Pleromatica or Elsinore's Drunkenness[1]

"[…] *y en esa noche oscura del fosfeno ver surgir un delfín iridiscente un arco iris de delfines un delfinado aéreo o irisado un arqueado delfín*"

Nestor Perlongher[2]

In what follows, we outline a phenoumenodelic scene for conceiving modern existence, a scene composed of a *suspended stage* (an ark caught in the process of being shipwrecked "*between the constellations and the sea*"), a *foolhardy task* ("*to vanquish chance*"), and a *patient method* ("*word by word*"). Let's start with a stubborn fact: we have undergone an exquisite and memorable crisis, a foundational one: the ground has been taken out. Beginning with the Copernican suspension of the earth and Kant's transcendental exponentiation of it, we have endured manifold upheavals, a series of ungroundings that continue to undermine the pre-modern forms of building, dwelling and thinking. The transcendental relativisation of the scientific worldview, the nineteenth century's "*crisis of verse*", the crisis of foundations in mathematics, the crisis of tonality, the unheimlichization of the Cartesian subject, the relativistic crisis of the spatiotemporal background, the quantum crisis of (onto-)logic—all of these "crises" share a common structure: in each case, a fixed God-given structure, a conjugated name-of-the-father, a supposed last instance, an aprioristic motionless Ur-Frame is brought into play, rendered dynamical, naturalized, thrown into the scene, suspended among a multiplicity of other possible frames. Far from being an unexpected disaster, this relativizing suspension of Ur-Grounds is the fine result, refracted into the diverse modes of experience, of the modern deconstruction of ornitheology, that is – in Mallarmé's terms – of the long and "*terrible struggle with that old and wicked plumage, now crushed, fortunately, God*".

Now, such a foundational crisis could lead us from bad – the transcendent Father – to Worse – an unrestrained contingency. With the heavens stormed and the earth suspended, it might seem as if there were nothing that could *fix* the bad infinity of chance and sublate the lack of any transcendent orientation for existence and for thinking. Adopting a neo-Karamazovian style, one could argue that, if God does not exist, then necessarily anything can be the case. However, the putative implication from the barred names-of-the-father *qua* Ur-Frames to the consecration of chance is a *non sequitur*. If we refuse to accept the supposed self-evidence of this inference, then the death of God posits a post-critical Elsinorian dilemma that calls for a subjective resolution: we can either accept (or even hypostasize) the sovereignty of chance, or we can interpret the foundational crisis as a determinate negation that opens onto post-critical modes of reason. Let's make a decision: we shall remain faithful to the injunction transmitted by the haunting specters of those who decided, like Mallarmé's *Maître*, and in spite of the lack of any transcendent guarantee or prescription, to carry out eidetic acts, i.e. acts oriented by regulative ideas projected by human reason. Far from

[1] I would like to thank Dylan Trigg for helpful conversations concerning the subjects addressed here and Robin Mackay for reading and making editorial suggestions on a first draft of this text.

[2] Nestor Perlongher, *Alabanza y Exaltacion del Padre Mario*, in *Chorreo de las iluminaciones, Poemas completos* (Buenos Aires: Seix Barral, 1997), p. 335.

sanctioning the irreversible debacle of modern reason, the Maître inferred "*from this conflagration at his feet*" [3] – from the transmutation of the immobile Ur-Ground into an ark continually going under – the coming of "*the one and only Number that cannot be any other*".[4] In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding regarding the kind of subjective posture that could be attuned to this post-foundational absolute, the Maître bequeathed us, in black and white, an unambiguous maxim: we must try to *vanquish chance word by word*,[5] i.e. we must try to fix the bad infinity of contingency by means of a patient work developed from within the very element affected by this contingency (language, in the situation faced by the Maître). According to this stance, the turmoil unleashed by the modern ungrounding of existence and thinking, the Copernican launching of the Ur-Grounds into orbit, far from being an irrevocable obstruction to the legitimacy of the infinite projects of reason, can be interpreted as an abyssal site in which these projects may be elevated to new, post-foundational modalities. In the particular context provided by the *theoretical* interest of reason, the critical reflection on the transcendental perspectivism of the pre-critical phase of modern science – as well as the consequent relativization of the resulting scientific worldview – would remain a worstward abstract negation if it did not render possible a post-critical determinate sublation of the transcendental perspectivism expounded by Kant; if it did not permit us to raise the concept of scientificity to new, post-critical powers.

