

One need only be rigorously consistent in maintaining the level of this problematic (a consistency that, of course, *every* previous epistemology has lacked) to see the *countersense* of a "natural scientific epistemology" and thus of every psychological epistemology. If, generally speaking, certain riddles are principially immanent in natural science, then their solution in accordance with their premises and results obviously are principially transcendent to it. To expect the solution to each problem that is involved in natural science *as such*—thus is involved in it through and through, from start to finish—from natural science itself, or even simply to believe that it could contribute any *premises* toward the solution of a problem of that kind, would mean to move in a countersensical circle.

It also becomes clear that if an epistemology is to retain its univocal sense, not only must every scientific supposition of nature remain principially excluded, but also every prescientific supposition of the same, and therewith *every* statement that implies *thetic* existential positings of materialities with space, time, causality, etc. This obviously also holds for all existential positings that concern the existence of the inquirer, his psychic capacities, and the like.

Furthermore: Although epistemology wants to inquire into the problems of the relationship between consciousness and Being, it can have Being in view only as a correlate of consciousness, as "what is intended" in consciousness: as what is perceived, remembered, expected, pictorially presented, fantasied, identified, distinguished, believed, supposed, valued, etc. One then sees that inquiry must be aimed at a scientific eidetic knowledge of consciousness, at what consciousness *itself*, by its *essence*, "is" in all its distinguishable formations, but at the same time at what it "*signifies*," as well as at the different ways in which it—in accordance with the essence of these formations (now clearly, now unclearly, now presentiatingly or representiatingly, now signitively or pictorially, now simply, now mediated by thought, now in this or that attentional mode, and so on in innumerable other forms)—intends *something objectual* and perhaps "shows" it to be a "valid," "actual" being. [301]

Every kind of object that is to be the object of rational discourse, of prescientific and then scientific knowledge, must manifest itself in that knowledge, thus in consciousness itself, and allow of being brought, in accordance with the sense of all knowledge, to *givenness*. All kinds of consciousness must allow of being studied in their essential connection and their relation back to the forms of givenness-consciousness belonging to them—just as under the

title of 'knowledge' they are, so to speak, teleologically ordered and, more precisely, grouped in accordance with various object-categories (as the groups of cognitive functions corresponding specifically to them). It is in this way that the sense of the question of legitimacy to be posed to all cognitive acts must be understood, that the essence of well-founded proof of legitimacy and of ideal justifiability or validity must allow of being fully clarified, and in fact for all levels of knowledge, above all for scientific knowledge.

What it means that objectuality *is* and is proved cognitively as being and being-thus, must become evident and hence comprehensible without remainder purely from consciousness itself. And for that the study of the *whole* of consciousness is required, since in *all* of its formations it enters into possible cognitive functions. Yet insofar as every consciousness is a "consciousness of," the eidetic study of consciousness also includes the study of significance and objectuality as such for consciousness. To study some kind of objectuality or other in accordance with its universal essence (a study that can investigate interests far removed from epistemology and the inquiry into consciousness) means to investigate its modes of givenness and to exhaust its eidetic content in the appurtenant processes of "clarification." Even if the orientation here is not the one directed to the modes of consciousness and an inquiry into their essence, the method of clarification nevertheless cannot do without the reflection on the modes of meantness and givenness. But the converse holds at any rate: the clarification of all fundamental kinds of objectualities is indispensable for the eidetic analysis of consciousness and thus is included in the latter; it is even less dispensable, however, in an epistemological analysis, which, of course, finds its task in the investigation of correlations. Thus we sum up all such studies, even though they are to be distinguished relatively, under the title of '*phenomenological* studies'. [302]

We thereby hit upon a science—of whose immense scope our contemporaries still have no idea—that is indeed a science of consciousness but by no means psychology; we hit upon a *phenomenology of consciousness* as opposed to a *natural science of consciousness*. Since it is safe to say that at issue here is in all likelihood not an accidental equivocation, one can expect in advance that phenomenology and psychology have to be very closely related insofar as both have to do with consciousness, even if in different ways, in different "attitudes." What we want to express thereby is that psychology has to do with "empirical consciousness," with consciousness in the experiential attitude, as an existent within the nexus of nature, whereas phenomenology has to do with "pure" consciousness, that is, with consciousness in the phenomenological attitude.

If this is correct, it would follow that, notwithstanding the truth that psychology is and can be philosophy any more than is physical natural science, it nevertheless must for essential reasons be closer to philosophy—

namely, through the medium of phenomenology—and its fate must also be most intimately connected with philosophy. Finally, one could foresee that every psychologistic epistemology must come about because, in missing the genuine sense of the epistemological problematic, it succumbs to a more or less understandable confounding of pure and empirical consciousness, or equivalently: because it "naturalizes" consciousness.

This is indeed my view, and in what follows it will be further elucidated.

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What was just said by way of general indication, and in particular what was said about the close affinity between psychology and philosophy, holds very little, however, of *modern exact psychology*, which is as foreign to philosophy as it possibly can be. Yet no matter how much this psychology may regard itself, on account of its experimental method, as the solely scientific psychology and look down on "armchair psychology"—the opinion that it is *the* psychology, psychological science in the full sense, I must declare to be an aberration with serious consequences. The constant fundamental trait of this psychology is that it brushes aside every direct and pure analysis of consciousness—namely, the "analysis" and "description" to be carried out systematically of the givens that offer themselves in the various possible directions of immanent seeing—in favor of all the indirect specifications of psychological or psychologically relevant facts, which without such an analysis of consciousness have an at least superficially comprehensible sense. For the experimental observation of its psycho-physical regularities it manages with rough class-concepts, such as 'perception', 'fantasy intuition', 'statement', 'calculation' and 'miscalculation', 'estimation of size', 'recognition', 'expectation', 'retention', 'forgetting', etc.; just as, conversely, the fund of such concepts with which it operates delimits the questions it asks and the observations accessible to it. [303]

One can say that experimental psychology is related to originary psychology analogously to how social statistics is related to originary social science. Such a statistics collects valuable facts, discovers in them valuable regularities, though of a quite mediate kind. The interpretive understanding, the actual clarification of them can be carried out only by an originary social science, that is, a social science that brings the sociological phenomena to direct givenness and inquires into them with a view to their essence. In much the same way, experimental psychology is a method of ascertaining possibly valuable psychophysical facts and regularities, but which, without a systematic science of consciousness that inquires immanently into the psychical, lacks any possibility of deeper understanding and definitive scientific value.

Exact psychology does not become aware of the fact that this constitutes a great defect in its procedure, and this even less so the more fervently

it lashes out at the method of self-observation and the more energy it invests in overcoming that *method's* defects through experimental method; yet that would mean overcoming defects of a method that, as can be shown, do not at all come into question for what is to be achieved here. The compulsion of the things, which are precisely psychical ones, proves to be too strong, however, for analyses of consciousness not to be carried out here and there anyway. It is just that these analyses are as a rule marked by a phenomenological naiveté that stands in odd contrast to the indubitable seriousness with which this psychology strives for exactness and also achieves it in many spheres (as long as it remains moderate regarding its goals). It achieves exactness wherever experimental observations concern subjective sensible appearances, whose description and characterization is to be carried out just as in the case of "objective" appearances, namely without drawing in any concepts and clarifications that [304]
lead over into the proper sphere of consciousness. And it also achieves exactness wherever the observations bear on roughly defined classes of the properly psychical, as they sufficiently offer themselves from the start without a deeper analysis of consciousness, provided that one abstains from investigating the properly psychological sense of the observations.

The reason why everything that is radically psychological is missing from the occasional analyses, however, lies in the fact that the sense and method of the work to be achieved here, and at the same time the enormous wealth of differences of consciousness (which for the methodically inexperienced flow indiscriminately into one another), become evident only in a pure and systematic phenomenology. In this way modern exact psychology—precisely because it regards itself already as methodically perfect and rigorously scientific—becomes *de facto* unscientific wherever it investigates the sense of the psychical that enters into psychophysical regularities, that is, wherever it wants to penetrate to an actually psychological understanding; just as, conversely, in all the cases in which the defects of unclarified ideas about the psychical lead one endeavoring to achieve more deeply penetrating knowledge instead to unclear formulations of the problems and thus to merely spurious results. Experimental method is indispensable here, as it is wherever at issue is the specification of intersubjective complexes of facts. But it presupposes what no experiment is able to achieve, the analysis of consciousness itself.

The few psychologists who, like Carl Stumpf, Theodor Lipps, and other men close to them, recognized this defect of experimental psychology, who were able to appreciate the (in the great sense) epoch-making impetus of Franz Brentano, and who then endeavored to carry further his beginnings of an analytically descriptive exploration of intentional lived experiences, either are regarded by the experimental fanatics as not to be taken seriously or else, if they were experimentally active, are valued only in this respect. And again and again they are combated as Scholastics. It will be astonishing enough to future

generations that the first modern attempts to inquire into the immanent seriously and in the solely possible manner of an immanent analysis—or as we say with better insight: an eidetic analysis—could be chided as Scholastic and brushed aside. This occurs for no other reason than that the natural starting point of such investigations lies in the usual linguistic characterizations of the psychical and then, after having immersed oneself in their significations, one asks about the phenomena to which such characterizations refer at first vaguely and equivocally. Certainly, Scholastic ontologism also allows itself to be led [305]
by language (by which I do not mean that all Scholastic inquiry was ontological), but it gets lost in drawing analytic judgments from the significations of words in the opinion that it has thereby gained knowledge of facts. The phenomenological analyst, who does not draw any judgments whatsoever from the word-concepts but looks into the phenomena that language stimulates through the relevant words or immerses himself in the phenomena that make up the fully intuitable realization of experiential concepts, mathematical concepts, etc.—should he *for that reason* also be branded a Scholastic?

One should bear in mind that everything psychical, provided that it is taken in that full concretion in which it has to be the first object of investigation for psychology as well as for phenomenology, has the character of a more or less complex "consciousness of," that this "consciousness of" has a bewildering abundance of formations, that all the expressions that at the outset of the investigation could be of service for self-understanding and objective description are in flux and ambiguous, and that thus the first beginning can obviously be no other than to make clear the roughest equivocations that first become visible. A definitive specification of scientific language would presuppose the complete analysis of the phenomena—a goal that lies in the dim and distant future—and as long as this has not been achieved, the progress made in the investigation also takes, on the face of it, to a considerable extent the form of demonstrations of new ambiguities that have only just become visible, and in fact in the concepts presumably already specified in the foregoing investigations. This is obviously unavoidable because it is rooted in the nature of the things. It is in light of this that one must judge the depth of understanding and the disparaging way in which those called to be guardians of the exactness and scientific character of psychology speak of "merely verbalistic," merely "grammatical" and "Scholastic" analyses.

