4. Recent Research in Logic

This review of the advanced literature in logic at the *fin-de-siècle* by the 23-year-old Heidegger, clearly one of his "juvenilia," is nevertheless of seminal importance for his future development. The theme of "logic" will recur throughout Heidegger's path of thought, first as a student who will write his two dissertations on logical problems, the first on "judgment in psychologism" and the second on the onto-logical problems of "category" and "meaning." The overwhelming influence of Emil Lask's *Logik der Philosophie* on the second dissertation will already be remarked in 1915 by Lask's teacher and Heidegger's *Doktorvater*, Heinrich Rickert, "perhaps even more than he [Heidegger] is himself aware" (see appendix I). This influence will persist in Heidegger's overt orientation toward a *philosophical* (transcendental, phenomenological, hermeneutical, ontological) logic in the various *Logik* courses of his teaching career (WS 1916–1917, WS 1925–1926, SS 1928) and beyond, which inevitably become courses in the philosophy of language (SS 1934, WS 1937–1938, SS 1944). Already in the 1912 review, Heidegger's proclivity toward the grammatical fringe phenomena is apparent: the exclamatory impersonal, the question, the existential sentence, even the negative judgment. The difference between the existential and the logical expressed most graphically in the neo-Kantian Lotze's impersonal "It '*is*' not, rather It *holds* [*gilt* = carries weight, is effective, valid]," which at several points in this review is expressed variously as the difference between the entitative and the validating, psychological occurrences and their logical content, beings and their meaning, objects and their objectivity, things and their thingliness, emerges as Heidegger's very first model for the ontological

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Heidegger's review essay "Neuere Forschungen über Logik" was first published in three issues of the monthly journal *Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland* [Literary Review for Catholic Germany] 38 (October, November, December 1912), no. 10, cols. 465–72; no. 11, cols. 517–24; no. 12, cols. 565–70. This review journal in its opening section is entitled "Overviews," as opposed to the second section entitled "Reviews." It was edited in 1912 by one of Heidegger's teachers, Joseph Sauer of Freiburg. Heidegger's overview is reprinted in its three parts as I, II, and III in *GA* 1, 17–43. The following paraphrase and summary by Theodore Kisiel is based on a comparison of the original 1912 text and the reprinted version in the *GA* edition.

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difference between beings and their be-ing. The historical oblivion of this difference is already articulated in Lask's plaint against the "hypostasizing" of the logical into the metaphysically entitative (Platonism) and sensorially entitative (psychologism). Lask's effort to free the "domain of validity" from its admixtures with the entitative "is a demand which in the entire history of philosophy has never been fulfilled in a fully conscious and consequential fashion." The young Heidegger's obvious fascination with the transcendental value of the valid, "this treasure of the German language," will later be denounced by him in *Being and Time* (156) as a "word idol." What remains after the disenchantment with value and validity is the phenomenological domain of sense, meaning, "truth," now understood as prelogical "existentials" of Dasein.

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Recent Research in Logic

I

Ever since the turn of the century, scientific logic has been conducting a full-scale clarification of its own principles. The very possibility and fact of such a critical meditation-on-its-sense [*Besinnung*] basically serves to undermine the traditional idea of logic as a finally fixed summary of forms and rules of thought which are not subject to any further expansion or deepening. The "sublation" (in Hegel's full sense of *Aufhebung*) of this traditional view has warranted the continuation of *logical problems* that are now found to include undeveloped fields of research. A thoroughgoing cognizance of the sense and scope of this battle over principles assumes an appearance of strangeness with the affirmation of a continuing store of logical problems, but it also positively illuminates the way for the demonstration of these problems. The general structure of the following overview has accordingly already been made transparent. Nevertheless, I regard an addendum on method not unnecessary, because this method in no way immediately emerges in the special character of the works to be mentioned, nor does it emerge from the task before us of presenting an overview and orientation.

Our overall goal of reporting the current logical problems brings with it a double duty.

1. Since the problems in philosophy are intimately bound together, where one problem engenders or supersedes another, a certain context of connections will have to be established, even though it will not be strictly systematic. A complete and closed systematics would be an overly daring venture in view of today's plethora of unresolved questions, but would also take us away from our assigned task.

2. This task yields its own principle of selection of the pertinent literature. Investigations of ground-laying significance, works that advance research and those that offer critical points of contact shall be identified. The many compre-

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hensive surveys of logic and the like will naturally go unnamed, which in no way implies a value judgment, while attention will be drawn more to special investigations whose value has come to be appreciated by the scientific philosophy of the present. That a certain lack of balance in content and presentation will still remain is something of which the reviewer is perhaps best aware.