The very possibility of enacting deeds intended to banish chance seems – in the framework provided by the epochal overcoming of the ornitheology – nothing short of pure madness. The Maître, like a good post-Kantian, is conscious that every act accomplished by a human mode of thought, every word uttered by a human mouth, merely "*emits a dice throw*".[6] Human experience is always already "transcended" into a *field of impersonal experience* wherein the *abstract* modalities of experience (conceptual, perceptual, imaginary, affective, oneiric, intersubjective, etc.) *concretely* converge. [7] This multiplicity of modes of being always already ahead of itself is necessarily predetermined by the transcendental structure of the corresponding subject. In Kant's jargon, the generic structure of the general objects = X of human experience are contingent upon a transcendental framing, which means that the transcendental apparatus that defines the generic subjective preconditions of a transcendent experience are at the same time the conditions of possibility of the intentional objects of this experience. We could summarize this standpoint by saying that *transcendental transcendence* – i.e. the modes, determined by the subject's transcendental structure, according to which a

[3] Stéphane Mallarmé, 'A Dice Throw At Any Time Never Will Abolish Chance*',* in *Collected Poems and Other Verses*, trans. by E.H. and A.M. Blackmore (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 166-167.
[4] *Ibid*., pp. 166-167.
[5] Stéphane Mallarmé, 'The Mystery in Letters', in *Divagations*, trans. by Barbara Johnson (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), p. 236.
[6] Stéphane Mallarmé, 'A Dice Throw At Any Time Never Will Abolish Chance*'*, p. 181.
[7] Regarding the notion of an *impersonal* or *anonymous experiential field* (which plays an essential role in what follows) see Jean-Paul Sartre, *The transcendence of the ego. An existentialist theory of consciousness*, trans. by Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Hill and Wang, 1960); William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2003); Gilles Deleuze, 'Immanence: A Life', in *Pure Immanence, Essays on A Life*, trans. by Anne Boyman (New York: Urzone Inc., 2001); Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), Example 3, pp. 44-49; Jean-Christophe Goddard, *1804-1805. La désubjectivation du transcendantal*, Archives de Philosophie 2009/3, Tome 72, pp. 423-441; and Renaud Barbaras, *Dynamique de la manifestation* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2013), Ch. IV.

subject can transcend itself into the impersonal field – is not transcendent enough. In what follows we shall "naturalize" Kant's stance by assuming that the generic structure defining (what we shall call) the *human transcendental type*, far from being characterized by some sort of pre-phenoumenal necessity, results from a contingent local subjectivation of the experiential field itself. In other words, we shall assume that the *transcendental* a priori structures of human experience are a posteriori products of the *immanental* "natural" dynamics of the impersonal field.[8] We could say that the excitation of local subjective modes within the experiential field gives rise to *subjective pheno(u)menalizations* of the latter, which can be understood as particular transcendental framings of the field's *impersonal phenoumenalization*. It follows that the human transcendental type defines just one particular mode among others (e.g. vegetable, animal, extraterrestrial) according to which the field of impersonal experience locally *umwelts* or frames its narcissistic self-experience. This transcendental conjugation of the thesis according to which "*every thought emits a dice throw*" permits us to set out the task bequeathed by the Maître – that of vanquishing chance – in the following terms: we can understand the infinite projects of reason – such as, for instance, the project of a post-critical science oriented by the regulative idea of truth – as projects of *universalization* intended to bypass the transcendental insularity of human experience, i.e. to enlarge the scope of human experience beyond the limits pre-fixed by its *contingent* transcendental type.

Now, the thesis according to which human experience is framed a priori by a contingently determined transcendental structure has elicited a pre-modern counter-revolution that continues to hamper the unfolding of a truly Copernican scenario. This reaction is based on the fallacy according to which the Kantian reflection that brought into focus the transcendental relativity of human experience, far from being the condition of possibility of a post-critical *sublation* of the corresponding limits, entails a juridical *limitation* of human experience. According to this *claustrophobic interpretation* of the critical motif, the transcendental structure fixes once and for all the ultimate insurmountable limits of human experience. In particular, the *theoretical* conjugation of this stance amounts to the claim that the scope of scientific rationality is limited *de jure* to the pheno(u)menal *Umwelt* (environing world) determined by the very transcendental structure that renders objective science possible – that is, to the *objective nature* defined by the transcendental type of the subject of science. To overcome this limitation, we would have to be able to jump over our own shadows, i.e. to perform transcendental variations enabling us to have phenoumenological experiences of the impersonal field—for instance, experiences "triangulating" a given phenoumenon from a diversity of transcendental viewpoints. According to the claustrophobic interpretation of the critical motif, such *phenoumenological empiricism* is juridically forbidden. Every human thought cannot but emit dice throws, enact experiences predetermined – and ineluctably limited – by the fixed generic structure of its contingent subjective supports. And of course, a dice throw – i.e., a human thought that cannot bypass the contingent structure of its very conditions of possibility – will never abolish chance, will

