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DELEUZE AND EMPIRICISM[1]

BRUCE BAUGH

1. *Introduction*

When the name of Gilles Deleuze is mentioned, it is usually in the context of "post-structuralism" or the philosophy of difference, along with such other recent French philosophers as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida.[2] But unlike these other figures, Deleuze's philosophy claims for itself a distinctively un-French inspiration: empiricism.

"Empiricism" here is not a handy label for a concern with empirical facts as opposed to theoretical constructions, or with "experience" as opposed to "reason." Like such textbook definitions of empiricism, Deleuze's empiricism is based on an interpretation of British empiricism – Locke, Berkeley and Hume – but especially Hume, to whose philosophy Deleuze devoted his first major work.[3] Unlike the textbook version, though, Deleuze's empiricism is not a dogma about the essence of mind, nature or reality, or "the doctrine according to which the intelligible 'comes' from the sensible."[4] It is rather a concern for "the concrete richness of the sensible" (*D* 54), for contingency, difference and incommensurability, and a resistance to universalizing abstractions through emphasis on the particularity of situated, historical practices (see *D* 112).

But Deleuze's empiricism also wants to be a metaphysics, a transcendental empiricism: "transcendental" in the sense of "necessary condition", but not in the sense of providing foundations for knowledge claims; empiricism, because it searches for real conditions of actual experience, not because it bases all knowledge on generalizations from experience. It is meant to be an empiricism that would be immune to Hegel's critique of empiricism as the poorest and most empty kind of knowledge, or a post Hegelian empiricist metaphysics.[5]

My main objective here will be to give an account of this empiricist metaphysics. Along the way, however, I will also look at what this metaphysics owes to Hume and to British empiricism generally. I will also say something about how this form of philosophizing found its way across the Channel into Deleuze's philosophy.

2. *Non-conceptual difference*

Deleuze's transcendental empiricism takes as its starting point the assertion that there is a difference between real difference and conceptual difference,[6] and it locates this difference in "the being of the sensible" (*DR* 80). At first glance, the sensible can be said to differ from the concept insofar as the concept determines the possibility of repeatable experiences that are identical in respect of their organizational form, whereas the sensible is the actuality of any given experience (*DR* 79-80), and as such is the non-repeatable basis for the difference *between* actualizations. The sensible as the

reality of a specific actualization falls outside of the concept; the concept determines the equivalency among actualizations (they are all actualizations of the same concept), the sensible is the ground of their difference.

But if this were all there were to the sensible, then the sensible would only be the indifferent occasion for the actualization of abstract conditions of possibility, the contents of a representation the nature and qualities of which are essentially determined by the concept (see *DR* 21). In that case, it would be the concept and the *a priori* conditions of experience that explained the sensible and constituted knowledge, not the sensible and the a *posteriori* actualization. Whatever sensible particularities of a representation are not covered by the concept are merely accidental or extrinsic (*DR* 46), as are the actual (here and now) sensations (since other qualitatively similar sensations at other times could be synthesized into a representation that would be equivalent, from the standpoint of knowledge). Beyond this Kantian challenge to empiricism lies the even greater Hegelian challenge, which does not discard sensible particularity as accidental, but instead makes it a moment in the self-articulation of the Idea, which includes within itself its empirical actuality, in the same way in which a work of art's form does not stand apart from its content, but must be grasped as the synthetic organization of just the contents it has (see *DR* 36-38).

Deleuze would object that actuality is not the accidental instantiation of a concept, and that if the Hegelian Idea includes empirical content, it does not for all that include its own "here and now" empirical actuality. Against Kant, Deleuze argues that the empirical is not what the concept determines *would be* in a representation if it occurred, something hypothetical (see *DR* 10), but actuality itself, real existence as opposed to the possibility of existence indicated by the concept.[7] Against Hegel, we may note that the difference between performances of Beethoven's *Seventh Symphony*, which is a unity of form and content equivalent to the Hegelian Idea, are not included in the Idea, since with respect to content, what is performed is identical, but the actual performances differ (see *DR* 79). The empirical is the here and now actuality that differentiates between performances and which makes repetition of the same work possible. The Hegelian Idea, to the extent that it transcends its actualizations, can no more explain the existence of any particular actualization than can the Kantian concept, but only the form that the actualization will take. Empirical actuality, then, is not to be explained through possibility, however "concretely" determined, but through actual causes (actions of musicians and conductor, materials involved, score utilized, etc.). The empirical is the effect of causes which contain no more and no less reality than it does, causes which are immanent and wholly manifest in the effect through which they are experienced, much as Spinoza's God is entirely immanent in his attributes (see *EPS* 42, 57-59, 80-81, 173, 178, 180).[8] Instead of being explicable through the concept, then, empirical actuality, "difference without concept... [is] expressed in the power belonging to the existent, a stubbornness of the existent in intuition" (*DR* 23), and is first given in sensory consciousness, a receptivity which grasps what comes

to thought from "outside" (*DR* 74).

Still, if the empirical is pure actuality, the pure here and now that falls outside of the concept and outside of the Idea, then it is without content from the standpoint of conceptual knowledge. This was Hegel's essential point about the emptiness of sensible particularity in his critique of sense certainty. Every "this" is as much a this as any other. At the same time, each "this" is not the other "thises" in the same way that other "thises" are neither it nor any other "this". So instead of being positive, simple and full of content, the "this" given in sensory actuality is an empty, negative universal.[9] With respect to its utter indeterminacy and lack of content, being, the here and now existence of something, is identical to nothing.[10]

It is here that Deleuze's debate with Hegel begins in earnest. Deleuze rejects the epistemological model on which Hegel's argument is based, and according to which whatever does not make a difference *to knowledge* makes no difference (see *DR* 7-9, 18-19). The empirical, to use a Kantian distinction, must be thought, even if it cannot be *known* (see *ES* 77), at least if knowledge is regarded as knowledge of phenomena. The empirical is the transcendental condition of the possibility of concepts, and in two senses: 1) it is the condition of the application of concepts over different cases and so of universality in general: 2) it is the real condition of experience. Contrary to Kantianism or Hegelian Idealism, it is the empirical which explains the conceptual and the abstract conditions of all possible experience, not the reverse.