Before proceeding any further, an endeavor such as ours must provide a suitable answer to the question, *What is logic?* Already here we stand before a problem whose solution is reserved for the future. Basically, however, the current lack of a univocal and universally acceptable definition of logic cannot impair the progress of research in its domain. This irrelevance by no means frees us from the urgency of becoming acutely aware of the authentic essence and object of logic. This demand has found its fulfillment in the already noted clarification of principles which coincides with a vigorous renunciation of *psychologism*. That psychologism cannot be understood merely as a "philosopher's fad" can be demonstrated without difficulty by a meditation-on-the-sense of the history of the problem. The widespread psychological research that is pursued virtually to a passion, the psychological attitude in ethical and aesthetic investigations, the dominance of psychological method in pedagogy and juridical practice, the extremes to which "psychological sensitivity" is taken in literature and art, all these attest to the "age of psychology." It should accordingly not be surprising if this general trend toward the psychological would also affect logic. The state of affairs is however actually just the reverse. The antagonism in critical idealism between psychological and transcendental method coupled with the long dominance of the *psychological* interpretation of Kant founded by Schopenhauer, Herbart, Fries, has with the rise of natural science likewise raised psychology to a comprehensive significance and given rise to a "naturalization of consciousness." The problem of psychologism in its broader aspect has been elaborated by O. Ewald in conjunction with the concrete historical (but not philological) question, "whether it is psychologism or transcendentalism that was grounded in the essence of Kantian philosophy."[1] The question is today probably decided in favor of the view of transcendental logic, which since the seventies is basically represented by Hermann Cohen and his Marburg school as well as by Windelband and Rickert. According to this trend, Kant in his *Critique* did not investigate the psychological origin of knowledge but instead the logical value of its validity. This *logical* interpretation of Kant and its further development is of importance for our problem in its elevation of the proper value of the logical. Natorp can accordingly say with some justification "that for them [the Marburgers], there is not all that much left to learn from Husserl's elegant arguments (in the first volume of the *Logical Investigations*), which we can only welcome."[2]

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1. O. Ewald, *Kants Methodologie in ihren Grundzügen* [Kant's Methodology in its Basic Features] (Berlin, 1906), 29.

2. Paul Natorp, *Kant und die Marburger Schule* (Berlin, 1912), 6.

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Nevertheless, we ourselves are inclined to attribute a far-reaching significance to Husserl's penetratingly profound and very propitiously formulated *Investigations*,[3] for they have truly broken the psychological spell and brought the above-mentioned clarification of principles into play. Husserl here does not hesitate to express his gratitude for the influential suggestions that he received from the *Wissenschaftslehre* (1837)[4] of the Austrian mathematician and philosopher, Bernard Bolzano. The planned reprint of this now rare book will probably soon appear. In this connection, the name of a German mathematician cannot be left unmentioned. Gottlob Frege's logical-mathematical researches are in my opinion not yet appreciated in their true significance, let alone exhausted. What he has written in his works on "Sense and Meaning"[5] and on "Concept and Object"[6] cannot be disregarded by any philosophy of mathematics. But it is also equally valuable for a universal theory of the concept. While Frege overcame psychologism in principle, Husserl in his *Prolegomena to a Pure Logic*[7] has systematically and comprehensively confronted the essence, relativistic consequences, and theoretical worthlessness of psychologism. Husserl's critique is directed in particular against John Stuart Mill, Christoph Sigwart, Bruno Erdmann, and Theodor Lipps. Recently, however, Lipps seems to have retreated from his earlier position, a move which may disencumber his conception of psychology and its tasks, which in many of its parts manifests an affinity with Husserl's conception. But the continuing attempt to maintain psychologism is demonstrated by the otherwise discerning work of G. Heymans, *The Laws and Elements of Scientific Thought*.[8]

Psychologism in general may be regarded as the prevalence of psychological principles, methods, and modes of demonstration in the practice of logic. Logic deals with thinking. Thinking undeniably has to be organized within that complex

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3. Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen* (Halle: Niemeyer, [vol. 1] 1900, [vol. 2] 1901).

4. [Editor's note: Bernard Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre. Versuch einer ausführlichen und grössentheils neuen Darstellung der Logik mit steter Rücksicht auf deren bisherige Bearbeiter* (Sulzbach: J. E. v. Seidel, 1837). The *Rundschau* version of the overview incorrectly gives the publication date of 1832. Translated into English by Rolf George as *Theory of Science: Attempt at a Detailed and in the main Novel Exposition of Logic with Constant Attention to Earlier Authors* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).]

5. Gottlob Frege, "Über Sinn und Bedeutung," *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* 100 (1892), 25–50.

6. Gottlob Frege, "Über Begriff und Gegenstand," *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie* 16 (1892), 192–205.

7. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. 1.

8. G. Heymans, *Die Gesetze und Elemente des wissenschaftlichen Denkens* (Leipzig, 2nd ed., 1905). This work, which teems with inconsistencies almost on every page, will be cited in the next paragraphs in order to characterize psychologism in a more concrete illustration. Moreover, in the present state of logical research, the attempt to refute all psychologistic errors is an exercise in futility.