[8] In *Dynamique de la manifestation*, Renaud Barbaras studies in detail the problem of characterizing the "natural" *a priori* (that we here call *immanental*) that underpins the "*correlational* [or transcendental] a priori" of Husserlian phenomenology and renders possible the subject-object polarizations, i.e. the very emergence of the correlated poles.

never activate phenoumenological modes of experience capable of overcoming transcendental perspectivism and its concomitant contingency. Now, if we grant that human experience is transcendentally framed, it does not follow that we cannot vary the very transcendental conditions of experience, that we cannot go beyond transcendental transcendence. A critical subject, i.e. a subject capable of performing a critical reflection on its own transcendental structure, can afford the possibility of varying, deforming, or perturbing the very a priori structure of its experience. In what follows, we shall call *phenoumenological experience* any experience that involves a shift of the very transcendental structure that renders a transcendent experience possible. A phenoumenological experience entails by definition a *speculative transcendence* that goes "beyond" transcendental transcendence; a partial trans-(in the sense of *transversal*)-umweltization of experience. The (bio)technological expansion of the scope of human perception and motor functions; the scientific and philosophical reprogramming of the categories of our understanding; literary and philosophical labor on the linguistic *organon*; psychedelic perturbations of neurochemical structure; the possibility of attuning the resolution of sensibility (both perceptive and affective) to different spatial and temporal scales; the perturbation of the very existential structures of being-there (by means of practices such as meditation, isolation, fasting, etc.),[9] are all local operators of transcendental variation giving access to phenoumenological experiences. By definition, a process of speculative transcendence is not an enterprise that could be carried out by a subject of a given transcendental type. Even in the particular context defined by the theoretical interest of reason, the infinite project oriented by the regulative idea of truth cannot simply proceed by means of acts of objective knowledge enacted by *the* subject of science: the re-presentation of nature as something that objectively stands before the subject of science is nothing but a particular moment of science as such. We might say that a post-critical science necessarily entails a *spiritual* dimension, in the precise sense that Foucault gives to this term:

> […] we could call "spirituality" the search, practice and experience through which the subject carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to the truth. […] It [spirituality] postulates that for the subject to have right of access to the truth he must be changed, transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent and up to a certain point, other than himself. The truth is only given to the subject at a price that brings the subject's being into play.[10]

The operations of transcendental variation should not be understood as some sort of definite deliverance of human experience with respect to any form of transcendental framing, but rather as successful differential transgressions of the limits that apply for each particular occasion. Far from giving access to a hypothetical noumenal realm absolved from any form of transcendental overdetermination, these speculative operations merely loosen the anchoring of experience to a fixed (and contingent) transcendental structure, thereby activating phenoumenological (or transumweltic) degrees of freedom. What is important here is that the impossibility of getting rid of the transcendental framing of experience does not entail the existence of insurmountable barriers to the process of universalizing transumweltization:

[9] Regarding the conception of these kinds of practices as perturbations of the existentials of the being-there (*Dasein*), see Jean-Yves Lacoste, *Expérience et Absolu* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994).
[10] Michel Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-82*, trans. by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 15.

speculative labor does not claim to purify experience of its transcendental framings, but rather to endow experience with a speculative mobility with respect to any fixed transcendental structure. If we were to think that our experience would be "purer" if we could get rid of any transcendental framing, then we would be – to *détourne* Kant's words – like "*the light dove* [that] *in free flight cutting through the air the resistance of which it feels, could get the idea that it could do even better in airless space*."[11] Of course, there is no compelling reason to perform such transcendental variations: the exercise of science, arts, politics and existential practices – as well as the exercise of their *concrete* concertation in philosophical thinking – are just existential possibilities among others. But equally, there is no reason whatsoever to limit in an a priori and dogmatic manner the scope of such infinite projects, to close off from the outset any possibility of affording transcendental variations.