3. *Multiplicity and Externality*

If in its simplest form, the empirical is the reason for the non-conceptual differences between one instance of a representation and another, then it is the basis of multiplicity, of an external and non-conceptual relation between instances, such that one can say there are many instantiations of one concept. Without this multiplicity, there could be no concepts, that is, no rules of synthesis that apply over different instances, or as Kant would say, over different representations.[11] This is not the logical restriction of one concept by another, which are negative in form ("not an animal in general, but this type of animal, which differs from others in respects a, b, c..."), but an existential condition, "the swarming of individuals that are absolutely identical with respect to the concept and yet participate in the same existential singularity" (*DR* 22), thus constituting a multiplicity. Contrary to Hegel, who identifies sensible particularity with the negative determinations produced by thought, equating the "this" with "not that or that", negative relations, such as those between concepts or between particular "thises," presuppose rather than constitute multiplicity (*DR* 73-82). This multiplicity is thus a positive fact, the empirical and prior condition of the conceptual determinations of thought, something that thought does not produce and cannot deduce, but can only encounter "after the fact". This is the priority of the a *posteriori* characteristic of empiricism (see *ES* 87-88).

Expressed in this way, the argument still looks far too Kantian. But

Deleuze is not arguing that the condition of the application of concepts is the existence of a given sensory manifold; the sensory manifold is just an instance of empirical multiplicity. Empirical actuality is also the condition of multiplicities of discrete elements, such as sets where a term's membership in a set was determined on a case by case basis, rather than on the basis of some antecedently specifiable rule, in which case it would be possible to repeat indefinitely the operation by which members would be added to the set, so that one could constitute a multiplicity of dispersed singularities that would not be synthesized into a manifold, in what Deleuze calls a nomadic distribution as opposed to a sedentary and closed one (*DR* 54).[12] Since it is the "here and now" empirical actuality of each instance that distinguishes it from other instances (*DR* 22-23), empirical actuality is the a *priori* of any multiplicity, including, but not only, the empirically given manifold, and so is the empirical and a *priori* condition of the domain of empirical experience (see *DR* 310, 328). This, I take it, is what Deleuze means when he says that difference is the being of the sensible (*DR* 80) and yet that "it is by means of difference that the given is given", where what is given is multiplicity (*DR* 286).

Deleuze's "multiplicity" is governed by a logic of difference rather than the logic of identity of the concept.[13] The logic of difference concerns the purely contingent relation between actualities: there is no necessity for a set to have *n* number of members, it has the number of members that correspond to the quite fortuitous conjunction of circumstances producing actual members of the set (see *DR* 80). Because the actuality of an instance is not included within the concept, the relation between actualities is not internal and conceptual, or dialectical, but external and contingent (see *EPS* 32, 209-210). For Deleuze, "empiricism is fundamentally linked to a logic... of multiplicities" (*D* viii), of relations that "are external and irreducible to their terms" (*D* 55), as in the Leibnizian the calculus,[14] or as in Hume, for whom "relations may vary without the ideas varying" (*D* 56-57; see *EPS* 243 f, *ES* 65-66, 96-102). It is this logic of external relations that Deleuze regards both as empiricism's greatest achievement and as the greatest impediment to Hegelianism, since it allows one to grasp terms as having come into relation through contingent empirical events,[15] that is, through a unique and chance interplay of forces (see *D* 122-123), a "throw of the dice" (*D* 5, 40, 67; *DR* 255).[16]

It is here that Deleuze's doctrine most obviously resembles that of the British empiricists. How is it that ideas, terms or signifiers come into relation to each other? According to Hume, the connexion of ideas is based on a general rule which is the product of experience, and specifically of the imagination under the guidance of the passions (*ES*, chapter 3). The imagination reproduces, varies and compares ideas in accordance with one's passions and interests, since it is the passions which determine what is or is not important in an idea, and so determine the relevant points of resemblance between actual instances (impressions or ideas). The principles of the association of ideas according to resemblance, contiguity and cause and

effect[17] thus depend on relations of relevant similarity being established through passion (see *ES* 61)[18]: "If the principles of association explain that ideas are associated, only the principles of the passions can explain that a particular idea, rather than another, is associated at a particular moment" (*ES* 103). On the other hand, passions and interests extend over a number of particular instances in virtue of the imagination's capacity for forming a set of ideas constituted by a *general* rule, a rule for abstracting from each particular those features which are not relevantly similar and for going beyond the actual to the possible (see *ES* 59-64, 130-132). The connexion between ideas through association, then, depends on the establishment of a general rule which is "a passion of the imagination": "In reflection, the passions imagine themselves, and the imagination becomes passionate: *the rule is possible*" (*ES* 57).

General rules and the connexions they allow are not based on an intrinsic or logically necessary relation between the ideas themselves, but are the contingent product of passions interacting with the capacity for reproducing and varying images: "the passions need somehow the association of ideas, and conversely, the association presupposes the passions. Ideas get associated in virtue of a goal, an intention, or a purposiveness which only passion can confer upon human activity. It is because man has passions that he associates ideas. There is thus a mutual implication of passion and the association of ideas" (*ES* 63).[19] Yet despite this mutual implication, the basis of association is passion, and consequently "the principles of passion are absolutely primary" (*ES* 120). Moreover, it is the passions which provide the very *raison d'être* of the imagination's generalizations, since the point of generalization is to make practical rules of conduct possible, and a practical rule aims at satisfying a passion (*ES* 132).