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of facts that characterizes a totality of psychic processes. From this, it at once follows that psychology is the truly basic science that must formally absorb logic into itself. The bases for this claim can be reinforced further. Logic is concerned, among other things, with the "laws of thought," whose paramount significance must be acknowledged. But where are these "laws" of thought to be drawn with more precise methodological certainty if not with the operative means of the exact science called "experimental psychology"? Heymans enlarges the task and elevates the competence of psychology still further. It must examine the *facts of consciousness* given in knowledge and in scientific convictions in relation to their conscious and unconscious (!) causes. Such a "psychological investigation of the appearances of thought can then lead to their justification; [...] a decision regarding the cognitive value of our knowledge can be methodically investigated only by way of psychological investigation." Heymans even speaks of an "epistemological experiment," by which he means the contemporaneous presence in consciousness of proof and the scientific conviction that it causes, the experimental setup, so to speak, within which the essence and law of knowledge can be studied. The proclaimed similarity of epistemology and chemistry totally dispels any doubt over whether H. really regards the *theory* of knowledge, epistemo*logy*, as an empirical science. His views on logic in the strict sense now likewise become fully comprehensible. Logic contains realities, psychic actualities, as its objects. The so-called basic laws of thought are laws of *facts*, and these factual laws regulate the psychic process of thought. The basis for their necessity and universal validity is a particular logical-psychological organization of the intellect. By this, however, H. in no way claims that precisely this intellectual structure is the only possible and necessary structure. The genus Man would also have to be thought to accord with other laws.

It is at this point that the empiricistic and relativistic tendency of psychologism becomes obvious. The argument that psychologism in general is internally contradictory has been thoroughly substantiated and widely applied by Husserl. A valuable contribution to the critique is also provided by Geyser.[9] While it brings nothing essentially new in critical viewpoints, the work is especially valuable in its historical second part, which shows that psychologism is not just today's "-ism." Whether Kant *in his basic critical tendency* actually should be included among the psychologists cannot in my opinion merely be left undecided but must be emphatically *denied*, despite the many passages that speak against this, without having to side with the extreme neo-Kantians for the corroboration of this thesis.

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9. Joseph Geyser, "Systematische und historische Darstellung der anthropologischen Auffassung des Erkennens" [Systematic and Historical Presentation of the Anthropological View of Knowledge], *Jahrbuch des Vereins für christliche Erziehungswissenschaft* 4 (1911), 98–183. We shall come back to this author's *Grundlagen der Logik und Erkenntnislehre* [Foundations of Logic and Epistemology] (see provisionally this review, *Literarische Rundschau* [1911], 287) in another context.

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Fundamental for the recognition of the absurdity and theoretical barrenness of psychologism is the distinction between psychic act and logical content, between the real occurrence of thought in the course of time and the ideal, extratemporal, identical *sense* [Sinn], in short, the distinction between what "is" and what "holds" with binding validity. This pure sense, intrinsically durable [*in sich Bestand habender*] as it is in its content, is the object of logic. Thus, logic is from the start stripped of the very character of an empirical discipline. The "function" of the basic logical laws as norms of thought upon deeper consideration proves to be a derivative dimension. The principles of contradiction and excluded middle are ideal relations between the objects of thought as such, for which it is totally without import as to when and how they are actually thought. The designation "laws" should therefore be consistently avoided for these relations of meaning in order to mark them off from the laws of nature even linguistically.

It is only after these fundamental distinctions have become clear that the definition of the essence and task of a pure logic can follow a secure course. The final goal of knowledge is a complete objective unity of the *contents* of knowledge. This unity is produced by the unity of a "coherence of reasons" or "foundational context" [*Begründungszusammenhang*] in its connection to and through "laws." In the purely theoretical sciences, the investigation will encounter basic laws that govern any context of knowledge whatsoever. Whatever the empirical sciences need from the theoretical for their durable content, they draw from the "nomological" disciplines.

The basic question of logic now passes over to the conditions of knowledge in general. Logic is the theory of theory, a study of science. Along with the primally theoretical [*Urtheoretisches*], the fundamental concepts (categories), their relations and their systematics, it studies the logical structure of the particular sciences, seeks to show the distinctive moments of their construction and method, demarcates them in their specific provinces, and finally strives to find a unity again in a system of the sciences. To fulfill its task, logic must remain in constant contact with the other sciences. It also becomes evident that this task, despite the profitable and not yet exhausted preliminary works,[10] will not be brought to a close so soon.

The examination and critique of psychologism has brought out the heterogeneity of the psychical, here a spatio-temporal reality, and the logical. This logical realm of the valid must now be brought into relief over against the sensorial enti-

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10. I am thinking of Wundt's *Logic*, but especially of Sigwart's "Theory of Method," the second part of his *Logic*, which is now in its fourth edition edited by Heinrich Maier. Reference may also be made to the newly edited edition of Lotze's *Logik*, Philosopische Bibliothek 141 (Leipzig, 1912), which may still be regarded as the basic book of modern logic, even though it has been superseded in some of its parts (theory of judgment, ethicizing tendency).