The very conception of such a phenoumenological empiricism presupposes that the transcendental ego is not a pre-phenoumenal entelechy, but rather a structure stemming from a (historico-)natural genesis and subject to both spontaneous and deliberate mutations. The so-called transcendental ego is just a snapshot abstracted from a local process of subjectivation enacted by the experiential field itself. Even the notion of a human transcendental type (which we use just for the sake of convenience) presupposes a coarse-graining that abstracts from cultural, linguistic, historical, gender, social, and ontogenetic variations among the corresponding sub-types. In this way, one of the last avatars of the pre-Copernican Ur-Ground, namely the absolutized transcendental ego conceived of as the ultimate constituting source of experience as such, is also forced to quit its pre-phenoumenal realm and become incarnate, to drift, and to fall through the bottomless and impersonal experiential field. Some might argue that this "*naturalization of the transcendental*" forgets the difference between the empirical and the transcendental – such as, for instance, the difference between the experience of an *objective body* and the *bodily* a priori structure rendering this *objective* experience possible. According to this line of argument, the very transcendental structure that renders objective experience possible cannot, as such, be an object of experience. Now, the thesis according to which the *phenomenological* difference between the empirical and the transcendental – such as the difference between the *objective body* (*Korper*) and the *body-qua-lived-body* (*Leib*) – entails an essential *ontological* difference, is far from self-evident. What do we understand by a transcendental structure framing the subject's experience, if not its perceptive and motor apparatus; its physiological constitution; its cultural, sociological, and historical environments; the categories conveyed by its language; the imaginary schemas by means of which it can categorize sensory data, and so on? As Merleau-Ponty clearly puts it, "*Nature outside of us is revealed by the nature that we are.*"[12] The *transcendental activity* of the transcending subject is always underpinned by an *immanental passivity* resulting from the fact that the subject of experience is just a being-there of the same "nature" as that which is framed by its experience.[13] In the last instance, the *subjective* experience of nature is a

[11] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A5/B9, p. 129.

[12] Quoted by Robert Vallier, *Être sauvage and the barbaric principle: Merleau-Ponty's reading of Schelling*, in *The Barbarian Principle: Merleau-Ponty, Schelling, and the Question of Nature*, ed. by Jason M. Wirth and Patrick Burke, (New York: State University of New York Press, 2013), p. 133.

[13] In Merleau-Ponty's own terms: "Philosophy has never spoken […] of the passivity of our activity, as Valéry spoke of a *body of the spirit*: new as our initiatives may be, they come to birth at the heart of being, they are

narcissistic self-experience *of* nature in the double sense of the genitive. We shall assume, then, that the active subject of the transcendental *constitution* of objective nature is a passive product of a natural *institution*: only the instituted can constitute, only an *incarnated* subject (one endowed with the corresponding transcendental structure) can trigger a local process of umweltic pheno(u)menalization of the field. It is certainly worth emphasizing, nonetheless, that the "*naturalization of the transcendental*" as we understand it here does not rely on a pre-critical scientism: we understand this "*naturalization of the transcendental*" as the other side of the "*speculativization of nature*", i.e. the upgrading of the concept of nature rendered possible by the speculative sublation of its pre-critical concept. In other words, the "*naturalization*" that is at stake here, far from resulting from a pre-critical concept of nature, is correlative to a post-critical concept that is rendered possible by transcendental reflection itself. Therefore, the "naturalization" of the transcendental should not be understood here as a simple reversal of the transcendental "idealism" that would place the *objective nature* of pre-critical naturalism – rather than the transcendental ego – in the role of the Ur-Ground (i.e. as a subordination of transcendental philosophy either to science or even to some form of "*philosophy of nature*"). We shall maintain that the theoretical movements addressing the two forms of production – i.e. the transcendental analysis of the *constituted visions* that unfold in the subject's pheno(u)menological *foreground* and the "*ontological psychoanalysis*" (Merleau-Ponty) of the "unconscious" proto-plasmatic *background* underpinning the *instituted* subjects – define the complementary and interrelated semicircles of a unique speculative theoretical movement. What we shall call *immanental phenoumenology* addresses the *carnal* indivision between the (instituting) *plasma* and the (constituted) *vision*. In Schellingian terms, *transcendental philosophy* (addressing the transcendental constitution of a subject's objective experience) and *philosophy of nature* (addressing the natural institution of the transcendental subject) must be synthesized in an *immanental phenoumenology of identity* in which the circular reflections between the speculative promotion of the notion of nature and the naturalization of the transcendental subject raise both the concept of nature and the concept of subject to new post-critical powers. Such an immanental phenoumenology addresses the whole process that envelops the immanental field of impersonal experience as such, the *spermatikos logos* that guarantees its intrinsic rational consistency, the natural processes by means of which local subjects are instituted within the field, the subsequent framings of the latter defined by the subjects' transcendental structures, and the myriad of "objective natures" (with their pheno(u)menological data and effective natural laws) that govern the structural consistency of the resulting umweltic spheres. Within such an immanental phenoumenology, the congenital idealistic tendencies of *transcendental phenomenology* (foreclosing the natural process of the institution of transcendental subjects) and the possible transcendental naivety of a pre-critical *philosophy of nature* (foreclosing the subjective overdeterminations of the concept of nature) must be mutually counterbalanced. Regarding this circular complementarity between transcendental philosophy and philosophy of nature, it is worth here quoting Merleau-Ponty at length:

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connected onto the times that streams forth in us, supported on the pivots or hinges of our life […]", Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 221.

> We do not contest the fact that the concepts of Nature, history, and mankind/humanity form a skein, an endless entanglement. But this is precisely why it is impossible to treat Nature as a detail of human history […]. Every positing of a Nature implies a subjectivity and even an historic intersubjectivity. This does not mean that the sense of natural being is exhausted by its symbolic transcriptions, that there is nothing to think before these transcriptions. It only proves that the being of Nature is to be sought below [*en deçà*] its being posited. If a philosophy of reflection is permitted to treat all philosophy of Nature as a philosophy of spirit and of mankind/humanity in disguise, and to judge it on the basis of the conditions of all possible objects for a spirit or a human, this generalized suspicion, i.e. reflection, cannot exempt itself from investigation. It must turn against itself. And, having measured what we risk losing if we start with Nature, we [must] also account for what we surely lack if we start from subjectivity: the primordial being against which all reflection institutes itself, and without which there is no longer philosophy, for want of an outside against which it has to measure itself.[14]

The notion of an *immanental phenoumenology* requires that we re-place the central notions of transcendental philosophy – in particular, the notion of *transcendental subject* and the concomitant notion of *transcendence* – within a new post-critical context. In the first place, a subject open to such variations of the transcendental structure can no longer – by definition – be understood as a particular instantiation of a transcendental type, i.e. of a fixed generic subjective structure. Correlatively, a speculative subject that drifts along gradients of transcendental variation is no longer surrounded by a single environing world: the umweltic bubbles defined by the transcendental types that (s)he can embody merge into a single transumweltic (or non-environmental) *interzone* of experience. In this sense, a speculative subject is "*poorer in world*" than a pre-critical subject, such as for instance a tick or a cactus. We could say that a speculative subject is necessarily a *plastic subject*, i.e. a subject capable of affording "shamanic" metamorphoses of its very transcendental structure.[15] Only a plastic subject can activate and embody phenoumenological modes of the experiential field, i.e. modes of experience that are not piloted by a unique transcendental type; only a plastic

[14] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 'La Nature ou le Monde du silence (pages d'introduction)', in *Maurice Merleau-Ponty*, ed. by Emmanuel de Saint-Aubert (Paris: Hermann Editeurs, 2008), pp. 45-46 (we have used the unofficial translation by D. Meacham and N. Keane). Regarding the relation between Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* and Merleau-Ponty's late philosophy see Vallier, *Être sauvage and the barbaric principle: Merleau-Ponty's reading of Schelling.* See also Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 'The Philosopher and his Shadow', in *Signs*, trans. by Richard McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964) and Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*. It is also worth noting that William James explicitly links his "radical empiricism' (or "philosophy of pure experience") to the post-Kantian "philosophy of identity": "Since the acquisition of conscious quality on the part of an experience depends upon a context [a *framing* in our terminology] coming to it, it follows that the sum total of all experiences, having no context, can not strictly be called conscious at all. It is a *that*, an Absolute, a "pure" experience on an enormous scale, undifferentiated and undifferentiable into thought and thing. This the post-Kantian idealists have always practically acknowledged by calling their doctrine *Identitätsphilosophie*. […] the philosophy of pure experience being only a more comminuted *Identitätsphilosophie*", William James, *How Two Minds Can Know One Thing*, in *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, pp. 70-71.