The particular doctrine of Hume's which Deleuze discusses, according to which the connexion between ideas is established by imagination and passion, is, however, merely the positive counterpart to a negative thesis argued by all the empiricists, which is that there is no necessary connection between ideas. This thesis takes different forms. In Locke, it is the thesis that there is no necessary connection between the simple ideas or sensations found united together in the perception of an object.[20] Berkeley quite readily deduced from this that we are able to make predictions based on inductive generalizations, then, "not by discovering any necessary connection between our ideas", but through experience's discovery of purely contingent and arbitrary connections between ideas – for example, the regular co-existence of the visual impression of fire with a feeling of heat leads to the generalization that "fire is hot," but it is equally possible for what looks like what we call "fire" to co-exist with the idea "cold."[21] The "consistent, uniform working" of nature, according to which certain ideas usually go together and which allows for foresight, is not due to any "immutable habitudes, or relations between the things themselves,"[22] but to an arbitrary relation between a signifying idea (the visual appearance of fire) and an idea signified (heat), where the connection between signifier and signified is

constituted "not by similitude, nor yet by the inference of any necessary connexion," but "purely and solely from experience, custom and habit," "a habit of knowing the connexion between the signs and things signified."[23] Although Locke thought that only the relation between *simple* ideas was arbitrary, Berkeley argued that there are only particular ideas, some of which have a general signification in virtue of being able to refer to a number of other particular ideas, but that abstract ideas, or determinate general ideas, are a fiction of the philosophers, nowhere to be found in experience.[24] If all ideas are simple, then what goes for simple ideas goes for all ideas, and the connection between any two ideas is based on habit, not on any property of the ideas themselves. Hume's theory locates the *basis* of habits of association in the passions, and so simply elaborates on Berkeley's thesis, which in turn takes as its starting point Locke's thesis of the lack of any *necessary* connection between the ideas joined together in experience (see *ES* 89-90, 133). For empiricism, there is no "constancy and uniformity" in the way ideas are linked in the imagination: these links are forged by chance and indifference, which determine the conjunction of circumstances and impressions, on the one hand, with passion and imagination, or habit, on the other (*ES* 23, 100-104, 115, 120). In that sense, atomism, "the theory of ideas, insofar as relations are external to them", is inseparable from associationism, which accounts for the relations between ideas in terms of something other than the ideas themselves (*ES* 105).

There is considerable historical justification, then, for Deleuze's assertion that empiricism can be defined in opposition to "any theory according to which, *in one way or another*, relations are derived from the nature of things" (*ES* 109). On the contrary, relations *in one way or another* are external to the things related: "Whether as relations of ideas or as relations of objects, relations are always external to their terms" (*ES* 66; see *ES* 98-100) . This is why empiricism's theory of the externality of relations so effectively rebuts Hegel's dialectic, where the subsumption of two terms in a higher synthesis depends on an internal relation between the terms. Deleuze's position here in some ways recalls Bertrand Russell's.[25] Deleuze occasionally cites Russell; he may have been impressed by Jean Wahl's treatment of Russell in *Les philosophies pluralistes d'Angleterre et d'Amerique*,[26] where Russell, along with other empiricists, is discussed chiefly as indicating ways in which "pluralism" can resist Hegel's monism.[27] For Deleuze, empiricism and pluralism are one and the same: "I am an empiricist, that is, a pluralist" (*D* vii). As Deleuze argues, both empiricism's insistence on the non-deducibility of actuality from concepts (realism) and its pluralism derive from the externality of relations: "Relations are external to their terms. When James calls himself a pluralist, he does not say, in principle, anything else. This is also the case when Russell calls himself a realist. We see in this statement the point common to all empiricisms" (*ES* 99).

Yet, to return from the question of historical interpretation to Deleuze's own metaphysics, the logic of externality is not self-subsistent, but is founded on the empirical actuality of instances that makes multiplicity possible, since

it is through the empirical actuality that a non-conceptual difference, and hence the purely additive and external relation of the AND, is made possible (see *D* 9, *DR* 71). Not only multiplicity, but exteriority as such, including space understood as parts external to each other, i.e. as extension and dimension (see *DR* 360), and time as a succession of mutually exclusive instants, have empirical actuality as their *a priori* condition (see *DR* 72, 79-81, 286-7, 296, 310; *B* 38, 77; *ES* 90-92), as their "groundless ground", their aconceptual and yet transcendental source (*DR* 296).[28] Prior to the law and measure of *a priori* forms of intuition is "movement and change without identity or law" (*ES* 87), the ontological unmeasure (*démesure ontologique*) of the empirical, "nomadic distribution and crowned anarchy" (*DR* 55, 388).[29] But since forms of intuition such as space and time are empirically conditioned, rather than pure, they are not necessary and universal, but contingent and particular, concrete rather than abstract, prior conditions that are in each case already conditioned, and which differ from case to case, rather than being the same for everyone.

Although this helps explain how the empirical can itself be a transcendental condition, it is not an adequate response to Hegel's critique of sense-certainty. The basis of multiplicity and exteriority is the difference between empirical actualities, but insofar as this difference can be expressed as the non-identity of actualities, each actuality is really identical to the others in that all share in *not-being the others*. Deleuze will have to give a positive account of empirical difference if this difference is to be irreducible to indeterminate non-being.

4. *Empirical conditions and individuation*

Deleuze's answer draws on his theory of a "higher empiricism". Not only is the empirical the metaphysical *condition of possibility* of the conceptual (see *DR* 79-81), historically produced empirical actualities are the *a priori* of actual experience, and it is for this reason that the difference between empirical actualities can be expressed as a positive difference with a determinate content, even though this determinacy of content is not phenomenal. This part of Deleuze's theory constitutes his most innovative and important response to Hegel's critique of empiricism.

The first stage of the argument comes in Deleuze's book on Bergson. Following Bergson,[30] Deleuze argues that far from being prior to experience, the possible expressed in the concept is only the reflected image of the real, "a retrograde movement of the true", intelligible structures abstracted from real experience and then projected backward in time, creating the illusion of being prior to, and of conditioning, the experience (*B* 18-20). In that case "it is not the real that resembles the possible, but the possible that resembles the real, because it has been abstracted from the real after the real is made" (*B* 98). This is but an instance of an empiricist maxim which Deleuze attributes to Whitehead, namely, "the abstract does not explain, but must itself be explained" (*D* vii).[31]

How, then, to explain the abstract? Not abstractly, certainly; that was

Hegel's great mistake.[32] No amount of abstraction will ever generate the concrete, not least because empirical actuality is not an intersection of concepts or a difference between concepts, but the difference between the conceptual and the empirical, difference as Being or Being as non-conceptual difference itself (*DR* 23, 52-61, 80, 94, 376-384; *B* 17 18, 77, 85).[33] Because the concept does not include within it or explain its own empirical actualization, what empiricism requires is not an eternal or timeless *a priori,* but "the conditions under which something new is produced" (*D* vii; see *L* 107), the actual, empirical conditions of experience and of concepts (see *DR* 3-4, 12f), conditions which by coming together in new and unpredictable ways are capable of producing unanticipated results.[34]