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tative as well as the suprasensorial metaphysical. This is a requirement which in the entire course of the history of philosophy has never been fulfilled in a thoroughly conscious and consequential fashion. Plato will always remain the prototype for the "hypostasizing" of the logical into the metaphysically entitative [*metaphysisch Seiendes*]. Lask, in a sweeping and penetrating study on the *Logic of Philosophy*,[11] has formulated the above requirement quite clearly and thus has at once paved the way for a more precise conceptual definition of philosophy as a science of values. The work as a whole is a broadening and deepening of Kant's transcendental logic developed on the basis of transcendental-logical Criticism. It is a broadening because Lask, contrary to Kant's containment of the problem of the categories to the sensorial entitative realm, commandeers a "new domain of application" for the category, namely, philosophy itself. Lask aspires to a theory of categories that embraces the totality of the thinkable in its two hemispheres of the entitative and the valid. His attempt should with good reason be placed among the series of great thinkers who have already devoted themselves to a theory of categories.

The logic of the categories of being [*Sein*] was created by Kant. Proper understanding of these categories requires that we bear in mind that being has here forfeited its translogical autonomy, that being has been transformed into a concept of transcendental logic. That does not mean that the objects are "stamped with a clear and distinct logical content"; only the objectivity of the objects, the thingliness over against the thingly, the being over against the beings is of logical value, a form-content. The union of form (category) and material is called "sense" [*Sinn*]. Knowing for transcendental philosophy means the enclosing of material (the sensory) with the category. Logic, whose cognitive objects are precisely the categories, can therefore know these forms only by in turn surrounding them anew with other forms. The philosophical category is therefore the form of form. If *being* is the "regional category" for sensory-intuitive material, then *validating* [Gelten] is the constitutive category for non-sensory material. What was formerly taken to be a simple form proves to be an interrelation of validating and validated. Consistently, the logical form of validity in turn stands in the category of validating. We thereby arrive at the form of the form of the form. Lask does not downplay the *regressus in infinitum* that has been opened up here. It signifies nothing less "than that the category is capable of becoming the infinite material of the category" (p. 112). A doubling, a pairing of constitutive content now runs through the entire system of categories. "The idea of having the constitutive category of being and the philosophical-constitutive content stand next to one another provides the basis for a

11. Emil Lask, *Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre. Eine Studie über den Herrschaftsbereich der logischen Form* [The Logic of Philosophy and the Theory of Categories: A Study of the Region Governed by Logical Form] (Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1911).

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complete understanding of any general logical forms whatsoever" (p. 138), as these are to be found in reflexive categories. For his discussion of the type of reflexive category, Lask makes the categories of *identity* basic.[12] Up to this point, the meaning-differentiating moment of the pure logical form in the two constitutive regions had been, respectively, the sensory or non-sensory *material*. But the shaping of meaning [*Bedeutung*] can also be effected by the "subject-object duplicity." The subjectivity is the creator of the reflexive sphere. Its regional category is identity, the category for "something in general" or "anything whatsoever" [*Etwas überhaupt*]. All distinctions of categorial content disappear in the reflexive category, which declares only its own formal meaning and not the meaning of its material content. Even though the reflexive region owes its "being" to subjectivity, once it has attained duration and persistence [*Bestand*] it *holds* objectively, it *validates* [es gilt]. There are formal relations that in their validity are removed from the arbitrariness of thinking, but only to the extent that thought itself is granted the power of being able to seize and commandeer [*bemächtigen*] any content whatsoever without regard to its special constitutive character. The peculiar character of the reflexive forms is their *general* meaning. Furthermore, Lask investigates the relations between the reflexive and constitutive categories, the table of philosophical categories (p. 169), dedicates a special chapter to philosophical knowledge, and concludes his work with an instructive historical excursus on the philosophical categories in theoretical philosophy.

In its own interest, critique of these detailed as well as sketchy declarations will be reserved in anticipation of the promised complete system of logic.

II

It seems to me that the same reserve must be extended to a completely new science which it is necessary to sketch out a bit in our context. This is the *Theory of Objects* of Meinong[13] and his students, which upon its first appearance was assessed in so many different ways. Even if the sudden emergence of a new and—as the theory of objects claims to be—comprehensive science immediately arouses doubt, our first obligation still remains to try to understand it. "Everything that is something is called an object. The region of objects thus includes everything in general, regardless of whether it is thought or unthought or at all thinkable. In particular, it is not even a determination of the object for it *to be*, that it exists or persists. Every object is something, but not every something *is*."

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12. Cf. Wilhelm Windelband, "Über Gleichheit und Identität" [On Sameness and Identity], *Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse* (1910), Treatise 14.

13. Alexius Meinong, *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie* [Investigations in the Theory of Objects and Psychology], ed. Meinong (Leipzig, 1904). Cf. in addition *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* 129 (1906), 130 (1907).