[15] In analogous terms, Deleuze argues that the subject of philosophy must necessarily be thought of as a *larval subject*: « In this sense, it is not even clear that thought, in so far as it constitutes the dynamism peculiar to philosophical systems, may be related to a substantial, completed and well-constituted subject, such as the Cartesian Cogito: thought is, rather, one of those terrible movements which can be sustained only under the conditions of a larval subject. » Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. by Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 118. However, the concept of a plastic subject is deprived of the regressive connotation conveyed by the Deleuzian notion of a larval subject: the immanental phenoumenology of spirit as we understand it here unfolds in the sense of an increasing plasticity, which is rendered possible by the post-critical interplay between transcendental reflection and speculative sublation.

subject can make a foray into the phenoumenodelic pleroma on board of a Transumweltic Express. Secondly, the speculative conception of a constituting subject that is itself an instituted natural product requires that we relativise the very characterization of its relation with the experiential field as a form of *transcendence*, i.e. as an act by means of which the subject gains access to a transcendent "outside" placed before her or him. In the conceptual framework provided by the post-critical naturalization of the transcendental subject, the notion of an individual *thrown into* and *transcended towards* a re-presented world is replaced by that of a subjective enduring fluctuation of the experiential field embodying a particular local form of its self-experience, eliciting a particular process of pheno(u)menalization. As Sartre puts it,

> The transcendent *I* must fall before the stroke of phenomenological reduction. The *Cogito* affirms too much. The certain content of the pseudo-"Cogito" is not "*I* have consciousness of this chair," but "There is consciousness of this chair." This content is sufficient to constitute an infinite and absolute field of investigation for phenomenology.[16]

In this context, an intentional experience is understood as a local bipolarization of the impersonal field assuming the form of a correlational vector going from a noetic source to a transcendent noematic target. Every *transcendent experience* (i.e. every intentional relation between a local subject and a transcendent object) is always – in the last instance – an *immanent self-experience* of the field itself, an act by means of which the field enriches its internal phenoumenalization. According to Merleau-Ponty, *the subject's vision "is not a view upon the* outside […] *The world no longer stands before him through representation; rather, it is* [the subject] *who is born among the things by a sort of concentration or coming-to-itself of the visible*".[17] Correlatively, the *transcendental conditions* by means of which a subject can have an intentional experience of a *transcendent* object hinge in the last instance on the *immanental conditions* that make possible the *immanent* polarizations of the self-experiencing field itself. Of course, *subjective* experience is necessarily – to a greater or a lesser degree – *local* and *perspectival*, which justifies the characterization of the intentional vectors as gradients of transcendence. It is thanks to this perspectival locality – i.e. to the fact that finite subjects embody empirico-transcendental vantage points entailing new framings of the experiential field – that the latter can deepen its infinite self-experience: *only from the chalice of this realm of finite subjects foams forth within the experiential field its own pleromatic infinitude*.[18] It is worth noting, nonetheless, that even this *subjective* description of experience as a form of transcendence can be the object of a speculative perturbation: the higher the degree of transumweltization associated with the spreading of a plastic subject through different transcendental structures – i.e. the higher the amount of transcendental viewpoints that (s)he can incarnate –, the lower the extent to which its experience is subjectively lived as a form of *transcendence*. In short, the *transumweltization* of a subject's experience goes hand in hand with its *immanentization*. This correlation can be understood as the transcendental version of the fact that multiscopic vision is "less transcendent", so to speak, than monocular

[16] Jean-Paul Sartre, *The transcendence of the ego. An existentialist theory of consciousness*, p. 53.
[17] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Eye and Mind", in *The Primacy of Perception*, trans. by Carleton Dallery (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 159–190.
[18] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 493.

vision. At the limit, the completely transumweltized experience of the field itself – which envelops all transcendental viewpoints that arise in its midst – is an *immanent* self-experience, a no-body's experience of no-thing.