Although Deleuze rejects the sort of empiricism that would explain concepts as abstractions or generalizations from experience, he nevertheless agrees with Bergson that the empirical is prior to the conceptual. What Deleuze looks for in Bergson is "a higher empiricism" (*B* 30; see *DR* 80) that instead of generalizing from experience goes beyond experience to conditions which are neither general nor abstract, but are themselves concrete and empirical, the conditions of "real experience in all its peculiarities" rather than Kant's conditions of "all possible experience in general" (*B* 27-28; see *LS* 300-302/260-262, *DR* 80, 94, *N* 93).[35]

This position is already anticipated in Deleuze's study of Hume. "According to Hume, and also Kant, the principles of knowledge are not derived from experience. But in the case of Hume, nothing within thought transcends (*dépasse*) the imagination, nothing is transcendental, because these principles are only principles of *our* nature, because they make possible an experience without at the same time making necessary the objects of this same experience" (*ES* 111-112).[36] For Hume, the conditions of our experience connect us with nature because they are natural principles, contingent configurations of force and circumstance which make possible our survival as a species (*ES* 104, 109, 119 120). For Kant, on the other hand, the principles which make possible our experience are the transcendental principles of experience in general, which constitute the necessary and *a priori* relations of things as phenomena (see *ES* 111, 119). Kant was right to go beyond what is found within experience in order to account for experience, but wrong to search for that "beyond" in the non-empirical realm of the transcendental, in which the supposed transcendental conditions (possibility) merely reproduce and reflect the conditioned (actuality)(see *LS* 128/105). The conditions of experience are themselves actual, not possible, contingent, not necessary, and particular rather than universal: "the real precedes the possible" and conditions it (*ES* 120).

The real causes of experience, unlike universal concepts in relation to representations, need not resemble their effect in any way (*B* 95-97), any more than an organism need resemble its genetic material, even though the causes are "virtually" or implicitly present in their effect (see *DR* 240; *F* 37; *EPS* 172, 232-233; *ES* 132-133). For real causes are not universal and *a priori* rules which the effect merely instantiates, in the way in which a

member instantiates a species, but are as determinate and as particular as the effect, with which real causes are coextensive: "the conditions are never more general than the conditioned element, and... are therefore not 'apodictic' but problematic" (*F* 114: see *F* 116). Rather than being antecedently given rules or schemas, the forces that actually produce experience are for the most part *without* form or law (*DR* 94), and are for the most part unconscious (see *B* 37, 54, 62-63).[37] In that case, the actuality of the empirical, instead of instantiating a rule or concept given by the understanding, is *empirically constituted* through a chance concatenation of forces, of converging and diverging series (see viii, *F* 78) or fluxes (*L* 108), differentials of intensity and rates of change (*D* 31-33, 123; *B* 77-85; *EPS* 196-199, 205-206, 236), which together produce something new and unforseeable (see *EPS* 242, *ES* 132).[38] Deleuze calls this unforseeable emergence of a. new actuality "the event" of actuality (see *LS* 13-21/4-11, 23 35/12-22, 67-73/52-57), this event being "a mixture of the dependent and the aleatory" (*F* 86, 117),[39] that is, of the necessary production of an effect by its cause and the purely contingent effective presence of those causes at that particular moment (see *EPS* 208-210, 212, 230, 238 ff, 249-250).[40] Essences, whether expressed through Kantian concepts or Hegelian Ideas, do not determine existence; coming into existence is not a transition from the possible (the concept) to the real (its instantiation), but the production of something new by already existing forces entering into new relations through chance encounters, where these encounters are nevertheless the extrinsically determined effects of previous encounters. Where these encounters produce stable effects or regular sequences, this is due to chance rather than logical necessity.[41]

This empirical sort of explanation would also account for the production and use of statements, including their use as concepts, or as statements having a determinate meaning in virtue of their relation to a system of statements and rules for the production of statements, and could also explain how statements could come to be used differently by entering into different, contingent and empirically conditioned relations with different systems and practices, and so take on different conceptual functions or meanings (see *F*, chapter 1: *D* 144). To use Deleuze's spatial or diagrammatic metaphor, a statement has a horizontal relation to other statements that determines its meaning and allows it to function as a concept (for example, a statement of definition), and a vertical relation that allows it designate particulars as instances of a universal, but it also has a diagonal or transversal relation to other conceptual systems, a purely "virtual" relation that becomes actual only when that statement in fact, due to contingent circumstances, enters into one of those systems (for example, when a language adopts a locution from another language). The first type of relation is syntactic or grammatical, the second is semantic or referential and the third is pragmatic and historical, since it concerns the actual historical and pragmatic reasons for a statement's becoming part of a new system of statements, or language. The actual functioning of a statement as a concept, then, is determined "in the last instance" by pragmatics (*D* 116-117; see *ES* 120). So although concepts are

not abstracted from experience in any straightforward way, they are nevertheless empirically constituted (as are the systems to which they belong), and are not really prior to the empirical, but only seem to be so when examined in the context of stable languages ("normal discourse"), where what can be seen and experienced is determined by an already constituted language.[42] Deleuze, then, agrees with Bergson that the possible only seems to precede the real, but is actually conditioned by it. Although there is no "wild" or "pre-linguistic experience" for Deleuze (see *D* 34), that does not make the conceptual prior to the empirical.