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Every object has a *being-so* that is independent of its being: this is a sentence which upon being reversed is no longer valid. An object with a contradictory being-so (square circle) cannot be, it is an impossible object. Meinong designates being and being-such/being-so as *objectives* and the objects to which they pertain—non-being as well as being is a being-objective—as *objects* in the strict sense.

These kinds of terminological stipulations cover a large space, but in my view of philosophy their "object" is by no means new. The investigations wish to be regarded as provisional and offer nothing conclusive. Ameseder attempts to group the already known and named objects "even if this grouping corresponds to no objective division and distribution." He distinguishes the two main groups into nonfounding objects and founding objects (comparative relations).

The first group includes the "objects of things" (matter) that are exclusively objects, since objectives never have actuality. Also to be counted in this group are the "objects of sensation," colors, sounds, etc. These objects may well be but not exist, while they are at once "co-apprehended" with determinations of time and place. Ameseder now brings out several relations between "apprehended" and "co-apprehended," e.g., that color requires a determination of place but not this particular determination. Valid as comparative relations are sameness, similarity, and difference. Between the last two, Ameseder stipulates certain relations like *coincidence*, which means that "two objects cannot be similar without also being different and, inversely, cannot be different without also being similar" (p. 100).

To my mind, the inversion does *not in general* hold. The author in fact conceives "different" quantitatively. Similarity and difference therefore persist between objects of the same kind. Objects that are different in kind—let me name triangle and electrometer—are accordingly not different, no more, of course, than they are the same. The concept of similarity is nowhere defined. The determination of *nearness* as temporal or locational *similarity* in opposition to *remoteness* as an equivalent kind of *difference* prompts one to conjecture that the two concepts differ only quantitatively. According to the author, therefore, infinite remoteness is zero-valued nearness. The unilateral regard for the quantitative moment prevents the author from developing the concept of similarity in general, which in mathematics receives an exact definition. But whether this mathematical concept is the concept of similarity in general and not a special one remains to be seen. In any case, an acute-angled and an obtuse-angled triangle are two triangles, just as nearness and remoteness are two stretches of distance. But their difference in no way gives us similarity. In addition, Ameseder discusses "objects of configuration" and "objects of combination," e.g., "a and b." Among the latter objects, which are to have all magnitudes, a sharp distinction should be made between "and" and "+."[14]

14. Cf. Heinrich Rickert, "Das Eine, die Einheit und die Eins. Bemerkungen zur Logik

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The present overview has not broached special questions for the purposes of a proper critique, but only wishes to show that the investigations in the theory of objects actually have their problems. Whether they of are a kind that is intrinsic to a unique new science in need of construction should at this point be briefly explored. The reason why the above investigations have been briefly outlined in our context is to raise the question of whether the *theory of objects* constitutes a particular region of logic. Meinong says it does not, and this denial is justified by his conception of logic as a *theoretically practical* discipline. It has to establish the rules and laws that lead to a maximum of knowledge. However, logic as the study of an art presupposes the theoretical and cannot be regarded, purely and simply for itself, as a science. If we recall our earlier conceptual definition of "pure logic," it will not be difficult to recognize that the theory of objects belongs in it. Worthy of note here is the external circumstance that Meinong (p. 22) explicitly remarks that his are the "very same goals" that drove Husserl into his *Logical Investigations*. Meinong also explicitly designates "symbolic logic," "logistics," as a part of the theory of objects, as well as mathematics as a special region, which coincides exactly with the tendency to include mathematics within logic.

Accordingly, what is new is only the *name* and the profuse terminology. This is not to deny that the current investigations, especially those of Mally, are full of penetrating and subtle ideas that are significant for a still outstanding systematic *theory of relations*. In like fashion can the theory of judgment draw a wealth of suggestions especially from the study of the objectives, as can the still quite problematic theory of negation, among other disciplines. And finally, the new terminology should not even be totally seen as ballast, for there are actually some things in logic that remain unnamed. I am thinking of the fine distinctions that continue to be discovered in the ongoing analysis of *meaning*.

It should not be left unsaid that the purely logical character of the investigations is *not* preserved. Along with metaphysical "inclusions" (pp. 91–92), there are also entanglements in psychology, despite Meinong's expressions of fundamental opposition to psychologism. That relapses into psychology are hard to avoid suggests that the sharp separation of logic from psychology perhaps cannot be maintained. We must make a distinction here. It is one thing for psychology to found logic in principle and to secure its *value of validity*, and another for it to assume the role of becoming an initial sphere of activity, an operational basis in logic. The second is in fact the case, since we have to do with the peculiar fact that harbors problems within itself that can perhaps never be fully clarified, namely, the fact that *the logical is embedded in the psychical*. But the position of psychology established in this way is still in need of further precision. Experimental psychology remains irrel-

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des Zahlbegriffs" [The One, Oneness, and One: Remarks on the Logic of the Concept of Number], *Logos* II (1911–12), 50 ff.