In the epoch of vigorous reaction against Scholasticism, the battle cry was: "Away with the hollow word-analyses. We must question the things themselves. Back to experience, to intuition, which alone can give our words sense and rational legitimacy." Quite right! But what are the things, then, and what kind of experience is it to which we must return in psychology? Are the things, for instance, the statements we get from test subjects in response to our questions? And is the interpretation of their statements the "experience" of the

psychical? Even the experimentalists will say that that is mere secondary experience; primary experience lies in the test subject himself and, on the side of [306]
the experimenting and interpreting psychologists, in their own, earlier self-perceptions, which for good reasons they contend neither are nor may be self-observations. The experimentalists are not a little proud of the fact that as superior critics of self-observation and of armchair psychology, which—they say—is based exclusively on self-observation, they have developed experimental method in such a way that it uses direct experience only in the form of "accidental, unexpected, unintentionally induced experiences"[4] and excludes disreputable self-observation entirely. If in *one* direction, despite great exaggerations, there doubtless lies some good, this psychology, it seems to me, nevertheless makes a principial mistake in the other direction by asserting that it places the analysis carried out in empathic understanding of others' experiences, as well as the analysis based on one's own initially unobserved lived experiences, on the same level with an experiential analysis (albeit an indirect one) carried out by physical natural science. In this way exact psychology actually believes that it is the experiential science of the psychical in principially the same sense as physical natural science is the experiential science of the physical. It overlooks the specific character of certain analyses of consciousness that must already have been carried out if naive experiences (whether they are observing or non-observing experiences, whether they occur in the framework of an active presence of consciousness or in that of memory or empathy) are to become experiences in a scientific sense.

Let us attempt to clarify this.

The psychologists believe that they owe all their psychological knowledge to experience, thus to those naive memories or instances of empathy in memories, which, by virtue of the methodical arts of the experiment, are to become foundations for experiential inferences. However, the description of what is given in naive experience and, going hand-in-hand with it, the immanent analysis and conceptual grasp of the same follow by means of a fund of concepts whose scientific value is decisive for all subsequent methodical steps. As becomes evident upon some reflection, they remain constantly untouched in the subsequent process due to the very nature of the experimental line of inquiry and method, and consequently themselves become part of the final results, thus also of the pretended scientific experiential judgments. On the other hand, their scientific value cannot be there from the beginning; nor can it come from experiences, no matter how numerous, of the test subject or the [307]
scientist running the experiment; it cannot be gained from any experiential observations whatsoever: And this is where phenomenological eidetic analysis comes in, which, no matter how unusual and uncongenial it may sound to the naturalistic psychologist, in no way is or can be empirical analysis.

4. Concerning this, see Wundt's *Logik* II^2, 170. [Wilhelm Wundt, *Logik. Eine Unter-* [306]

From Locke to this day the conviction—which derives from the history of the development of empirical consciousness and therefore already presupposes psychology—that every conceptual presentation "stems" from earlier experiences is confounded with the completely different conviction that every concept draws the legitimation of its possible use (for instance, in descriptive judgments) from experience; and that means here that only with *regard* to what *actual* perceptions or memories yield can legitimations be found for its validity, for its essentiality or inessentiality, and by extension for its valid applicability in individual cases that are to be predetermined. When describing, we employ the words 'perception', 'memory', 'figment of the imagination', 'statement', etc. What an abundance of immanent components such a single word indicates, components that we "interpretively" insert into what is described without having found them in it analytically! Does it suffice to use these words in the popular sense, in the vague, completely chaotic sense that they have acquired, we know not how, in the "history" of consciousness? And even if we were to know it, of what use to us would this history be, how could it change the fact that the vague concepts are just vague and, by virtue of this very character of theirs, are obviously unscientific? As long as we do not have any better ones, we may use them, confident that for the practical purposes of life sufficient rough distinctions are made with them. But does a psychology have any claim to "exactness" that leaves the concepts that *determine* its objects without scientific specification, without methodical treatment? Of course, just as little as a physics would have that rested content with the everyday concepts of 'heavy', 'warm', 'mass', etc. Modern psychology no longer wants to be the science of the "soul" but of "psychical phenomena." If this is what it wants, then it has to be able to describe and determine these phenomena with conceptual rigor. It has to have acquired the necessary rigorous concepts through methodical work. Where has this rigorous work been carried out in "exact" psychology? We look for it in vain in the vast literature.

The question of how natural, "muddled" experience becomes scientific experience, of how the statement of objectively valid experiential judgments [308] can be achieved, is the cardinal methodological question of every experiential science. It need not be raised and answered *in abstracto* or at any rate not in philosophical purity: Historically it finds its answer through deed, namely in such a way that genial pioneers of experiential science seize *in concreto* and intuitively upon the sense of the necessary experiential method and, by following it purely in an accessible experiential sphere, put a piece of objectively valid experiential determination to work and thus bring about the beginning of science. They owe the motives for their procedure not to any revelation but to their immersion in the *sense* of the experiences themselves, or in the sense

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suchung der Principien der Erkenntnis und der Methoden wissenschaftlicher Forschung, 2 vols. [306] (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 2d, rev. ed., 1893–95), II/2: 170.]

of the "Being" given in them. For although "given," it is given in "vague" experience only "in a muddled way"; hence the question forces itself upon us of how it actually is, how it is to be determined with objective *validity*, how, that is, by means of which better "experiences" and how are they to be bettered—by what method. For the knowledge of external nature the decisive step from naive to scientific experience, from vague everyday concepts to scientific concepts with full clarity, was first made, as is well known, by Galileo. As for the knowledge of the psychical, the sphere of consciousness, we have "experimentally exact" psychology, which regards itself as the completely legitimate counterpart of exact natural science—and yet, however little it is aware of the fact, in substance it is at a stage that lies *before* the epoch of Galileo.

That it is not aware of this may, of course, be surprising. We understand that naive natural history prior to science lacked nothing in the way of natural experience, that is, nothing that could not be brought out in the context of natural experience by means of natural-naive experiential concepts. In its naiveté it had no idea that physical things have a "nature" and that that nature can be determined by certain exact concepts in experiential-logical procedure. However, psychology, with its institutes and precision instruments, with its cleverly devised methods, rightly feels itself to be beyond the stage of the naive experiential science of the soul of ages past. Moreover, there is no lack of its repeatedly renewed reflections on method. How could it fail to notice what is principially most essential of all? How could it fail to notice that it necessarily gives its purely psychological concepts, which it now cannot do without, a content that is not simply taken from what is actually given in experience but [309]
is applied to that given? How could it fail to see that, as soon as it approaches the sense of the psychical, it unavoidably carries out analyses of the contents of these concepts and accepts corresponding phenomenological connections as valid that it applies to experience but that, contrary to experience, are a priori? How could it fail to notice that, if it actually wants to achieve psychological knowledge, presuppositions of experimental method cannot be justified through themselves and that its procedure is cardinally distinguished from that of physics in that the latter excludes the phenomenal principially in order to seek for the nature that is represented in the phenomenal, whereas psychology wants to be a science of the phenomena themselves?

Now all that could and had to escape its notice due to its naturalistic attitude, as well as its eagerness to emulate the natural sciences and to regard experimental method as the main thing. In its arduous, often astute considerations of the possibilities of psychophysical experiments, in outlining experimental procedures, in constructing the finest instruments, in tracking down possible sources of error, etc., it has nevertheless failed to investigate the question of how, by what method, those concepts that enter essentially into psychological judgments can be brought from the state of muddledness to one of

clarity and objective validity. It has failed to consider the extent to which the psychical, rather than being the representation of a nature, has instead its own "essence," which, prior to all psychophysics, is to be inquired into rigorously and with full adequacy. It did not consider what lies in the "sense" of psychological experience, nor what "demands" Being (in the sense of the psychical) places *of itself* on method.

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What has constantly confused empirical psychology from its beginnings in the eighteenth century on is thus the misleading image of a natural scientific method on the example of physicochemical method. One is firmly convinced that, considered in principial generality, the method of all experiential sciences is one and the same, thus that it is the same in psychology as in the science of physical nature. Just as metaphysics suffered for so long from the false imitation now of geometric, now of physical method, the same course of events is repeated in psychology. It is not without significance that the fathers of experimentally exact psychology were physiologists and physicists. True method follows the nature of the things to be inquired into, not our prejudices [310]
and examples. Natural science brings out from the vague subjectivity of physical things in naively sensible appearance objective physical things with exact objective qualities. In the same way, one tells oneself, psychology must bring what is psychologically vague in the naive view to objectively valid determination, and that is achieved by the objective method, which is obviously the same as the method of natural science that has been brilliantly proved by innumerable successes.

Yet how the givens of experience achieve objective determination and what sense 'objectivity' and 'determination of objectivity' each has, what function experimental method can take on in each case—that depends on the ownmost sense of the givens, or on the sense that the relevant experiential consciousness (as an intending of precisely these and no other beings) by its essence attributes to them. To follow the natural scientific *model* means almost inevitably: to reify consciousness, and that entangles one from the beginning in countersense, from which arises ever anew the inclination to pose countersensical problems, to set out in false directions of inquiry. Let us consider this more closely.

Solely the spatiotemporal world of bodies is nature in the pregnant sense. All other individual existence, thus the psychical, is nature in a secondary sense, and that determines fundamentally essential distinctions between natural scientific and psychological method. Principially, corporeal existence alone is experienceable in a multiplicity of direct experiences, thus perceptions, as individually identical. That is why it alone—if the perceptions are thought as distributed among different "subjects"—can be experienced by many subjects

as individually identical and described as intersubjectively the self-same. The same materialities (physical things, processes, etc.) lie before our eyes and can be determined by us all according to their "nature." However, their "nature" means: Presenting themselves in experience in manifoldly changing "subjective appearances," they nevertheless are present as temporal unities of enduring or changing qualities, and they are present as embedded in the nexus that combines them *all*, the nexus of the one world of bodies with its one space and its one time. They are *what* they are only in this unity; only in causal relation to or in combination with one another do they obtain their individual identity (substance) and obtain the latter as the bearer of "real qualities." All materially real qualities are causal. Everything corporeally existent is subject to laws of possible changes, and these laws bear on the identical, the physical thing, not [311]
of itself, but the physical thing in the unitary, actual, and possible nexus of the one nature. Every physical thing has *its* nature (as the ideal concept of *what* it is, *it*: the identical) insofar as it is the unifying point of causalities within the one totality of nature. Real qualities (materially real, corporeal qualities) are a title for possibilities of the change, predelineated by laws of causality, of something identical, which thus can be determined regarding what it is only by recourse to those laws. Materialities, however, are given as unities of immediate experience, as unities of manifold sensible appearances. The sensibly graspable non-changes, changes, and conditions of change provide cognition everywhere with guidance and function for it, as it were, as a "vague" medium in which the true, objective, physically exact nature presents itself and out of which thought (as scientific experiential thought) determines, constitutes the true.[5]

None of that is anything that has been imposed upon the physical things of experience or upon the experience of physical things, but belongs irrevocably to their essence in such a way that every intuitive and consistent inquiry into what the physical thing *in truth* is—the physical thing that as experienced appears constantly as a something, a being, a determinate and at the same time determinable something, but in the fluctuation of its appearances and the appearing circumstances appears again and again as being otherwise—necessarily leads to causal connections and terminates in the determination of corresponding objective qualities as lawful ones. Natural science is thus only consistent in investigating the sense of what the physical thing itself claims, so to speak, to be as experienced, and it calls this, unclearly enough: "exclusion of secondary qualities," "exclusion of the merely subjective in the appearance" while "holding fast to the remaining, the primary qualities." Yet that is more than an unclear expression; it is a bad theory for its good procedure.