5. *Singularities and Intuition*

Together with the logic of external relations, "higher empiricism" affords another way of resisting Hegel. The empirically actual is not a bare particular, a "this" like any other "this", but a singularity that has a determinate content in virtue of its actual genesis, the history of its coming into being (see *DR* 56). It is both simple and yet, because of its multiple causes, "a virtual multiplicity" with "a plurality of meanings and irreducible multiple aspects" (*B* 14; see *EPS* 64f, 81, 195f).[43] Its individuality is a function of, and subsequent to, individuating causal processes, not a function of the unity or simple particularity of a "this" or an "I"; it is a matter of intersecting series, like a mathematical point, not a synthesis, and certainly not the act of synthesis of a sovereign reason or transcendental ego (*DR* 56; *N* 7; *D* 92, 120, 131; *F* 78; *ES* 103).[44] Consequently, "the terms distinguished each retain their respective positivity, instead of being defined by opposition to each other" (*EPS* 60).[45] Hegel's famous critique of the abstractness of sense-certainty can get no hold here.

Yet it should be noted that the determinate content an empirical actuality has because of its causal history may not correspond to any distinguishing phenomenal characteristics, and in that respect, Hegel's critique of empiricism is completely valid.[46] At the beginning of this discussion of Deleuze, we saw that in the case of different actualizations of the same concept, where (*ex hypothesi*) there is no difference in the phenomenal content of the representations, empirical actuality is what distinguishes one actualization from another. We now see, however, that the difference between actualizations cannot be accounted for simply by the sheer "thisness" of the actual, but by the differing causal history of each actuality, which makes each "this" a singular "virtual multiplicity". Since the singularity of this actuality is a function of its historical genesis, and since this empirical actuality is the basis of the multiplicity that is the *a priori* condition of concepts and of the sensory manifold, it follows that *a priori* conditions are themselves historical and *a posteriori* (see *F* 56, 59-60, 84, 114-116).

To a certain extent, Deleuze's position does not seem that far from Hegel's, since Hegel also wants to account for concrete actuality in terms of its historical genesis. The difference between the two thinkers lies in their different conceptions of historical development. For Hegel, development is a

series of negations resulting in a synthesis, and so requires that each developmental factor be intrinsically or logically related to the others. In addition, for Hegel the result of the historical process is not simply a causal outcome; it is also the goal and reason for the entire process. Deleuze, by contrast, holds a completely non-teleological view of causation and of causal processes. A causal process involves the interaction of extrinsically related terms which produce an unforseeable result. There is no final goal that regulates the process and which would make the relation between terms internal and the result forseeable. Instead of logical necessity, causal geneses are governed by a mixture of the necessity of efficient causation and the contingent presence of causal factors. Genealogy thus stands opposed to any dialectical conception of history that would make particular events and processes subordinate to a teleological process and that would allow one to grasp the particular in terms of the universal, a view that effectively annuls time and duration by substituting logical relations for temporal ones[47]

Because it has a determinate content in virtue of its causal genesis, and because this genesis is not to be understood dialectially, empirical actuality is not the merely accidental and cognitively empty "this" given in immediate sensory intuition. It is not a mere sensation or sense datum. Although Deleuze's empiricism suggests we grasp empirical actuality through a non-conceptual "intuition" (see *B*, chapter 1), this "intuition" is not an immediate impression or feeling. On the other hand, it is not a recognition through the already known (the concept), the reduction of the new to the old, but an encounter with the not-yet-known, with the different and the new as such (*DR* 52-61, 376 384; *LS* 190-197/162-168, 208-211/177-180: *D* 92).[48] "Intuition" is a form of interpretative insight capable of relating an empirical actuality to its causal history or "genealogy" (see *N* 2, 6, 52f, 75, 91, 157f; *F* 114-116), not according to an antecedently given schema or method, but creatively, in such a way that differences and singularities can be grasped in their uniqueness and positivity. In practice, that means using genealogy to grasp things and events not as new instances of an old rule, or as mere exceptions to the rule, but as new and contingent interactions between terms that have no intrinsic, conceptual connection (see *F* 21f, 36f, 78f). Instead of the rule of identity, where particulars instantiate the universal, intuition relies on what Wahl calls analogy, which "does not link the identical to the identical, but the different to the different," such that "the new cannot be deduced from the old."[49]

"Intuition" is thus a complex process that is a goal of knowledge, not a starting point. It is the richest, not the poorest form of knowledge, and although it is capable of formalization, it does not try to reduce the singular to some combination of general rules that would make each actuality or event predictable in principle.[50] Yet it shares with the sensible a receptivity to what comes from "outside" thought's conceptual determinations and is encountered only "after the fact".[51] The empirical can be identified with the sensible, then, only if the sensible is not understood as a discrete given, but as the virtual multiplicity revealed in Deleuzian "intuition".

The source for this aspect of Deleuze's empiricism is, once again, Jean Wahl, notably Wahl's *Vers le concret*.[52] Against Hegel's speculative identity of thought and being, Wahl counterposes a kind of empiricism, "defined by its affirmation of the non-deducibility of being" or "the irreducibility of being to knowing". This is not the empiricism of Locke or Russell, in which being is taken to be a discrete "given" revealed in sensation, but the "meta-empirical empiricism" of the later Schelling, of Hamann, Whitehead and Marcel, all of whom, says Wahl, conceive of concrete being not as a construct out of the atoms of sensation, but as a totality "in which no element is absolutely transcendent to any other," but where elements rather penetrate and are immanent to each other. The elements of experience are thus themselves concrete particulars, each with a distinct existence,[53] singularities defined by their contingent and actual interrelations with other beings, rather than isolated atoms.[54] "A fact is irreducible because it is both a totality and a particularity, and in the final analysis these two characteristics imply each other".[55] Far from being "given," concrete being is "a beyond through which knowledge has a meaning [sens], towards which it directs itself, from which it derives nourishment." It is only in subordinating experience to the demands of language (expressibility) and of objective knowledge that the concrete particularities of existence appear to be empty: they are empty for conceptual thought, but not empty in being, which is other than thought.