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evant for logic. However, even the so-called "self-observational" psychology only becomes useful in a particular attitude. The investigation passes over to the *meanings* [Bedeutungen], the *sense* [Sinn] of the acts and thus becomes a study of meanings, a *phenomenology*[15] of consciousness. With the critical rejection of psychologism, Husserl at the same time positively grounded phenomenology in a theoretical way and himself successfully put it to work in this difficult area. In the sense just established, psychology will always remain in philosophy's nexus, even if it may otherwise constitute itself, and rightly so, as one of the research domains ordered next to natural science.

Let us now shift our attention away from these general logical problems to the special questions.

After Kant had made the basic problem of critical philosophy absolutely clear and went in search of a "Guiding Clue for the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding," he felt compelled to return to the judgment. Kant's recourse to a table of judgments is today rejected as a mistake in a number of respects. But there is still a kernel of truth here, since it is in the judgment that Kant touched the very nerve of knowledge. "But we can trace all actions of the understanding back to a judgment, so that the understanding in general can be represented as a faculty of judging." It is the merit of recent logic for having made the *judgment itself* into a problem. The fact that there are a great number of theories of judgment available today may be taken as proof for the difficulty of the problem.

Judging is a psychic process, a distinctive concurrence and togetherness of representations. The judgment comes to us in the form of a grammatical sentence. The determination that every judgment assumes a position in the disjunction "true-untrue" marks the distinctiveness of the judgment. For this disjunction cannot meaningfully be applied to bare representations nor to volitional acts nor to mental movements. What precisely is true or untrue? From what has been said, it is the concurrence of representations. But can we say that the occurrence of a "process" is true or untrue? An occurrence *is* or *is not* and so stands outside the either-or of true-untrue. What is true is instead the representational *content*, what we *mean*, the *sense*. The judgment is a sense. With this, we have made the transition from psychology to logic. The sense of the judgment "Gold is yellow" has a particular structure. When we get to know this structure, we will also be able to define what a judgment is, logically considered. It has already been remarked that the judgment assumes a fixed form, so to speak, when it is put down in a *grammatical sentence*. This sentence shows its usual form in a conjunction of subject and predicate through the copula.

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15. Edmund Husserl, "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," *Logos* I (1910–11), 289–341. [English translation: "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," trans. Marcus Brainard, *New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* II (2002), 249–95; original German pagination is reproduced in the margins of the translation.]

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This immediately prompts us to go further and say that the judgment combines the content of the subject-representation with that of the predicate-representation.

Was grammar actually the sure guide to knowledge of the logical structure of judgments? There is a cry of "Fire" from someone! [*Es ruft jemand "Feuer"!* = Someone is crying "Fire"!][16] The cry can be true or untrue, so it is a judgment. But where are the subject and predicate that are supposed to be combined by the copula? In the judgment "It's thundering!" [*Es donnert!*] we search in vain for the subject-representation as well as the copula. Which of the three linguistic formulations is to provide direction for finding the logical articulation? Is the logical sense of "Fire!" not richer than the single word? And what is the meaning of the "It"? Is it permissible to see the subject in It? And if we grant that the judgment is normally a combination of two representational contents, how is the relation between the two to be characterized more precisely? Does "Gold is yellow" mean that gold belongs in the extension of the concept yellow? But this interpretation can in no way be imposed upon the judgment "a is greater than b." When Lehmen[17] declares that through the judgment the *identity* of the two concepts, or more precisely, the identity of *what is known* through the concepts, is maintained, then this definition, if it is at all tenable, totally excludes a hypothetical judgment like "If the temperature drops to 0° Celsius, water freezes."

The impersonals and existential sentences have been from the start the cross of scientific logic. But they have also for the most part forced it to deliberate meticulously on the distinction between the grammatical sentence and the logical judgment. We should therefore not be misled into orienting logic upon grammar, even less so since many sentence-forms express no judgments whatsoever.[18] In some cases, however, the productivity of investigations of language by way of descriptive psychology should not be underestimated. I am thinking especially of the problem of the *question*,[19] which can be resolved neither purely logically nor purely psychologically.

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16. [Editor's note: The prolific usage of the impersonal judgment in German idiom far exceeds English practice, and therefore the possibility of accurate translation. But it is important here to convey the impersonal tone as much as possible in translation, with an eye (ear) to the later Heidegger's coinages of exclamatory impersonals like "It's worlding!" (*Es weltet!* already in 1919) to express the nuanced actions of being.

A favorite English substitute has become the "there is" of *es gibt*, a common German idiom which only the later Heidegger will exploit in its literal sense as "It's giving!"]

17. Alfons Lehmen, *Lehrbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 1 (1909), 55 ff.

18. Alexius Meinong, *Über Annahmen* [On Assumptions] (Leipzig, 1902), chap. 2, § 6. The second edition (1910) was not available to me. Meinong wants to establish the "assumptions" as a region *between* representations and judgment. We shall especially take the *logical dignity* of assumptions into our consideration.