5. It should be noted thereby that this medium of phenomenality in which natural scientific intuition and thought constantly move is itself not treated as a scientific theme by the latter. New sciences, psychology (to which belongs a good portion of physiology) and phenomenology, take hold of that theme.

Let us turn now to the "world" of the "psychical" and limit ourselves to the "psychical phenomena" that the new psychology regards as the region of its objects—that is, to begin with let us leave the problems concerning the soul and the ego out of consideration. Is the objectivity proper to "nature" contained, we thus ask, in every perception of the psychical, just as it is contained in the sense of every physical experience and every perception of a physical thing? We soon see that the relationships in the sphere of the psychical are [312] totally different from those in the physical sphere. The psychical is distributed (speaking metaphorically, not metaphysically) among monads that have no windows and communicate with one another only through empathy. Psychical Being, Being as "phenomenon," is principially not a unity that could be experienced in several separate perceptions as individually identical, not even in perceptions by the same subject. In the psychical sphere there is, in other words, no difference between appearance and Being, and if nature is an existence that appears in appearances, then the appearances themselves (which, of course, the psychologist counts among the psychical) are not themselves a Being in turn that appears by means of underlying appearances—as every reflection on the perception of any appearance makes evident. Then it already becomes clear: There is, simply put, only *one* nature, that which appears in the appearances of physical things. Everything that we call a psychical phenomenon in the broadest sense of psychology is, considered in and of itself, precisely phenomenon and *not* nature.

A phenomenon is thus not a "substantial" unity, it has no "real qualities," it knows no real parts, no real changes, and no causality—all these words understood in the natural scientific sense. To ascribe a nature to phenomena, to inquire into their real determinative parts, into their causal connections—that is a pure countersense, no better than if one were to ask about the causal qualities, connections, etc., of numbers. It is the countersense of the naturalization of something whose essence excludes Being as nature. A physical thing is what it is and remains in its identity forever: nature is eternal. What qualities or modifications of qualities are in truth ascribed to a physical thing—the physical thing of nature, not the sensible physical thing of practical life, the physical thing "as it appears to the senses"—can be determined with objective validity and confirmed or legitimated again and again in new experiences. On the other hand, something psychical, a "phenomenon," comes and goes; it does not retain any enduring, identical Being that could be objectively determined as such in the natural scientific sense, for instance, as objectively divisible into components, "analyzable" in the proper sense.

What "psychical" Being "is," experience cannot tell us in the same sense that holds of the physical. The psychical is, after all, not experienced as something that appears; it is "lived experience" and in fact lived experience seen in reflection; it appears as itself through itself, in an absolute flux, as a Now and [313]

already "fading away," in a visible way sinking back into a having-been. The psychical can also be something recollected and thus be something experienced in a certain modified way, and in the "recollected" lies the "having been perceived"; and it can be something "repeatedly" recollected, in recollections that are united in a consciousness that is conscious of the recollections themselves again as something recollected or as still held fast. In this connection, and in it alone, as what is identical in such "repetitions," the psychical can be "experienced" and identified a priori as existing. Everything psychical that is experienced *in this way* is thus, as we likewise can say with evidence, embedded in a comprehensive nexus, in a "monadic" unity of consciousness, a unity that in itself has nothing at all to do with nature, with space and time, substantiality and causality, but rather has its completely unique "forms." It is a flux of phenomena unlimited at both ends, with a line of intentionality running through it, a line that is, as it were, the index of the all-penetrating unity, namely the line of immanent "time," which is without beginning and without end, a time that no chronometer can measure.

Gazing in immanent seeing back over the flux of phenomena, we move from phenomenon to phenomenon (each a unity in the flux and itself grasped in the flowing) and never to anything but phenomena. Only after immanent seeing and the experience of physical things have been synthesized do seen phenomenon and experienced physical thing enter into relation. Through the medium of both the experience of physical things and the experience of this relation, empathy occurs at the same time as a kind of mediate seeing of the psychical and is characterized in itself as a seeing into a second monadic nexus.

Now to what extent is something like rational inquiry, as well as valid statement, possible in this sphere? To what extent also are only such statements possible as we have just given them as the roughest descriptions (remaining silent about entire dimensions)? Now obviously inquiry will make sense here if it is devoted purely to the sense of the "experiences" given as experiences of the "psychical" and if it thereby takes and seeks to determine the "psychical" precisely as that which it (i.e. that which is seen in this way) demands, as it were, to be taken and determined as. That is, above all, if one does not allow any countersensical naturalizations. One must, in other words, take phenomena just as they are given, that is, as this flowing being-conscious-of, intending, appearing that they are, as this being-conscious-of-in-the-foreground and being-conscious-of-in-the-background, as this being-conscious-of as something present or as pre-present, as something fantasied or signitive or depicted, as something intuited or emptily presented, etc. One must also take them thereby as they are given in the change of these or those attitudes, these or those attentional modes, being modified or transformed in this way or that. All that bears the title 'consciousness of' and "has" a "significance" and "intends" something "objectual," which latter—even if now called from some [314]

standpoint or other 'fiction' or 'actuality'—can be described as something "immanently objectual," "intended as such," and intended in this or that mode of intending.

That one can here inquire, make statements, and make them with evidence, obeying the sense of this "experiential" sphere, is absolutely evident. It is precisely the observance of the aforementioned demand, of course, that is the difficulty. The harmoniousness or countersensicalness of the investigations to be carried out here depends completely on the consistency and purity of the "phenomenological" attitude. It is not easy for us to overcome the primeval habit of living and thinking in the naturalistic attitude and thus of naturalistically falsifying the psychical. Furthermore, much depends on the insight that a "purely immanent" inquiry into the psychical (in the broadest sense of the word used here of the phenomenal as such) is indeed possible, an inquiry of the kind that was just characterized and that stands in opposition to the psychophysical inquiry into the same, a mode of inquiry that we have yet to take into consideration and that, of course, also has its legitimacy.

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Now if the immanently psychical is in itself not nature but rather the opposite of nature, what do we inquire into regarding the psychical as its "Being"? If it is not determinable in "objective" identity as a substantial unity of real qualities that can be grasped, determined by experiential science, and confirmed again and again; if it is not to be lifted out of the eternal flux; and if it is incapable of becoming the object of intersubjective validity—what can we grasp, determine, and fix as an objective unity in it? Understanding this, however, to mean that we remain in the pure phenomenological sphere and leave out of account the relations to the body experienced as a physical thing and to nature. The answer then reads: Even if phenomena as such are not *nature*, they nevertheless have an *essence* that is graspable, and adequately graspable, in immediate seeing. All statements that describe phenomena by means of direct concepts do so, provided they are valid, by means of concepts of essence, thus by means of conceptual significations of words that must allow of being redeemed in eidetic seeing.

It is necessary to seize correctly upon this ultimate foundation of all psychological method. The spell of the naturalistic attitude, under which we all find ourselves to begin with and which makes us incapable of disregarding nature and thus of making the psychical an object of seeing inquiry in the pure instead of the psycho-physical attitude, has blocked the path here into a great, unprecedentedly momentous science, which is, on the one hand, the basic condition for a *fully scientific psychology* and, on the other, the field of the genuine *critique of reason*. The spell of primeval naturalism also consists in its making it difficult for us all to see "essences," "ideas," or rather—since we do indeed see [315]

them, so to speak, constantly—to accept them in their peculiarity instead of countersensically naturalizing them. Eidetic seeing holds no more difficulties or "mystical" secrets than does perception. If we bring "color" intuitively to full clarity, to full givenness for ourselves, then what is given is an "essence," and if likewise we bring to givenness for ourselves in pure seeing (perhaps looking from perception to perception) what "perception," perception in itself—that which is identical in arbitrarily many flowing singular perceptions—is, then we have grasped the essence 'perception' in seeing. As far as intuition, intuitively being-conscious-of reaches, that is how far the possibility of the corresponding "ideation" (as I was in the habit of saying in the *Logical Investigations*) or of "eidetic seeing" reaches. To the extent that the intuition is pure, and includes no accompanying transient opinions, to that extent the essence seen is adequately seen, absolutely given. Thus pure intuition also rules the entire sphere that the psychologist appropriates as that of "psychical phenomena" if he takes them purely on their own terms only, in pure immanence. That the "essences" grasped in eidetic seeing can be fixed in definitive concepts (to a very large extent at least) and thereby provide possibilities for definitive and, in their way, objectively and absolutely valid statements, is obvious to anyone free of prejudice. The smallest differences in color, the finest nuances, may defy specification, but 'color' in contrast to 'tone' is such a certain difference that there is nothing in the whole world that is more certain. And such absolutely distinguishable or specifiable essences are not only those of sensible "contents" or appearances ("visible things," phantoms, and the like), but no less those of everything that is psychical in the pregnant sense, of every egoic "act" and egoic state that corresponds to such familiar titles as, for instance, 'perception', 'fantasy', 'memory', 'judgment', 'feeling', 'will', with all their innumerable special forms. Excluded thereby remain the finest "nuances" [316]
belonging to what is indeterminable about the "flux," while at the same time the describable typology of flowing also has its "ideas," which, grasped and fixed in seeing, make possible absolute knowledge. Every psychological title, such as 'perception' or 'will', is a title for an extremely comprehensive domain of "analyses of consciousness," that is, of eidetic inquiries. At issue here is a region with an expanse that in this respect can be compared only with natural science—however strange that may sound.

Of decisive significance, however, is the knowledge that eidetic seeing is by no means "experience" in the sense of perception, memory, or equivalent acts, and furthermore is by no means an empirical generalization that at the same time existentially posits in its sense the individual existence of experiential details. The seeing seizes upon the *essence* as *being an essence* and in no way does it posit *existence*. Accordingly, eidetic knowledge is no matter-of-fact[e] knowledge, and includes not the least assertive content regarding an individual (e.g. natural) existence. The basis, or better: the initial act, of eidetic see-

ing—for instance, of the essence of perception, memory, judgment, etc.—*can* be a perception of a perception, a memory, a judgment, etc., but it can also be a mere, simply "clear" fantasy, which after all is as such no experience, does not seize upon any *existence*. That does not affect the seizing upon an essence at all; it is a seeing seizing upon *as* the grasping of an essence, and that is precisely a different kind of seeing from experiencing. Of course, essences can also be vaguely presented (e.g. signitively presented) and erroneously posited—in which case they are merely alleged essences, marked by conflict, as the transition to catching sight of their incompatibility teaches; the vague positing, however, can also be confirmed as valid by returning to the intuition of the givenness of the essence.