Wahl in fact follows Marcel in proposing a concept-less intuition of being through bodily feeling as the only genuine access to the real.[56] Although Hegel would have considered this position to be equivalent to Jacobi's doctrine of immediate intuitive knowledge,[57] and so as already surpassed in the System, Wahl protests that Hegel believes he has surpassed this "feeling of existing in the midst of things"[58] only because he reduces "reality in its thickness"[59] to the determinations of thought, rather than grasping its true nature as "an irrational and unthinkable unity."[60]

It is Deleuze's great achievement to have rendered the richness of concrete being both rational and thinkable without conflating being with thought. Deleuzian intuition is not governed by concepts, and yet is still rational insofar as it tries to grasp empirical actuality through determinate causal processes which constitute actualities as the singular results of singular encounters between forces, and so as determinate singularities.[61] Far from being poor, intuitive knowledge is rich and varied, since it does not aim at a uniform, encompassing Truth, but at things in their plurality,[62] and in Wahl's words, "A world populated by particular, concrete, definite things, seen in their detail, in all their differences, would be. . . a superabundant world".[63] As Deleuze puts it: "Hegel wanted to ridicule pluralism, identifying it with a naive consciousness which would be happy to say 'this, that, here, now,' – like a child stuttering out its most humble needs. The pluralist idea that a thing has many meanings, the idea that there are many things and that one thing can be seen as 'this and then that' is philosophy's greatest achievement, the conquest of the true concept, its maturity and not its renunciation or infancy" (*N* 4).

References

1. An earlier version of this paper appeared in *Man and World*, vol. 25, no. 2, 1992. I would like to thank the editors of *Man and World* and Kluwer Academic Publishers for permission to publish this revised version in this special issue of the *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenolooy*. I would also like to thank Andrew Irvine, Steve Savitt and especially Constantin Boundas for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Funding for research leading to this paper was generously provided by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Post-Doctoral Fellowship.
2. See for example Vincent Descombes, *Le Même et l'autre: quarante-cinq ans de la philosphie française*, (Paris: Minuit, 1979); translated as *Modern French Philosophy* by L. Scott-Fox and J.M. Harding (Cambridge University Press, 1980). See also Gillian Rose, *The Dialectic of Nihilism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984).
3. Gilles Deleuze, *Empirisme et subjectivité: Essai sur la nature humaine selon Hume* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953, second edition, 1972); translated with an introduction by Constantin V. Boundas as *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). Further references to this work will be given parenthetically as *ES*; references are to the English translation unless otherwise noted, and references to the French are to the second edition. See also Deleuze's article on Hume in *Histoire de la philosphie,* edited by François Châtelet *et al.* (Paris: Hachette, 1972-73), vol. 4, 65-78.
4. Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Naw York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 54; hereafter cited parenthetically as *D*. See also *ES* 87.
5. Vincent Descombes has said that Deleuze's philosophy is above all, post-Kantian; see Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, p. 152. I would argue that insofar as Deleuze's empiricism is meant to meet the challenge of Hegel's critique of empiricism, it is "above all" post-Hegelian.
6. See Deleuze, *Différence et répétition* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), pp. 21-23, 36, 41, 48 and passim; hereafter given in parentheses as *DR*.
7. See Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, translated by Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1990), p 36; hereafter *EPS*. Originally published as *Spinoza et le problème de l'expression* (Paris: Minuit, 1968). References are to the English translation unless otherwise indicated.
8. See section 4 below.
9. G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, translated by A.V. Miller (Oxford University Press, 1977), A. I., "Sense-Certainty: Or the 'This' and 'Meaning'".
10. See Hegel's *Science of Logic*, translated by A.V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1989), Book I, chapter 1, p 82.
11. For Deleuze, as for Kant, "representation" presupposes identity, the sameness of what can be presented repeatedly. At the same time, the term "representation" contains an ambiguity. On the one hand, it refers to what is presented, and hence to the content of the representation as determined by the concept. On the other, it refers to a given, actual "representation", and hence to the actual instantiation of the concept in experience. See Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosopnhy*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), pp. 8-9; originally published as *La Philosophie Critique de Kant* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963).
12. The set of clones of an organism might be an example of a discotinuous mutiplicity
13. Deleuze identifies four elements of the logic of the concept: l) identity of form 2) analogy of relations 3) opposition of internal determinations or differentia and 4) resemblance of the determined object to its concept; *DR* 44-45. A logic of difference would have to avoid or subvert all four elements (see *DR* 52).
14. See Gilles Deleuze, *Le Pli: Leibniz et le baroque* (Paris: Minuit, 1988), pp. 149-150; hereafter *L*. In Leibnizian "fluxions", "variables can exist without the relation and the relation without the variables: the relation is external to the variables, just as it is outside of the constant".

15. Deleuze refers to such banal conjunctions as "the glass is on the table" (*D* 55), in which the relation does not affect the being of the glass or the table, but he may have been inspired by such Surrealist conjunctions as "the surprising encounter between an operating table, a sewing machine and an umbrella" (Breton).
16. On the theme of "the throw of the dice", see Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone Press, 1983) pp. 25-29, hereafter cited as *N*; originally published as *Nietzsche et la philosophie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), pp. 29-33. See also Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze and Guattari* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 29-30, and Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum", in *Lanquage, Counter-Memory, Practice,* translated by Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 165-166.
17. See Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited by Ernest C. Mossner (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), Book I, part I, section 4.
18. See Hume, *Treatise*, Book II, Part I, section 9, p. 359: "For as all relations are nothing but a propensity to pass from one idea to another, whatever strengthens the propensity strengthens the relation... ;" the specific cases discussed refer to the propensity to pass from one idea to another because of the relation between the emotions the ideas occasion, not because of the relation between the ideas themselves. See also *Treatise*, Book II, Part II, section 8 and *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, edited and introduced by Charles W. Hendel (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), pp. 33-34.
19. Translation altered; see *Empirisme et subjectivité*, p. 58.
20. See Locke, *An Essay Concerning the Human Understanding*, edited by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), Part IV, chapter 3, section 14: "So let our *Idea* of any Species of Substance, be what it will, we can hardly, from the simple Ideas contained in it, certainly determine the *necessary co-existence* of any other Quality whatsoever... For all the Qualities that are co-existent in any Subject... we cannot know certainly any two to *co-exist* any farther, than Experience, by our Senses, informs us. Thus though we see the yellow Colour, and upon trial find the Weight, Malleableness, Fusibility and Fixedness, that are united in a piece of Gold, yet because no one of these Ideas has any evident *dependence*, or necessary connexion with the other, we cannot certainly know, that where any four of these are, the fifth will be there also, how highly probable soever it may be..." See also Part IV, chapter 12, sections 9-10, pp . 644-645 .
21. Compare Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (Lasalle: Open Court, 1966), p. 36, cited at *ES* 133.
22. See Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, edited by Roger Woolhouse (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988), sections 30-32 and 107, pp. 63-64 and 93.
23. Berkeley, *Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher*, Dialogue IV, in *Berkeley: Selections*, edited by Mary W. Calkins (New York: Scribner's, n.d.), pp. 366-368; see also p. 361. The "providential" connection between signifier and signified is, for Berkeley, the strongest evidence of Divine Providence, but for Hume it is merely further evidence for the impossibility of any rational justification of induction; see *Treatise*, Book I, Part III, sections 2-4, 14-15 .
24. Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, Introduction, especially paragraphs 10-16, 23 (pp. 40-46, 50).
25. See David Pears, *Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy* (New York: Vintage, 1967), chapter 10.
26. Jean Wahl, *Les Philosophies pluralistes d'Anqleterre et d'Amerique* (Paris: Alcan, 1920). See Deleuze, DR 81.
27. For Wahl, pluralism is defined in opposition to monism. In the monism of Bradley or T.H. Green, terms are related to each other through the mediation of a totality, in which case all relations are really internal, and in fact not relations between different terms at all, but various aspects of a non-relational One (*Philosophies pluralistes*, pp. 2-15). Pluralism, by contrast, insists on the absolute or irreducible reality of individuals, on difference and on the externality of relations (*ibid.*, pp. 28-29, 83, 93). If, as James argues, it is possible to have knowledge in a particular domain without knowing everything, then the knowable parts are independent of the (unknowable) whole: "For [partial knowledge] to be possible, there must