19. The "question" is not treated comprehensively. Definitive results regarding its "essence" are not available. Cf. Stadler, "Die Frage als Prinzip des Erkennens und die 'Einleitung' der Kritik der reinen Vernunft" [The Question as Principle of Cognition and the "Introduction" to the *Critique of Pure Reason*], *Kant-Studien* 13 (1908); Josoph Klemens Kreibig,

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The wholly alien character of the domains of logic and grammar has been forcefully demonstrated by Lask in his work on the judgment.[20]

The question is: What is the basis for the *univocal* [einsinnig] "articulation of the statement's content," the "unchangable" relational direction between subject and predicate? The theoretical structure of sense is to be reduced to the constitution of objects, which, however, without transgressing the region of the logical, only works for the logic oriented upon Kant. For this demonstration of the theoretically primal articulation, reference must be made to the previously reviewed work of the author [Lask, *Logic of Philosophy*]. In that work, Lask designated the union of categorial form and categorial material as "sense." Knowing accordingly means the enclosing of material with form. In the judgment, accordingly, the categorial form (predicate) is asserted of the alogical material as subject. With his theory of predication, Lask attempts to bring Kant and Aristotle as close as possible to one another. For Kant, judging means subsuming the sensory-intuitive material under the categorial concepts of the understanding. Likewise in Aristotle, the categories are predicates of the basic category of substance; but these predicates are of a metalogical nature. The judgment "a is the cause of b" is according to the grammatical theory interpreted in such a way that "a" presents the subject and "cause of b" the predicate. Lask divides it into the material (a and b) and into the category causality. His theory can be applied to the impersonals without difficulty. The sensory-intuitive material "thundering" stands in the category existence. Lask directly confronts the difficulty that the division into alogical material and logical form cannot always be immediately carried out in the judgments, that moreover already finished concepts, i.e., formed material, appear in the subject position. The category reaches, so to speak, through the already effected categorial envelopment to the original material. This material can therefore be categorially affected in various directions and numerous ways. The relation between the judicative elements (material and form), the *copula*, has in the Laskian theory the indifferent character of a "relatedness in general." Earlier attempts defined the "is" now as identity (Lotze), now as "classification of an object in the content of another" (Erdmann), or directly even as *existing* (Brentano).[21]

Die intellektuellen Funktionen. Untersuchungen über Grenzfragen der Logik, Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie [The Intellectual Functions: Investigations of the Boundary Questions of Logic, Psychology, and Epistemology] (Vienna, 1909), § 65. Kreibig regards the question as a complex phenomenon and classifies it under the "thoughts that are like judgments."

20. Emil Lask, *Die Lehre vom Urteil* [The Theory of Judgment] (Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1912), 44–79.

21. For orientation on the various theories of judgment, see Joseph Geyser, *Grundlagen der Logik und Erkenntnislehre. Eine Untersuchung der Formen und Prinzipien objektiv wahrer Erkenntnis* [Foundations of Logic and Epistemology: An Investigation of the Forms and Principles of Objectively True Knowledge] (Münster, 1909), 172 ff.; also Kreibig, *Die intellektuellen Funktionen*, 161 ff.

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What Lask is after in the direction of transcendental philosophy, is sought by Geyser on an Aristotelian foundation and in kindred ways. and by Kreibig in the investigations that have already been cited. Geyser's work must be granted fundamental significance because, for the very first time on the Aristotelian-Scholastic side, it has broken with the traditional conception and treatment of logic and has placed the *problems* in the foreground.

Geyser investigates the forms and principles of an *objectively normative* knowledge. The concept of the object here must be distinguished from the critical concept. Object (subject) of the judgment is "the real and non-real object that is intended *to be presented* by the judicative thought and that consequently stands over against this intention as measure and norm" (p. 51). Object is "objective givenness" which "serves as the norm of affirmation and negation" (p. 54) for a judgment. The judicative decision thus decrees whether the intentional thought is fulfilled or not fulfilled by the object. Likewise in Lask, the judicative decision stands before the question of truth, namely, whether accordance or contrariety of truth falls to the sense of the judgment in question. The two conceptions seem to converge and yet are far apart. Their ways separate over the concept of *objectivity*.

Geyser's criticism of the "supra-individual I"[22] does not seem to me to be wholly apt. The conception of the concept arose directly from the attempt to make truth and its validity independent of the individual subject. The concept should be understood purely logically as the system of validating forms of knowledge which in actual knowing are, to be sure, stored in an individual subject, just as Geyser has to require a "bearer" for pure intentional thought. Geyser's "pure thoughts" approach what Meinong calls the "objectives."[23] And I regard this phenomenon, not in its prevalence but in its "nature" and structure, as problematic.