Every judgment that brings to adequate expression, in definitive, adequately formed concepts, what lies in essences, how essences of a certain genus or particularization are connected with certain others, how, for instance, "intuition" and "empty intention," how "fantasy" and "perception," how "concept" and "intuition," etc., combine with one another, are necessarily "combinable" on the basis of such and such essential components, fitting together, say, like "intention" and "fulfillment," or conversely are not combinable, founding a "consciousness of disappointment," etc.—every such judgment is an instance of absolute, universally valid knowledge, and as an eidetic judgment it is of such a kind that to seek to justify, confirm, or refute it by means of experience would be a countersense. It fixes a "relation of idea,"[e] an Apriori in the genuine sense that Hume had in mind, to be sure, but had to fail to notice [317]
on account of his positivistic confounding of essence and "idea"[e]—as the opposite of "impression."[e] Nevertheless, even his skepticism did not dare to be consistent and doubt such knowledge—to the extent that he saw it. Had his sensualism not blinded him to the whole sphere of the intentionality of "consciousness of," had he engaged it in eidetic inquiry, he would have become not the great skeptic but the founder of a truly "positive" theory of reason. All the problems that move him so passionately in the *Treatise*[e] and drive him from confusion to confusion, problems that in his attitude he cannot at all formulate adequately and purely, most definitely lie in the domain ruled by phenomenology. They can be solved completely by following out the essential connections of forms of consciousness and of what is intended, which belongs correlatively and essentially in each case to those forms, in a generally seeing understanding, which no longer leaves any *meaningful* question open. Thus the immense problems of the identity of an object in contrast to the diversity of impressions, or perceptions, *of* it. Indeed: How diverse perceptions, or appearances, come to "bring to appearance" one and the same object such that it can be "the same" *for them* and for the consciousness that binds them into a unity and identity—that is a question that can be clearly raised and answered by phenomenological eidetic inquiry (to which our formulation, of course,

already points). To want to answer this question after the manner of empirical natural science means not to understand it and to misinterpret it countersensically. That a perception, like any experience whatsoever, is a perception precisely of this object, which is oriented precisely in this way, colored, formed, etc., precisely in this way—that is a matter of its essence, however things may be regarding the "existence" of the object. That this perception fits into a perceptual continuity (though not just any one) in which constantly "the same object presents itself in constantly different orientations"—that again is purely a matter of essence. In short, here lie the great fields, as yet wholly uncultivated in writing, of the "analysis of consciousness," whereby the title 'consciousness', like the title 'the psychical' above, whether it is really suitable or not, would have to be so broadly drawn that it would characterize everything immanent, thus also everything consciousness intends as such and in every sense. Once freed of the false naturalism that countersensically inverts them, the problems of origin so often discussed over the centuries become phenomenological problems. Thus the problems of the origin of the "presentation of space," the presentation of time, a physical thing, number, the "presentations" of cause and effect, etc. Only after these pure problems have been determinately formulated in a meaningful way and solved do the empirical problems of the emergence of such presentations as occurrences in human consciousness obtain a sense that can be scientifically grasped and treated with a view to their solution. [318]

But everything depends on one's seeing and making wholly one's own that just as immediately as one hears a tone one sees an "essence," the essence 'tone', the essence 'appearance of a physical thing', the essence 'visible thing', the essence 'pictorial presentation', the essence 'judgment' or 'will', etc., and that in seeing one can make eidetic judgments. On the other hand, however, it depends on one's guarding against the Humean confounding and therefore on not confusing phenomenological seeing with "self-observation," with inner experience, in short, with acts that posit, instead of essences, individual particulars that correspond to the them.[6]

As long as it is pure and makes no use of the existential positing of nature, pure phenomenology as science can *only* be inquiry into essence and by no

6. Time and again the *Logical Investigations*, which in their pieces of a systematic phenomenology engaged for the first time in eidetic analysis in the sense characterized here, have been misunderstood as attempts to rehabilitate the method of self-observation. Of course, the unsatisfactory characterization of the method in the "Introduction" to the first investigation of the second volume, the designation of phenomenology as descriptive psychology, bears part of the blame for that. The necessary clarifications were already provided in my third report on German writings on logic in the years 1895–99 in *Archiv für systematische Philosophie* 9 (1903), 397–400. [See Edmund Husserl, "Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik in den Jahren 1895–99," in *Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890–1910)*, ed. Bernhard Rang, Husserliana XXII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1979), 162–258, here 204–8.]

means inquiry into existence; every "self-observation" and every judgment based on such "experience" lies beyond its scope. The individual in its immanence can be posed and at best subsumed under the rigorous eidetic concepts that arise from eidetic analysis only as a This-there!—this onward flowing perception, memory, etc. For while the individual *is* not essence, it does "*have*" an essence that can be stated about it with evident validity. Yet to fix it as an individual, to assign it a place in a "world" of individual existence, is something that such mere subsumption obviously cannot achieve. For phenomenology the singular is eternally the ἄπειρον. Phenomenology can know with objective validity only essences and essential relations and thereby achieve, and do so conclusively, everything that is necessary to achieve an elucidating understanding of all empirical knowledge and of all knowledge as such: the elucidation of the "origin" of all formal-logical and natural-logical and any other guiding "principles" and all the problems of the correlation of "Being" (Being of [319]
nature, Being of value, etc.) and "consciousness"[7] which are intimately connected with that elucidation.



Let us move on now to the psychophysical attitude. In it the "psychical," along with the entire essence *proper to* it, is related to a body and to the unity of physical nature: what is grasped in immanent perception and is interpreted as essentially of such and such a kind enters into relation to the sensibly perceived and thereby to nature. Only through this relation does it gain an indirect natural objectivity, mediately a place in the space and in the time of nature (the time we measure with clocks). To some not more precisely determined extent, the experiential "dependence" on the physical provides a means of intersubjectively determining the psychical as an individual Being and at the same time of progressively exploring psychophysical relations. That is the domain of "psychology as a natural science," which according to its literal sense is psychophysical psychology and at the same time, obviously in contrast to phenomenology, empirical science.

7. The definiteness with which I express myself—in a time for which phenomenology is at best a title for specializations, for quite useful detail work in the sphere of self-observation, instead of the systematic science fundamental to philosophy, the entrance way to the genuine metaphysics of nature, spirit, and ideas—here has its background everywhere in the long-standing and unremitting investigations on whose progressive results my philosophical lecture courses in Göttingen were based from 1901 on. In view of the intimate functional interconnection of all phenomenological strata, and thus also of the inquiries related to them, and in view of the extraordinary difficulty that the elaboration of a pure methodology entails, I have not considered it beneficial to publish isolated results that are still marked by uncertainties. I hope to be able to present the wider public in the not too distant future with my inquiries concerning phenomenology and the phenomenological critique of reason, which in the meantime have been consolidated on all sides and have grown into comprehensive unities.

It is, of course, not unobjectionable to regard psychology, the science of the "psychical," only as a science of "psychical phenomena" and their connections to a body. For it is *de facto* guided everywhere by those primeval and inevitable objectivations whose correlates are the empirical unities 'man' and 'animal', and, on the other hand, 'soul', 'personality', or 'character', 'disposition of personality'. However, for our purposes it is not necessary to pursue the eidetic analysis of these unitary formations and the problem of how they of themselves determine the task of psychology. For it soon becomes clear that these unities are of a principially different kind than the materialities of nature, which are after all by their essence given through adumbrative appearances, [320] whereas this by no means holds of the unities in question. Only the founding basis 'human body', though not the human being itself, is a unity of material appearance, and definitely not personality, character, etc. Obviously with all such unities we are pointed back to the immanent vital unity of the respective flux of consciousness and to morphological peculiarities that distinguish various such immanent unities. Accordingly, all psychological knowledge, even where it is primarily related to human individualities, characters, and dispositions, also finds itself pointed back to those unities of consciousness and thus to the study of *the phenomena themselves* and their interconnections.

Especially after all the expositions given here, one now need no longer exert much effort to see clearly and for the most profound reasons what was already presented above: that all psychological knowledge in the usual sense *presupposes eidetic knowledge* of the psychical and that it would be the pinnacle of absurdity to hope to inquire by psychophysical experiments and by those unintended inner perceptions, or experiences, into the *essence* of memory, judgment, the will, and the like, in order *thereby* to obtain the rigorous concepts that alone can give scientific value to the characterization of the psychical in psychophysical statements, and to these very statements.

The fundamental error of modern psychology, which hinders it from being psychology in the true, fully scientific sense, is that it has not seen and elaborated this phenomenological method. It has allowed itself to be prevented by historical prejudices from using the approaches to such a method which lie in every clarifying conceptual analysis. Connected with this is the fact that most psychologists have not understood the beginnings of phenomenology that are already available; what is more, they occasionally have even held the eidetic inquiry carried out in a purely intuitive attitude to be—metaphysical-Scholastic abstraction. What is seized upon and described in the seeing stance, however, can be understood and checked only in the seeing stance.

In light of all the foregoing expositions, it is clear, and will, as I have reason enough to hope, soon be more generally acknowledged, that an actually sufficient empirical science of the psychical in its relations to nature can be realized only after psychology is built upon a *systematic* phenomenology, thus

if the essential formations of consciousness and its immanent correlates, in- [321]
quired into and fixed in systematic connection by means of pure seeing, provide the norms for the scientific sense and content of the concepts of all manner of phenomena, hence of the concepts with which the empirical psychologist expresses the psychical itself in his psychophysical judgments. Only an actually radical and systematic phenomenology—not pursued on the side and in isolated reflections but in exclusive devotion to the highly varied and complicated problems of consciousness, and pursued with a completely free spirit, which is not blinded by any naturalistic prejudices—can give us the proper *understanding* of the "psychical," in the sphere of individual as well as of communal consciousness. Only then will the immense experimental work of our age, the wealth of the empirical facts and the in part very interesting regularities gathered, bear its legitimate fruits through evaluative critique and psychological interpretation. Then, too, one will again be able to admit what can by no means be admitted of today's psychology: that psychology stands in close, even the closest, relation to philosophy. Then the paradox of antipsychologism, according to which an epistemology is not a psychological theory, will lose all its offensiveness insofar as every actual epistemology must necessarily be based on phenomenology, which thus forms the foundation common to every philosophy and psychology. And finally that kind of sham philosophical literature will also no longer be possible that grows so rampantly today and that offers us, with the pretension to the most serious scientific character, its epistemologies, logical theories, sundry ethics, philosophies of nature, and pedagogics on a natural scientific and above all "experimental-psychological basis."[8] Indeed, in view of this literature one can only be astonished at the decline of the sense for the profound problems and difficulties to which the greatest minds of mankind had devoted their life's work and unfortunately also at the decline of the sense for genuine thoroughness, which within experimental psychology itself—despite the principial defects it involves on our view—indeed compels so much respect from us. I am firmly convinced that [322]
the historical judgment of this literature one day will prove far more severe than of the much-rebuked popular philosophy of the eighteenth century.[9]

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8. Not least it is due to the circumstance that the opinion that psychology—and, of [321]
course, "exact" psychology—is the foundation of scientific philosophy has become a firm axiom at least in the natural scientific departments of philosophical faculties, and that those faculties now, giving in to the pressure of the natural scientists, are very eagerly seeking to transfer a philosophical professorship to other investigators who may well be outstanding in their own fields but are no more in inner touch with philosophy than, say, chemists or physicists.