be multiplicity and contingency, the independence of terms with respect to the relations they enter into" (*ibid.*, p. 93). If the reality of the terms is not relative to the relation, then it follows that the reality of the known object is not relative to the knower: it exists independently of the knower (*ibid.*, p. 217). "A consistent pluralist must be a realist... To be a realist is to negate absolute unity, it is to affirm the externality of certain things in relation to certain others" (*ibid.*, p. 94). The real existence of individuals follows, then, from the externality of relations, and the latter doctrine can be defended in two ways which Wahl draws from Russell: there is no a *priori* demonstration that it is not true that many things exist, and monism is internally contradictory, since even though it considers all relations to be predicates of the One, there is a relation between the predicate and the Absolute, and so diversity reappears: "there is an irreducible multiplicity both in the world of relations and the world of terms" (*ibid.*, pp. 215-221).

28. Deleuze has in mind Schelling's doctrine of the primal ground (*Urgrund*) that is a non-ground (*Ungrund*) or abyss. (*Abgrund*), which Schelling develops in his *Philosophical Investigaions into the Essence of Human Freedom and Related Matters* (1809), and which Heidegger discusses in his *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, or *The Essence of Grounds* (1929).
29. Deleuze's "crowned anarchy" recalls Wahl's discussion of Menard (*Philosophies pluralistes*, p. 58), who spoke of "an anarchic, disordered Olympus" of natural forces: "If Menard's Gods are living, if his Olympus is so varied, it is because he knows that 'anarchic and multiform' nature laughs at our systems,... that nature cannot be circumscribed, and has its centre everywhere. If he imagines multiple Gods, it is because the diversity of effects lead him logically to the diversity of causes." Talk of anarchy does not fail to arouse anxiety in some commentators, such as Gillian Rose, *The Dialectic of Nihilism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), chapter 6, "The New Bergsonism: Deleuze". The title of the book expresses Rose's orientation clearly enough, and calls to mind Lukaçs' rather frantic response to existentialism, *The Destruction of Reason* (1955); indeed, Rose warns us, in the most apocalyptic tone, that Deleuze and his ilk want nothing less than "the destruction of knowledge" (p. 1). In response, one might again cite Wahl, who approvingly quotes Renouvier and Proudhon's arguments (pp. 67-70) that monism is celestial autocracy, the theocratic support of terrestial absolutists and kings; pluralism is the cure for this disease, and pluralism is polytheistic and anarchist.
30. See Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988); hereafter cited in parentheses as *B*.
31. Compare Wahl, *Philosophies pluralistes*, pp. 92-93: "The pragmatist philsopher does not seek the help of abstractions to gather together the greatest possible number of concrete objects; the concrete is not explained by the abstract." See also ibid., p. 37.
32. See Deleuze's criticisms of Hegel's attempts to explain the concrete through the abstract in *Bergsonism*, p. 120nl4 and p. 44: "...we are told that the One is already multiple, that Being passes into nonbeing and produces becoming... To Bergson, it seems that in this type of *dialectical* method, one begins with concepts that, like baggy clothes, are much too big... In such cases the real is recomposed with abstracts; but of what use is a dialectic that believes itself to be united with the real when it compensates for the inadequacy of a concept that is too broad or too general by invoking the opposite concept, which is no less broad and general? The singular will never be attained by correcting a generality with another generality." See also *Différence et répétition* pp. 16, 73ff and pp. 18-19: "Hegel substitutes the abstract relation of the particular to the concept in general for the true relation of the singular and the universal in the Idea... One must ask how Hegel betrays and denatures the immediate in order to found his dialectic upon this misunderstanding, and introduce mediation in a movement which is nothing more than that of... the generalities of [his] thought".
33. See also Deleuze, *Logique du sens* (Paris: Minuit, 1969), pp. 190-97, 208-211, 300-302; English translation by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, edited by Constantin V. Boundas, *The Logic of Sense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); see pp. 162-168, 177-180, 260-262. Further references given parenthetically as LS, with the French page numbers given first, followed by the page numbers of the English translation.
34. Wahl calls the chance interplay of forces and conditions, through which the new emerges and

the forces in play risk their destruction, an "adventure", one characteristic of multiplicities in which individuals are affirmed, such as American democracy; *Philosophies pluralistes*, p. 88.