A special problem of the theory of judgment lies in the *negative* judgment. In cognitive dignity, the positive judgment unquestionably has the priority. But considered in their logical structure, the two prove to be equal in rank. In affirmation, the accordance of truth falls to the "fragment of sense," i.e., to the value-indifferent relation between category and categorial material; in negation, the contrariety of truth. The "underlying support" for the judicative decision is the same in both kinds of judgments.[24] For Geyser, "the negative judgment is not the simple counter-

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22. See Jonas Cohn, *Voraussetzungen und Ziele des Erkennens. Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Logik* [Presuppositions and Goals of Knowledge: Investigations of the Basic Questions of Logic] (Leipzig, 1908). Cohn's theory goes back to Heinrich Rickert's *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis* [The Object of Knowledge] (Tübingen, 2nd ed., 1904). This work, which is foundational for the grounding of logic as a science of value, will appear shortly in a new and expanded edition. A student of Rehmke has recently written a critique: O. Schlunke, *Die Lehre vom Bewusstsein bei Heinrich Rickert* [The Theory of Consciousness in Heinrich Rickert] (Leipzig, 1911).

23. Meinong, *Über Annahmen*, chap. 7, 150–211.

24. Lask, *Die Lehre vom Urteil*, 181 ff.

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image of the positive judgment, but is logically richer by one thought. This consists in the "negation of the preliminary positive judgment."[25] Geyser is perhaps led to his interpretation by the "*not*" occurring in the *sentence*, which expresses the *non*-fulfillment of the intentional thought in the subject. The positive judgment, however, posits the intention as *fulfilled* without express linguistic confirmation. In my view, Geyser's theory of judgment itself requires the coordination of positive and negative judgment. Both are decisions confronting the value-neutral question: Is the "intentional thought" fulfilled in the object or not?[26] The "synthetic intention" preceding the negative judgment seems to be identical with the "affirmative assumptions," which Meinong allows to partake in the negative judgment. Geyser indeed wants his analysis to be regarded as a *logical* one, which has nothing to do with the psychological question of how the negative judgments come about. But the "attempted positive judgment," which in each case has to found a negative one, is not a purely logical specific moment, because an "attempted judgment" can also precede the particular positive one. It is not asked how a *particular* negative judgment about the object is possible, but rather what the sense of precisely this transpired negative judgment is.

III

[Summary paraphrase: The young Heidegger concludes his tour through the extant logical literature by moving beyond the theories of the logical object and the logical judgment to theories of the logical argument, beginning with the reason-consequence relation of the hypothetical "judgment" and the simple syllogism that more overtly contextualizes conclusions with their evidence, where once again the concern focuses on purging all psychologistic vestiges from the "evident judgment" in order to place the decision of "justification" on the level of the "truth" of logical content. The final section concludes with the "coherent unity of reasons [*Begründungszusammenhang*] grounding a system of propositions" that logically constitutes the larger field of an entire science, especially as this is treated by a "new" direction in logic, that of "logistics" or "symbolic logic," which is historically rooted in the Leibnizian *mathesis universalis*. Refinements of concepts and methods in the science of mathematics in the late 19th century led to a "philosophical" grounding of its theory of sets and groups. This work spilled over into formal logic, permitting it to go beyond the traditional logic of subsumption to a universal logic of relations by way of the application of algebraic methods and its symbols to logical problems. This in turn shaped the logical structure of mathematics. Thus, the new century brought the most complete "mathematical" systematization of logical problems in Bertrand Russell's *The Principles of Mathematics* I (Cambridge, 1903) and its further devel-

25. Geyser, *Grundlagen der Logik und Erkenntnislehre*, 149–50.
26. Ibid., 54, 169–70.

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opment in *Principia Mathematica* I (Cambridge, 1910) by Russell and Whitehead. A less rigorous presentation of the system is presented in Louis Couturat, *Les principes des mathématiques* (Paris, 1905; German trans. 1908). The young Heidegger thus concludes his overview with two paragraphs assessing this trend toward a "mathematical logic" originating from "across the channel."]

Such a "calculus" of judgments, of classes, and of relations deals with the basic logical concepts and functions. The proof that these *and only* these uphold the structure of mathematics at once gives the identity of logic and mathematics. This theory grants logic the new task of the demarcation of domains. With this resolution, it is in my view especially necessary to point out that logistics does not come out of mathematics at all and that it is incapable of proceeding to the genuine logical problems. I see the limits in the applications of mathematical symbols and concepts (in particular, the concept of *function*), which conceal the *meanings* of concepts and their *shifts in meaning*. The deeper sense of principles is left in the dark. The calculus of judgments is, for example, a calculating with judgments. Logistics is simply not familiar with the problems of the theory of judgment. Mathematics and the mathematical treatment of logical problems reach limits at which its concepts and methods fail, more precisely, there where the conditions of their possibility lie.

The work prescribed here must be carried out, and it will not be as quickly finished as the overcoming of psychologism. Tied to our question are precisely the philosophical problems of mathematics and pure natural science, which have not been settled since Descartes and have become more complicated with the unexpected advances of mathematics. These last thoughts have taken us into a broad domain of problems, the logic and systematics of the particular sciences, questions which must be given special treatment as the occasion arises.

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