9. By chance while writing this essay I received the excellent paper "Über das Wesen [322]
und die Bedeutung der Einfühlung" [On the Essence and Significance of Empathy] by Dr. M[oritz] Geiger (Munich) in the *Bericht über den IV. Kongreß für experimentelle Psychologie in Innsbruck* (Leipzig 1911)[, 29–73]. In a very instructive way, the author endeavors to distinguish the genuine psychological problems, which in the attempts thus far at a descrip-

We now leave the battlefield of psychological naturalism. Perhaps we may say that the psychologism that has continued to gain ground since Locke's day was really only a murky form which the solely legitimate philosophical tendency had to work its way through in order to achieve a phenomenological justification of philosophy. Furthermore, insofar as phenomenological inquiry is eidetic inquiry, thus in the genuine sense a priori inquiry, it simultaneously takes full account of all the legitimate motifs of aprioricism. At any rate, our critique should have made it clear that recognizing that naturalism is a principially miscarried philosophy does not mean that one must abandon the idea of a rigorously scientific philosophy, a "philosophy from below." The critical distinction between psychological and phenomenological method points to the latter as the true way to a scientific theory of reason and likewise to a sufficient psychology.

In keeping with our plan, we now move on to the critique of historicism and to the discussion of worldview philosophy.

Historicism and Worldview Philosophy [323]

Historicism takes its position in the factual sphere of the empirical life of spirit, and by positing it absolutely, without exactly naturalizing it (especially as the specific sense of nature is far removed from historical thought and at any rate does not influence the latter in a generally determinative way), a relativism arises that has a close kinship with naturalistic psychologism and that entangles us in analogous skeptical difficulties. Of interest to us here is only what is peculiar to historicistic skepticism, with which we want to become more thoroughly familiar.

All spiritual formation—the phrase thought in as wide a sense as possible, which may include every kind of social unity, at the lowermost level that of the individual himself, but also every cultural formation—has its inner struc-

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tion and theory of empathy partly have become clearly visible, partly have been mixed with one another unclearly, and discusses what has been attempted and achieved regarding their solution. The assembly held that against him, as can be gathered from the report of the discussion (ibid., 66). Meeting with loud applause, Miss Martin says: "When I came here, I expected to hear something about the experiments in the area of empathy. But what did I actually hear—nothing but old, ancient theories. Nothing about experiments in this area. *This is not a philosophical society*. It seemed to me that the time has come that anyone who wants to bring such theories here should show whether they are confirmed by experiments. In the sphere of aesthetics, such experiments have been carried out, for instance, the experiments by Stratton concerning the aesthetic significance of eye movement, also my investigations of this theory of inner perception." Further: Marbe "sees the significance of the doctrine of empathy in the impetus to experimental investigation, such as, incidentally, those that have already been conducted in this area. The method of the representatives of the doctrine of empathy is related to experimental-psychological method much as the method of the Presocratics is related to that of modern natural science." I have nothing more to add to these facts. [322]

ture, its typology, and its wondrous wealth of outer and inner forms, which arise in the stream of spiritual life itself, are in turn transformed, and in the transformation themselves cause other structural and typical distinctions to emerge. In the perceptible outer world, the structure and typology of organic becoming offer us precise analogs. Therein there are no fixed species and there is no construction of the same made of fixed organic elements. Everything seemingly fixed is a stream of development. If through inner intuition we immerse ourselves in the unity of the life of spirit, we can feel our way into the motivations prevailing therein and also "understand" the essence and development of the respective form of spirit in its dependence on the spiritual motives of unity and development. In this way everything historical becomes "understandable," "explicable" for us in its peculiarity of "Being," which is precisely the "Being of spirit," unity of internally mutually-conditioning moments of a sense and therefore unity of taking shape and developing in accordance with inner motivations and that sense. Also in this way, then, art, religion, morals, and the like can be intuitively inquired into. Likewise the worldview, which is closely related to them and at the same time comes to expression in them, and which, if it assumes the forms of science and lays claim to objective validity after the manner of science, used to be called 'metaphysics' or even 'philosophy'. Hence with regard to such philosophies the great task arises of exploring their morphological structure and typology, as well as their developmental connections, and of bringing to historical understanding the motivations of spirit that determine their essence by living in the most inward accord with those philosophies. How much that is of significance and indeed admirable is to be achieved in this regard is shown by Wilhelm Dilthey's writings, particularly the recently published treatise on the types of worldview.[10] [324]

Thus far the talk was, of course, of historical science but not of historicism. We seize most easily upon the motives that impel one towards the latter when we follow a few sentences from Dilthey's presentation. We read: "Of the reasons that give skepticism nourishment ever anew, one of the most effective is the anarchy of philosophical systems" (3/75). "However, the doubts that have arisen out of the progressive development of historical consciousness reach far more deeply than the skeptical inferences from the opposition of human opinions" (4/76). "The doctrine of development <as a natural scientific doctrine of evolution, interwoven with the knowledge of the history of the

10. See the anthology [Max Frischeisen-Köhler, ed.,] *Weltanschauung, Philosophie und Religion in Darstellungen von W. Dilthey, etc.* (Berlin: Reichel & Co., 1911). [See also Wilhelm Dilthey, "Die Typen der Weltanschauung und ihre Ausbildung in den metaphysischen Systemen" (The Types of Worldview and their Development in the Metaphysical Systems), in *Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, Gesammelte Schriften VIII (Stuttgart: Teubner/Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2d ed., 1960), 73–118.]

development of cultural formations> is necessarily bound up with the knowledge of the relativity of the historical form of life. In the gaze that encompasses the earth and all pasts disappears the absolute validity of any one individual form of life-constitution, religion, and philosophy.[11] Thus the formation of historical consciousness destroys even more fundamentally than the overview of the conflict of the systems the belief in the universal validity of any one of the philosophies that have undertaken to express the world-nexus in a compelling way through a nexus of concepts" (6/77–78).

There is obviously no doubt about the *factual truth* of what was just said. The question, however, is whether, taken in *principial universality*, it can be legitimate. Certainly, a worldview and a worldview philosophy are cultural formations that come into being and disappear in the stream of the development of mankind, whereby their spiritual content is determinately motivated under the given historical circumstances. Yet the same holds also of the rigorous sciences. Do they *for that reason* lack objective validity? A very extreme historicist might well affirm this, pointing here to the change in scientific views, how what is regarded today as proven theory will tomorrow be seen to be void, how some speak of certain laws, whereas others call them mere hypotheses and still others call them vague notions. Etc. In view of this continual change of scientific views, would we really have no right, then, to speak of sciences not only as cultural formations but also as objective unities of validity? One easily sees that, when historicism is consistently carried through to its conclusion, one ends up with extreme skeptical subjectivism. The ideas 'truth', [325]
'theory', 'science' would then, like all ideas, lose their absolute validity. For an idea to have validity would therefore mean that it is a factual construct of spirit that is held to be valid and, in this facticity of being valid, determines thought. Validity that is unqualified or "in itself," that is what it is even if no one happens to effect it and no historical mankind would ever effect it—there is no such thing. Nor is there any such validity in the case of the principle of non-contradiction and all logic, which nowadays is in complete flux anyway. Perhaps the end result is that the logical principles of non-contradictoriness turn into their opposite. And furthermore all the sentences that we just expressed, and even the possibilities that we considered and claimed as validly existing, would have no validity in themselves. Etc. It is not necessary to continue along these lines and repeat discussions that have been presented elsewhere.[12] The foregoing should suffice to gain the concession that—however great are the difficulties that the relationship between what obtains in the flux and objective validity, between science as cultural appearance and science as the system of valid theory, may pose to the clarifying understanding—the dis-

11. [In Dilthey's text, the latter portion of the sentence reads: "life, constitution, religion, or philosophy." The bracketed insertion is Husserl's.]

12. In the first volume of my *Logical Investigations*.

tinction and opposition must be acknowledged. Yet if we have conceded that science is a valid idea, what reason would we still have not to regard similar distinctions between what obtains historically and what is valid as at least open—whether or not we may be able to understand them by way of a "critique of reason"? The science of history, empirical human science in general, cannot determine at all, neither in the positive nor in the negative sense, whether a distinction is to be made between religion as cultural formation and religion as idea (that is, as valid religion), between art as cultural formation and valid art, between historical and valid law, and finally also between historical and valid philosophy; whether or not between the one and the other, put Platonically, there exists a relationship between the idea and its murky manifestation. And if spiritual formations can in truth be considered and judged with respect to such oppositions of validity, then the scientific decision about validity itself and its ideal normative principles is by no means a matter for empirical science. The mathematician will not turn to historical science to be instructed about the truth of mathematical theories; it will not occur to him to link the historical development of mathematical presentations and judgments to the question of truth. So how is the historian at all supposed to decide [326]
about the truth of the given philosophical systems and, what is more, about the possibility of a science that is valid in itself? And what could he ever adduce that could cause the philosopher to waver in the belief in his idea, that of a *true* philosophy? Whoever denies a particular system, no less whoever denies the ideal possibility of a philosophical system in general, must adduce reasons. Historical facts about development, even the most general facts about the kind of development of systems in general, may be reasons, even good reasons. But historical reasons can yield only historical consequences. To want either to justify or to refute ideas from facts is countersense—*ex pumice aquam* [to get water from a pumice stone], to use Kant's quotation.[13]

Thus just as the science of history cannot say anything relevant against the possibility of absolute validities in general, likewise it cannot say anything in particular against the possibility of an absolute, that is, scientific metaphysics or any other philosophy. As historical science it can never justify even the assertion that *thus far* there has been no scientific philosophy; it can only justify it based on other sources of knowledge, and those are obviously already philosophical. For it is clear that philosophical critique, too, insofar as it is

13. Dilthey (op. cit.) likewise rejects historicistic skepticism; but I fail to understand how he can believe he has obtained from his very instructive analysis of the structure and typology of worldviews decisive reasons *against* skepticism. For as is argued above in the text, a human science (which is, after all, empirical) can argue neither against nor *for* anything that lays claim to objective validity. The matter changes, and that seems to move his thought inwardly, when the empirical attitude, which aims at empirical understanding, is replaced with the phenomenological eidetic attitude.