35. See also Deleuze, *Foucault*, translated by Sean Hand, foreword by Paul Bové (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), hereafter given as *F*, p. 60: Although Foucault analyses "*a priori* conditions under which all ideas are formulated and all behaviours displayed", "Foucault differs in certain fundamental respects from Kant: the conditions are those of real experience... they are on the side of the object and the historical formation, not a universal subject (the *a priori* itself is historical)...". For Deleuze, at any rate, Foucault. is also a practitioner of Bergson's "higher empiricism".
36. Altered; see *Empirisme et subjectivité*, p. 126.
37. Unconscious, but not unconsciousness, which, according to Deleuze, is an effect, something produced; see *D* 78.
38. See Wahl, Philosophies pluralistes, p. 45: "If there is a plurality of beings in the world, there can also be the creation of new points of application for the forces present in it".
39. Compare Sartre, "Jean Giradoux and the Philosophy of Aristotle," in *Literary Essays*, translated by Annette Michelson (New York: Philosophical Library, c1955), p. 45: "an event [is]... the irruption of a new phenomenon whose very novelty exceeds all expectation and upsets [*bouleverse*] the order of concepts". (Translation modified; see Sartre, *Situations I*, Collection "Idées" [Paris: Gallimard, 1975], p. 105.)
40. See also Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, translated by Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights, 1988), pp. 67, 71, 76f, 93-96, 102-103; hereafter cited as SPP. Originally published as *Spinoza: Philosophie pratique* (Paris: Minuit, 1970; revised 1981).
41. Compare Wahl, *Philosophies pluralistes*, p. 82: "Only chance explains growth, the developing complexity, the infinite diversity of the universe; and at the same time as it explains diversity and irregularity, chance also explains regularity itself, as the calculus of probabilities teaches us."
42. In the same way that Kuhn and others have argued that observations are determined by the scientific practice to which they belong, a practice that is constituted by a certain vocabulary, according to which problems, phenomena and evidence are defined. See Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
43. Compare with Wahl, *Philosophies pluralistes*, p. 46, where Wahl says that Lotze's empiricism "wants to restore to things their multiple determinations, determinations of variety and relation, which they must have in order to condition the sequence of the facts of experience, which is so varied. The similar takes the place of the identical; the dissimilar acts on the dissimilar".
44. Similarily, Deleuze argues that Spinoza's God is coextensive with his expressions (modes), not a transcendent God that precedes and controls those expressions, or lies behind them; see *EPS* 81-82.
45. Translation altered. See also *EPS* 80 and *SPP* 94-97.
46. Deleuze, like Arthur Danto, is fond of Borges' story of Pierre Menard's version of *Don Quixote*, which is word for word identical to Cervantes' and yet, because it includes Cervantes' version within its causal history, is different (and indeed, "infinitely richer"). See Arthur Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 33-37.
47. See Wahl, *Philosophies pluralistes*, pp. 22, 59-62, 74, 95-96, 222. Pluralism is not defined simply by multiplicity (since even Hegelianism can allow for certain forms of multiplicity and difference), but by "development over time [*dans la durée*]," "the mobility of things and beings, the idea of time [temps]" and the mutability of forces through new combinations. Because new combinations result from chance, rather than any dialectical necessity, the future is open and real, rather than already contained in the present. Duration, then, is oriented towards the future, not driven by the past, and time is discontinuous, rather than a necessary evolution of a unified whole, since it is constituted from the chance encounters of irreducibly particular things according to the interaction of forces. This Bergsonian note also resounds in Deleuze; see *Bergsonism*, especially chapters 3 and 4.
48. See Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," p. 194.
49. Wahl, *Philosophies pluralistes*, p. 38. See DR 52.

50. Deleuze does not develop the formal side of his theory, but refers to the work of mathematicians such as Riemann and Albert Lautman; I am sure that Deleuze would also feel an affinity for recent work on the theory of "chaos".
51. See *SPP* 100f on the capacity to be affected, which is consciously experienced as sensibility, as openness to the outside.
52. (Paris: Vrin, 1932). See Deleuze, *D* 57-58: "Apart from Sartre, who remained caught none the less in the verb to be, the most important philosopher in France was Jean Wahl. He not only introduced us to an encounter with English and American thought [i.e., pluralist empiricism], but he had the ability to make us think, in French, things which were very new..". The assertion of the AND over against the IS, of multiplicity and difference over against identity, and of "the concrete richness of the sensible" over against abstract principles, these are the characteristics that Deleuze's empiricism (see *D* 54-59) inherits from the empiricist "pluralism" of Wahl's *Vers le concret* and his *Les philosophies pluralistes d'Angleterre et d'Amerique*, which Deleuze cites at *DR* 81n. In fact, Deleuze was gracious enough to write, "The entire oeuvre of Jean Wahl is a profound meditation on difference; on empiricism's possibilities to express poetic nature, free and wild; on the irreducibility of difference to the simple negative; on the *non-Hegelian* relations of affirmation and negation" (*DR* 81). Deleuze also cites *Vers le concret* at *L* 103nl and Wahl's *Le Malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel* (Paris: Rieder, 1929) at *N* 217nl2 (original French, p. 180n2.)
53. See Wahl, *Philosophies pluralistes*, pp. 102-103.
54. Compare Deleuze, *IS* 67-73/52-57, 124-127/102-105.
55. Wahl, *Philosophies pluralistes*, p . 104 .
56. See *Vers le concret*, pp. 235-238.
57. See Hegel's *Logic. Being Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, translated by William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), §61-§70 (p. 95-105).
58. *Vers le concret*, pp. 3-4n.
59. *Vers le concret*, p. 8.
60. *Vers le concret*, p. 238. Compare Deleuze, *Empirisme et subjectivité*, p. 152 (*ES* 133): "Philosophy must be constituted as the theory of what we do and make, not as the theory of what is. What we do and make has its principles; Being can never be grasped except through the very principles of our doing and making, as the object of a synthetic relation". Since the relations that constitute Being as a synthetic totality are not due to any intrinsic connection among the givens of experience, but to need and passion, the concrete totality encountered in experience is, as in Wahl, not a rational or logical one, that is, not a dialectical synthesis of internally related terms.
61. See Wahl, *Philosophies pluralistes*, p. 58.
62. See Wahl, *Philosophies pluralistes*, pp. 102-103.
63. See Wahl, *Philosophies pluralistes*, p. 104.