actually to lay claim to validity, is philosophy and that its sense implies the ideal possibility of a systematic philosophy as rigorous science. The *unconditional* assertion that every scientific philosophy is a chimera, with the justification that the alleged attempts over the millennia make probable the intrinsic impossibility of such philosophy, is absurd not only because an inference from a few millennia of higher culture to a boundless future would not be a good induction, but is absurd as an absolute countersense, like 2 x 2 = 5. And this for the reason indicated: If philosophical critique finds something it can refute with objective validity, then there is also a field in which something can be justified with objective validity. If the problems have been proved to have been framed "obliquely," then it must be possible to set them right and pose straight problems. If critique proves that philosophy as it has developed historically operates with muddled concepts, that it has mixed concepts, and has drawn false inferences, then therein lies undeniably (if one does not want get mired in senselessness) that, put ideally, the concepts can be elucidated, clarified, and kept distinct, that in the given field correct inferences can be drawn, etc. Every legitimate, deeply penetrating critique itself provides means of progress, points to ideally legitimate goals and paths and thus to an objectively valid science. Moreover, one would also have to say, of course, that the historical untenability of a spiritual formation as a fact has nothing whatsoever to do with untenability in the sense of validity—which, like everything said thus far, is applicable to every sphere in which validity is claimed. [327]

What may still mislead the historicist is the fact that by immersing ourselves in a historically reconstructed spiritual formation, in the intending or signifying prevailing in it, as well as in the connections of the motivations belonging to it, we not only can understand their sense but also can judge their relative value. If we think our way, say, assumptively, into the premises that a historical philosopher had at his disposal, we may perhaps be able to acknowledge, even admire, the relative "consistency" of his philosophy, in another respect excuse any inconsistencies due to shifts and confoundings of problems which are held to have been unavoidable given the level of the problematic and analysis of signification at that time. We may consider as a great achievement the successful solution of a scientific problem that today belongs to a class of problems that a high school student could easily master. And there are analogs in every region. By contrast, we obviously continue to maintain that the principles even of such relative valuations lie in ideal spheres that the *valuing* historian who does not want to understand mere developments can only presuppose, but not—as historian—justify. The norm of the mathematical lies in mathematics, that of the logical in logic, that of the ethical in ethics, etc. He would have to seek reasons and methods of justification in these disciplines if he wanted to proceed scientifically also in the valuation. If in this respect there are no rigorously developed sciences, well

then he values on his own responsibility, say, as an ethical man or one who believes in a particular religion, but at any rate not as a scientific historian.

If I therefore regard historicism as an epistemological aberration that, owing to its countersensical consequences, must be just as brusquely rejected as naturalism, then I would nevertheless like to emphasize expressly that I [328] fully acknowledge the tremendous value of history in the broadest sense for the philosopher. For him the discovery of the common spirit is just as significant as the discovery of nature. Indeed, the immersion in the general life of spirit provides the philosopher with more original and therefore more fundamental material for inquiry than does the immersion in nature. For the realm of phenomenology, as a doctrine of essence, stretches from the individual spirit soon over the whole field of universal spirit, and although Dilthey shows in such an impressive way that psychophysical psychology is not the one that can serve as the "foundation of the human sciences," I would say that it is solely the phenomenological doctrine of essence that is capable of justifying a *philosophy* of spirit.

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We now move to a consideration of the sense and legitimacy of worldview philosophy in order to compare it later with philosophy as rigorous science. The worldview philosophy of modernity is, as was already indicated above, a child of historicistic skepticism. Normally, the latter spares the positive sciences, to which it—as inconsistent as it is, like every skepticism—ascribes the value of actual validity. Worldview philosophy accordingly presupposes all the individual sciences as treasure-troves of objective truth, and to the extent that it finds its goal in satisfying as far as possible our need for definitive and unifying, all-comprehending and all-understanding knowledge, it regards all individual sciences as its foundations. As a consequence, it occasionally calls itself scientific philosophy, since it is built on firm sciences. However, since, properly understood, not only the scientific character of the foundations belongs to the scientific character of a discipline, but also the scientific character of the goal-setting problems, the scientific character of the methods, and especially also a certain logical harmony between the guiding problems on the one hand and such foundations and methods on the other, the expression 'scientific philosophy' does not mean much. And indeed the expression is generally not understood in all its seriousness. Most worldview philosophers certainly feel that the claim they lay to the scientific rigor of their philosophy does not fare very well, and many of them admit quite openly and honestly at least to the low scientific quality of their results. Nevertheless, they set the value of that kind of philosophy, which precisely wants to be [329] more worldview than world-science, very high, and all the higher the more skeptical its stance—precisely under the influence of historicism—towards the

aim of rigorous philosophical world-science. Their motives, which at the same time determine more precisely the sense of worldview philosophy, are roughly as follows.

Every great philosophy is not only a historical fact, but in the development of the spiritual life of mankind it also has a great, indeed unique teleological function, namely as the highest intensification of the life-experience, culture, and wisdom of its age. Let us dwell for a moment on the clarification of these concepts.

Experience as personal habitus is the precipitation of acts of natural, experiential position-taking that have occurred in the course of life. This habitus is essentially conditioned by the way in which the personality, as this particular individuality, is motivated by acts of its own experience and no less by the way in which it takes in foreign and transmitted experiences by approving of or rejecting them. As for the cognitive acts bearing the title 'experience', there can be cognitions of natural existence of every kind, either simple perceptions and other acts of immediately intuitable cognition or the acts of thought grounded on them at different levels of logical treatment and legitimation. But that is not enough. We also have experiences of works of art and other values of beauty; no less of ethical values, whether on the basis of our own ethical conduct or of perceiving that of others; likewise of goods, things of practical utility, and things of technical serviceability. In short, we not only have theoretical but also axiological and practical experiences. Analysis shows that the latter point back to valuing and willing lived experiences as bases of intuition. On such experiences are also based experiential cognitions of a higher, logical dignity. Thus one who is experienced all-around, or, as we also say, who is "*cultivated*," has not only experience of the world but also religious, aesthetic, ethical, political, practical-technical, etc., experience or "*culture*." However, we use this admittedly well-worn word 'culture'—inasmuch as we, of course, have its opposite 'lack of culture'—only for forms of the habitus described that are of relatively higher value. The old-fashioned word 'wisdom' (worldly wisdom, world- and life-wisdom) and most of all the now popular expression 'world- and life-view',[14] or simply 'worldview', refer to particularly high levels of value.

We will have to regard wisdom or worldview in this sense as an essential component of that still more valuable human habitus that we have in mind in the idea of perfect virtue and that characterizes habitual excellence in relation to all possible directions of human position-taking, to cognitional, valuational, and volitional position-takings. For with this excellence goes hand-in-hand the well-formed ability to judge rationally about the objectualities of such position-takings, about the environing world, values, goods, deeds, etc., [330]

14. [Compare the passage cited n. 3 above.]

or to be able to legitimate expressly the position-takings of that habitus. Yet that presupposes wisdom and belongs among its higher forms.

Wisdom or worldview in this determinate sense, though one that includes a variety of types and valuational gradations, is—and this need not be further elaborated—no mere achievement of an isolated personality, which would be an abstraction anyway; the personality belongs to a cultural community and an age, and it makes good sense in relation to its most pronounced forms to speak of the culture and worldview not only of a particular individual but also of the age. That holds especially of the forms now to be dealt with.

By grasping in thought the wisdom alive in a great philosophical personality, the wisdom that is inwardly richest but still obscure to itself, still uncomprehended, one opens up possibilities of logical treatment and, on a higher level of culture, the application of the logical methodology elaborated in the rigorous sciences. That the entire content of these sciences, which, after all, confront the individual as valid demands of the common spirit, belongs at this level to the substructure of a valuable culture or worldview is obvious. Now insofar as the vital and therefore most persuasive cultural motives of the age are not only grasped conceptually but also are unfolded logically and are otherwise treated in thought and the results gained thereby are brought to scientific unification and consistent completion in interplay with newly accruing intuitions and insights, an extraordinary expansion and intensification of the originally uncomprehended wisdom arises. There arises a *worldview philosophy* that gives in the great systems the relatively most perfect answer to the riddles of life and the world, namely that achieves in the best way possible the solution and satisfactory clarification of the theoretical, axiological, practical inconsistencies of life, that experience, wisdom, and mere world- and life-view are able to overcome only incompletely. The spiritual life of mankind marches on, however, with its abundance of ever newer formations, [331]
spiritual battles, experiences, and valuations and specifications of goals; with the expanded horizon of life into which all the new spiritual formations enter, culture, wisdom, and worldview change, philosophy changes, climbing to higher and higher peaks.

Insofar as the value of worldview philosophy, and thus also of the striving for such philosophy, is initially conditioned by the value of wisdom and of striving for wisdom, a special consideration of the goal it sets for itself is hardly necessary. If one takes the concept of wisdom as broadly as we did, then it certainly expresses an essential component of the ideal of the perfect excellence achievable according to the standard of the respective phase of the life of mankind, in other words, of a relatively complete concrete adumbration of the idea of *humanity*. It is thus clear how everyone is to strive to be as all-around excellent a personality as possible, excellent in accordance with all the basic orientations of life, which for their part correspond to the basic kinds of

possible position-takings, thus also to strive in each of these orientations to be as "experienced" as possible, as "wise" as possible," and therefore also to "love wisdom" as much as possible. According to the idea, every striving man is necessarily a "philosopher" in the most original sense of the word.

As is well known, out of the natural reflections on the best paths by which to achieve the high goal of humanity and thus at the same time of perfect wisdom a technique has arisen, that of the virtuous or excellent man. If, as is the rule, it is defined as a technique of correct action, then this obviously amounts to the same thing. For consistently excellent action—which is, after all, what is meant here—leads back to the excellent practical character, and this presupposes habitual perfection in an axiological and intellectual respect. Conscious striving for perfection presupposes in turn striving for all-around wisdom. In a material respect, this discipline directs the one striving to the different groups of values, those in the sciences, the arts, religion, etc., that every acting individual has to acknowledge as transsubjective and binding validities. And one of the highest of these values is the very idea of this wisdom and perfect excellence. Of course, this ethical technique, whether kept more popular or scientific, also enters into the framework of a worldview philosophy, which for its part with all its provinces, as soon as it has arisen in the communal consciousness of its age and faces the individual persuasively as an objective validity, must become a highly significant cultural force, [332]
a point from which the most valuable cultural energies radiate for the most valuable personalities of the age.

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After having done full justice to the high value of worldview philosophy, it may well seem that nothing could prevent us from *unconditionally* recommending that one strive for such philosophy.

Yet perhaps it can be shown that with regard to the idea of philosophy there are still other and, *from certain points of view*, higher values to be satisfied, namely those of a *philosophical science*. The following should be borne in mind. Our consideration is carried out at the level of the scientific culture of our age, which is an age of immense powers of objectified rigorous science. For modern consciousness the ideas 'culture' or 'worldview' and 'science'—understood as a practical idea—were sharply distinguished, and they remained distinguished from now on for all eternity. We may regret it, but we must accept it as a fact that continues to have an effect, a fact that has to determine our practical position-takings in a corresponding way. The historical philosophies were certainly worldview philosophies insofar as the drive for wisdom dominated their creators; but they were just as much scientific philosophies insofar as the goal of rigorous science also was alive in them. Both goals were either not yet at all or not sharply distinguished. In practical striving they flowed

together; they also lay at finite distances, however high above the one striving for them may have felt them to be. That has changed completely since the constitution of a supratemporal *universitas* of rigorous sciences. Generations upon generations work enthusiastically on the immense edifice of science and add their modest objects of inquiry to it, ever conscious of the fact that the edifice is infinite and will never ever be completed. Worldview is also an "idea," of course, but that of a goal lying in the finite, to be actualized principially in an individual lifetime after the manner of steady approach, just like morality, which would certainly lose its sense if it were the idea of a principially transfinite infinite. The "idea" of worldview is accordingly for each age a different one, as should be quite clear from the foregoing analysis of its concept. By contrast, the "idea" of science is a supratemporal one, and here that means that it is not limited by any relation to the spirit of an age. Now connected with these distinctions are essential distinctions in the directions of practical goals. After all, our life goals are generally of a double nature, some are for time, others for [333]
eternity, the former serve our own perfection and that of our contemporaries, the latter also serve the perfection of posterity, down to the most distant generations. Science is a title for absolute, timeless values. Every such value, once discovered, belongs henceforth to the value-treasures of *all* subsequent mankind and obviously determines forthwith the material content of the ideas of culture, wisdom, worldview, as well as that of worldview philosophy.

Thus there is a sharp distinction between worldview philosophy and scientific philosophy as two ideas that are related to one another in a certain way but are not to be confounded with one another. Here it should be noted that the former is by no means the imperfect realization of the latter in time. For if our interpretation is correct, then thus far there has yet to be any realization of that idea whatsoever, that is to say, in our age there is no philosophy that is currently under way as rigorous science, there is no "doctrinal system," not even an incomplete one, that has been objectively set forth in the unified spirit of a community of investigators. On the other hand, there were worldview philosophies already millennia ago. Nevertheless, one can say that the realizations of these ideas (if such is presupposed by both) would asymptotically approach and coincide with one another in the infinite, were we to imagine the infinite of science fictively as a "point infinitely far away." The concept of philosophy would thereby have to be grasped in a correspondingly broad way, and in fact so broadly that it would encompass, in addition to the specifically philosophical sciences, all individual sciences after they had been transformed into philosophies through the clarification and evaluation proper to the critique of reason.

If we take the two distinct ideas as contents of life goals, then it follows that in contrast to striving proper to a worldview a completely different inquiring striving is possible, one that, while fully conscious that science can

never again be the complete creation of an individual, nevertheless devotes the greatest energies in cooperation with others imbued with the same ethos to helping a scientific philosophy make its breakthrough and develop further step by step. The great question of the present is, aside from their clear separation, the relative valuation of these goals and thereby also of their practical compatibility.

From the outset we concede that from the standpoint of philosophizing individuals a universally valid decision for one or the other kind of philosophizing cannot be given. The one group consists of predominantly theoretical [334]
men, by nature inclined to seek their vocation in rigorously scientific inquiry if only the province of such inquiry that attracts them holds promise. Thereby it may well be that the interest, even the passionate interest in this province derives from emotional needs, say, needs stirred by a worldview. By contrast, for aesthetic and practical natures (for artists, theologians, jurists, etc.) the situation is different. They see their vocation in the realization of aesthetic or practical ideals, thus ideals of an extra-theoretical sphere. Among them we also count theological, legal, and in the broadest sense technical investigators and writers insofar as through their writings they do not want to promote pure theory but primarily to influence practice. Admittedly, in the actuality of life itself the distinction is not exactly sharp; and precisely in an age in which practical motives rise up overpoweringly, even a theoretical nature will be able to give in more intensely to the force of such motives than his theoretical vocation would permit. But this poses a great danger particularly for the philosophy of our age.

The question must be raised, however, not only from the standpoint of the individual but also from that of mankind and of history, namely insofar as we consider what it means for the development of culture, for the possibility of a steadily progressing realization of the idea of the eternity of mankind—not of man *in individuo*—whether the question will be decided predominantly in one or the other sense, in other words, whether the tendency towards the one kind of philosophy completely dominates the age and causes the tendency towards the other—let us say, scientific philosophy—to die out. That, too, is a practical question. For our historical influences and thus also our ethical responsibilities extend to the farthest reaches of the ethical ideal, to those that mark the idea of the development of mankind.

It is clear how the decision at issue would arise for a theoretical nature *if* indubitable beginnings of philosophical doctrine were available. Let us look at other sciences. All primeval mathematical or natural scientific "wisdom" and wisdom-teaching has forfeited its rights to the extent that the corresponding theoretical doctrine is justified in an objectively valid way. Science has spoken, wisdom must learn from now on. Natural scientific striving for wisdom prior to the existence of rigorous science was by no means illegitimate;

it is not discredited after the fact for *its* age. Faced with the exigencies of life, with the practical necessity of taking a position, man could not wait until—perhaps millennia later—science had arrived, even assuming that he was at all already familiar with the idea of rigorous science. [335]

On the other hand, every science, no matter how exact, provides a doctrinal system that is developed only to a limited degree and is surrounded by an infinite horizon of science that has yet to become actual. Now what is to be regarded as the right goal for this horizon, the further development of rigorous doctrine or of "view," "wisdom"? The theoretical man, the investigator of nature by vocation, will not hesitate in answering. Wherever science can speak, and even if only centuries from now, he will contemptuously reject vague "views." He would consider it a sin against science to *recommend* that one devise nature-"views." In doing so, he surely defends a right of future mankind. The rigorous sciences owe their greatness and the continuity and abundant strength of their progressive development not least precisely to the radicalism of such an ethos. Certainly every exact investigator forms his own "views"; in seeing, having premonitions, suspecting, he gazes beyond what has been definitively justified; but it is only with a methodical intention that he devises new pieces of rigorous doctrine. As the investigator of nature well knows, this position-taking does not preclude that experience in the prescientific sense, although bound up with insights of science, plays a significant role within natural scientific technique. The technical tasks have to be dealt with, the house, the machine must be built; there can be no waiting until natural science can give exact information about everything of concern. As a practical man the technician therefore decides differently than the natural scientific theoretician. From the latter he takes doctrine, from life he takes "experience."

The situation is not quite the same regarding scientific philosophy, precisely because not even a beginning of scientifically rigorous doctrine has ever been elaborated and because the philosophy—both as historically transmitted and as that which is in the process of being vigorously developed—that intercedes for that doctrine is at most a scientific semi-finished product or an unsorted jumble of worldview and theoretical knowledge. On the other hand, we unfortunately cannot wait here either. The philosophical distress as worldview distress compels us. It becomes ever greater for us the farther the sphere of the positive sciences expands. The vast abundance of scientifically "explained" facts with which they present us cannot help us since they, like all the sciences, principially harbor a dimension of riddles whose solution becomes a vital question for us. The natural sciences have not deciphered for us in any respect the current actuality, the actuality in which we live, produce, and exist. [336] The general belief that to achieve *this* is their function and that they are simply not yet far enough along, the opinion that they—principially—can achieve

this, has revealed itself to the more perceptive to be a superstition. The necessary distinction between natural science and philosophy—as a science with a principially different tendency, though it is essentially related to natural science in several areas—is on its way to gaining recognition and being clarified. To speak with Lotze: "To calculate the course of the world does not mean to understand it." Yet we are no better off with the human sciences. To "understand" the spiritual life of mankind is certainly a great and fine thing. But unfortunately this understanding also cannot help us and should not be confounded with the philosophical understanding that is to disclose the riddles of the world and of life for us.

The spiritual distress of our age has indeed become unbearable. Would that it were only the lack of theoretical clarity about the sense of the "actualities" inquired into in the natural and human sciences that disturbed our peace—namely, about the way in which Being in the ultimate sense is known, what is to be regarded as "absolute" Being, and whether something of that kind is at all knowable. It is instead the most radical *vital* distress from which we suffer, a distress that leaves no part of our lives untouched. All life is position-taking and all position-taking is subject to an ought, to a verdict concerning validity or invalidity according to claimed norms that have absolute validity. As long as these norms were not disputed, were not threatened and ridiculed by any skepticism, there was only *one* vital question: how best to satisfy the norms in practice. What are we to do now, however, when any and every norm is contested or empirically falsified and robbed of its ideal validity? Naturalists and historicists fight for a worldview, and yet both work from different sides to reinterpret ideas as facts and to transform all actuality, all life, into an incomprehensible idea-less jumble of "facts." The superstitious belief in the fact is common to them all.

It is certain that we cannot wait. We must take a position, we must endeavor to resolve the disharmonies in the position we have taken on actuality—on the actuality of life, which has significance for us and in which *we* are to have significance—into a rational, albeit unscientific "world-and-life-view." And if the worldview philosopher is helpful to us in this regard, should we not be thankful to him?

However much truth lies in what was just asserted, however little we would like to do without the elation and invigoration that old and new philosophies offer us, it is nevertheless necessary to insist, on the other hand, that we also remain mindful of the responsibility we have to mankind. For the sake of time, we must not sacrifice eternity; in order to alleviate our distress, we must not bequeath to posterity distress upon distress as an ultimately ineradicable evil. The distress here stems from science. But only science can definitively overcome the distress that stems from science. If the skeptical critique brought by the naturalists and the historicists dissolves the genuine objective [337]

validity in all deontical regions into countersense; if unclear, disharmonious, though naturally developed concepts of reflection inhibit, if as a consequence ambiguous or absurd problems inhibit a proper understanding of actuality and the possibility of taking a rational position on it; if a special but (for a large class of sciences) necessary methodical attitude that is practiced habitually renders one unable to move into other attitudes, and if troubling countersenses in the interpretation of the world are connected with such prejudices—then against these and all similar ills there is only *one* remedy: scientific critique and in addition a radical science, rising up from below, grounded on sure foundations, and progressing in accordance with the most rigorous method: the philosophical science we are advocating here. Worldviews can quarrel, only science can decide, and its decision bears the stamp of eternity.

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Thus in whatever direction the new revolution in philosophy may go, it is beyond question that it may not relinquish the will to rigorous science, but instead must, as theoretical science, confront the practical striving proper to the worldview and with full consciousness *part* with such striving. For here all attempts at mediation also must be rejected. The advocates of the new worldview philosophy will perhaps object that to pursue the latter need not mean that one abandon the idea of rigorous science. The true worldview philosopher, they will say, will not only be scientific in laying the foundation, that is, by using all that is given by the rigorous individual sciences as solid building blocks; but he will also employ scientific method and will gladly seize every chance to promote philosophical problems in a rigorously scientific way. Only in contrast to the metaphysical timidity and skepticism of the preceding epoch, he will even pursue the loftiest metaphysical problems with bold daring in order to achieve the goal of a world- [338]
view that harmoniously satisfies the intellect and heart in accordance with the state of the age.

Insofar as this is meant as mediation, intended to blur the line between worldview philosophy and scientific philosophy, we must lodge our protest against it. It can only lead to a softening and weakening of the scientific drive and promote a pseudo-scientific literature, which is lacking in intellectual honesty. There are no compromises here, no more here than in any other science. We could no longer hope for theoretical results if the worldview drive were to become *all-dominating* and also deceive theoretical natures by means of its scientific forms. If over millennia the greatest scientific minds, passionately dominated by the will to science, have achieved not one piece of pure doctrine in philosophy, and all that is great that they have achieved, albeit imperfectly developed, they have achieved only owing to this will, then the worldview philosophers will certainly not be able to think that they can pro-

mote and definitively justify philosophical science on the side. Those who place the goal in the finite, who want to have their system and in time enough to be able live by it, are in no way called to do so. Here there is only *one* thing to do: with complete honesty, worldview philosophy must itself waive its claim to be science and thus cease at the same time—which surely is contrary to its purest intentions anyway—to confuse minds and hinder the progress of scientific philosophy.

Its ideal goal should remain simply the worldview, which by it essence is precisely not science. It should not let itself be swayed in this respect by that fanaticism for science that is all too widespread in our age and that disparages everything as "unscientific" that cannot be demonstrated with "scientific exactness." Science is *one* value among other, equally legitimate values. That in particular the value of the worldview stands with complete firmness on its own ground, that it is to be judged the habitus and achievement of the individual personality, whereas science is to be judged the achievement of the collective work of generations of investigators—that we have shown clearly in the foregoing. And just as both have different sources of value, they likewise have different functions, and different ways of having an effect and of teaching. Worldview philosophy teaches just as wisdom teaches: personality addresses personality. Thus, only one may teach and address the wider public in the [339]
style of *such* philosophy who is called to it either through a particularly significant individual manner and individual wisdom or as a servant of higher, practical—religious, ethical, legal, etc.—interests. However, science is impersonal. Its coworker does not need wisdom but theoretical talent. What he contributes enriches the treasure of eternal validities that must be beneficial to mankind. Yet, as we saw above, that holds to an exceptionally high degree of philosophical science.

Only after the decisive distinction of the one philosophy from the other has taken hold in the consciousness of the age does it become thinkable that philosophy could assume the form and language of genuine science and recognize that what is frequently praised and even imitated about it—its profundity—is imperfection. Profundity is a symptom of chaos that genuine science wants to transform into a cosmos, into a simple, completely clear, lucid order. As far as its actual doctrine reaches, genuine science knows no profundity. Every piece of complete science is a whole made of steps of thought, each of which is immediately evident and thus not at all profound. Profundity is a matter of wisdom, conceptual distinctness and clarity a matter of rigorous theory. Reminting the conjectures of profundity into definite rational formations is the essential process of the reconstitution of the rigorous sciences. Even the exact sciences had their long periods of profundity, and just as in the battles of the Renaissance, so too in the battles of the present—we dare to hope—philosophy will fight its way from the level of profundity to

that of scientific clarity. To do so, however, it needs only the right sureness of goal and the great will, which in full consciousness is aimed at the goal and exerts all available scientific energies. Our age is called an age of decadence. I cannot regard this reproach as justified. One will hardly be able to find in history an age in which such a sum of working forces was set into motion and was at work with such success. We might not always approve of the goals; we might also deplore that in quieter epochs, in which people passed their lives more contentedly, blossoms of the life of spirit grew, the likes of which we can neither find nor hope for in our epoch. And yet, even if what has been wanted and has been wanted again and again may in our age repel the aesthetic sense, for which the naive beauty of what has grown freely is of so much greater concern, what immense values nevertheless lie in the volitional [340]
sphere if only great wills find the right goals. One would do our age quite an injustice were one to impute to it the will to what is base. Whoever is capable of awakening belief, of giving rise to understanding and enthusiasm for the greatness of a goal, will easily find the strength to devote to that goal. I mean, our age is by its vocation a great age—only it suffers from the skepticism that has undermined the old, unclarified ideals. And it suffers precisely for that reason from the all too slight development and power of philosophy, which is still not far enough along, still not scientific enough to be able to overcome skeptical negativism (which calls itself 'positivism') by means of true positivism. Our age wants to believe only in "realities." Now, its strongest reality is science, and thus philosophical science is what our age needs most.

But if, interpreting the sense of our age, we turn to this great goal, then we must also realize that we can achieve it only in *one* way, namely if with the radicalism belonging to the essence of genuine philosophical science we accept nothing given in advance, accept nothing as a beginning that has been handed down nor allow ourselves to be blinded by any names, no matter how great, but rather seek to gain the beginnings through free devotion to the problems themselves and the demands radiating from them.

Certainly we also need history. Not, to be sure, after the manner of the historians, losing ourselves in the developmental contexts in which the great philosophies have grown up, but in order to allow the philosophies themselves, through their own spiritual content, to have a stimulating effect on us. Indeed, out of these historical philosophies philosophical *life* flows towards us with the entire wealth and strength of vital motivations, provided we understand how to look into them, to penetrate to the soul of their words and theories. But it is not through philosophies that we become philosophers. To get bogged down in the historical, to busy oneself with it in a historical-critical activity, and to want to achieve philosophical science by means of an eclectic treatment or an anachronistic renaissance: that results only in hopeless attempts. *Not philosophies but the things and the problems are the point from*

which the impulse to inquiry must issue. But by its essence, philosophy is the science of the true beginnings, of the origins, of the ῥιζώματα πάντων [roots of everything]. The science of the radical must itself be radical in its procedure—and in every respect. Above all it must not rest until it has obtained *its own* absolutely clear beginnings, that is, its own absolutely clear problems, the methods prescribed by the proper sense of these problems, and the lowermost field of work wherein the things are given with absolute clarity. Only one may *nowhere* renounce radical presuppositionlessness and, for instance, from the start identify such "things" with empirical "facts," thus to feign blindness to the ideas, which indeed are absolutely given in so great an extent in immediate intuition. We are under the spell of prejudices that date from the Renaissance. It is a matter of indifference to one truly without prejudice whether a judgment comes from Kant or Thomas Aquinas, whether from Darwin or Aristotle, from Helmholtz or Paracelsus. What is necessary is not the demand to see with one's own eyes, but instead that one not, under the compulsion of prejudices, interpret away what has been seen. Since in the most impressive sciences of modernity, the mathematical-physical sciences, the greatest amount of work by far was done by indirect methods, we are only too inclined to overestimate indirect methods and to misjudge the value of direct seizing upon. Yet it lies precisely in the essence of philosophy, insofar as it returns to the ultimate origins, that its scientific work moves in spheres of direct intuition, and it is the greatest step our age has to make to see that with philosophical intuition in the right sense, the *phenomenological seizing upon essences*, an endless field of work opens up and a science that, without any indirectly symbolizing and mathematizing methods, without the apparatus of inferences and proofs, nevertheless obtains an abundance of the most rigorous cognitions, which are decisive for *all* further philosophy. [341]

Translator's Note

In preparing the present translation, I have occasionally profited from Quentin Lauer's often elegant and insightful translation of the same text as published in Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 71–147. While the basis of this translation was provided by the version first published in *Logos*, account was taken of the critical edition of the text as published in *Aufsätze und Vorträge (1911–1921)*, ed. Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp, Husserliana XXV (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987), 3–62, but especially the text-critical notes on 337–38. This new translation differs from Lauer's most obviously due to the fact that Husserl's divisions between text-blocks and his use of italics have been restored in keeping with the original publication. However, due to the layout of the present text, two unmarked divisions or spaces could not be replicated; they fall between the paragraphs ending p. 252 and beginning p. 253, and between those ending p. 277 and beginning p. 278 above. My insertions have been placed in square brackets. Words that Husserl wrote in English in the original text are indicated by a concluding superscripted 'e'.

A few remarks are in order concerning some of the terms in the glossary below:

Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften: The latter is rendered here as 'human sciences'. The disadvantage of this translation is that it conceals the presence of *Geist* (spirit) in the German term. That this is no small disadvantage becomes clear in the course of the treatise, not least in the emphasis Husserl places on nature and spirit therein. He thinks these quite literally, and as a consequence he thinks the sciences that bear on these regions as the "sciences of nature and of spirit." The term 'human sciences' is justified by the fact the spirit at issue for Husserl is, of course, the human spirit. Note that *Geister* (literally 'spirits') is rendered as 'minds' here. Finally, for the sake of economy 'spiritual' has often been used to translate *geistig* or constructions with *Geistes-* instead of expanding the given phrase into 'x of spirit'. It should be noted that 'spirit' and 'spiritual' are to be understood broadly and not in a specifically religious sense.

Prinzipiell: Although uncommon in current English, 'principial' has been used as its translation. The *OED* defines 'principial' as 'standing at the beginning; initial'. Beyond economy of expression, the chief reason for using this term here rather than the more common 'in principle' is that Husserl himself sets off his understanding of the term from other possibilities by the following definition: "Here, as throughout this writing, we are using the word '*prinzipiell*' in a rigorous sense, with reference to highest and thus most radical essential universalities or essential necessities" (*Ideas I*, 77 n.).

Ding – Sache: In order to distinguish Husserl's use of *Ding* from that of *Sache*, the former has been rendered as 'physical thing', the latter simply as 'thing'. In cases in which *Ding* is modified, 'physical' has generally been replaced with the pertinent adjective (e.g. 'visible' or 'sensible'). *Sache* appears only on its own or in the phrase *die Sachen selbst* (the things themselves).

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beginnings : *Anfänge* (cf. ἀρχαί)
Being : *Sein*
being(s) : *Seiendes*, *Wesen*
culture : *Bildung*, *Kultur*
essence : *Wesen*
existent : *Daseiendes*
existence, existential : *Dasein*, *Daseins-*
experience : *Erfahrung*
experiential : *Erfahrungs-*, *erfahrend*
experiential sciences : *Erfarhungswissenschaften*
history : *Geschichte*
historical science, science of history : *Historie*
human sciences : *Geisteswissenschaften*
humanity : *Humanität*
immersion : *Vertiefung*
justification : *Begründung*
justify (v.) : *begründen*
corporeal : *körperlich*
legitimation : *Rechtfertigung*
legitimate (v.) : *rechtfertigen*
life-view : *Lebensanschauung*
lived experience : *Erlebnis*
mankind : *Menschheit*
material : *dinglich*
materiality : *Dinglichkeit*
memory : *Erinnerung*
minds : *Geister*
nature-views : *Naturanschauungen*
normation : *Normierung*
(i.e. 'providing [sth] with its norm')
object : *Gegenstand*, *Objekt*
objectual : *gegenständlich*
objectuality : *Gegenständlichkeit*
physical thing : *Ding* (≠ *Sache*)
presentation : *Vorstellung*
principial : *prinzipiell*
recollection: *Wiedererinnerung*
remember (v.) : *Erinnern*
scientific character : *Wissenschaftlichkeit*
scientificity : *Wissenschaftlichkeit*
spirit : *Geist*
spiritual, of spirit : *Geistes-*, *geistig*
thing : *Sache* (≠ *Ding*)
view : *Anschauung*
world-science : *Weltwissenschaft*
(i.e. 'science of the world')
worldview : *Weltanschauung*