The effective activation of phenoumenological degrees of freedom requires mobilizing of all the subtleties and resources – as well as the patience – of the corresponding modes of thought. Let's consider the case addressed by the Maître. The Maître not only bequeathed us the task of *vanquishing chance*, but also prescribed specific gestures adapted to his field of operations: such a task must be *patiently* accomplished *word by word* – that is, in the very element of language. Here, language must be understood as a particular example of a *transcendental operator* framing experience. As Kant argued, following Aristotle, language encodes the categorical a priori forms of judgmental linkage that structure the human experience of the impersonal field. We could understand language as a symbolic knife tracing *abstract cuts* in the impersonal field, cuts that structure its corresponding umweltic modes of appearing. Now, language is operational: the linguistic abstract cuts of the field – "*the textual work that comes out of the spider's belly*"[19] – interweave a cobweb to trap the intended noematic "flies". But language is not like the knife of Chuang-Tzu: its abstract cuts, far from slicing without resistance through the *spermatikos logos* that rationally inseminates the field, render possible a particular coarse-grained experience of the latter. Transcendental reflection makes it explicit that the linguistic cobweb, in order to weave points of impasse for the targeted flies, must have its own points of impasse: if the interstices of the lattice were too small, the web would not be invisible to its potential victims, i.e. it would be inefficacious. In this way, every linguistic cobweb is characterized by a given "power of resolution" that establishes a cut-off demarcating the "visible" landscape from a background that necessarily remains "invisible". The very transcendental operator that allows the spider to grasp the field in an effective manner weaves an umweltic bubble around the spider: every form of pheno(u)menal revealing takes place against a concealed backdrop. The impasses of any particular symbolic cobweb – its invisibles and indiscernibles – are just symptoms of the transumweltic nature of the impersonal field itself, i.e. of the fact that the phenoumenological field as such cannot be idealistically identified with the pheno(u)menal *Umwelt* defined by any possible transcendental structure. In this sense, the impasses of the symbolic order can indeed be understood as symptoms of the phenoumenal "real". The sad destiny of Funes the Memorious attests to the fact that finer is not always better. We should not understand a finite resolution as a sort of limitation that could be bypassed merely by increasing the power of resolution, but rather as a particular mode of experience that awakens certain *effective qualities* of the field, qualities that might be invisible *at both higher and lower powers of resolution*. In particular, even low powers of resolution call forth qualities of the field that define legitimate phenoumenological data of the experiential flood. In the mode of experience opened up by (what we shall call) *phenoumenodelic suspension*, all the abstract modes of experience (perceptive, affective, conceptual, etc.), all the strata of effective qualities (primary, secondary,…, *n*-ary), all the *Umwelten* brought forth by the possible transcendental structures, belong to a single experiential field. A given phenoumenon *P*, far from being a

[19] Jacques Lacan, *On Femenine Sexuality. The Limits of Love and Knowledge*, ed. by Jacques-Allain Miller, trans. by Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), p. 93.

hypothetical thing-in-itself existing independently of any pheno(u)menalization, can be understood as a sort of "functor" assigning to every possible empirico-transcendental structure *T* what we could call the *T-pheno(u)menalization of P*. This definition has the twofold merit of preserving the ontological scope of the processes of phenoumenalization – thereby upholding the identity between *being* and *appearing* – without succumbing to any form of subjective idealism – thereby banishing from the outset the subjective reduction of the notion of phenoumenon. Now, a Kantian spider knows that its cobweb is characterized by a particular power of resolution, that the transcendental grid shaped by the "evolutionary" process that institutes it as a local arachnid fluctuation of the impersonal field always entails a coarse-graining out of which a particular *Umwelt* arises, endowed with its effective qualities, its spatiotemporal scales, its nomological regularities, its visible flies and its invisible depths. As we argued above, the effectuation of such a transcendental reflection opens up the possibility of activating phenoumenological degrees of freedom: by exploring different stitches, by adjusting the sharpness of the linguistic knife, by increasing or decreasing the grain, a speculative spider can probe the field at different scales and witness how a whole spectrum of sensuoscapes continuously arise and fade as it freely tunes the resolution. The Mallarméan Maître knows better than anyone that we are not constrained to stay within the transcendental limits fixed by a "*universal report*" shaped by the constraints of communication and effective action; that we are not condemned to foreclose the "*real*" points of impasse of the symbolic order, thus limiting the scope of our experience to the transcendental frame defined by the corresponding "categories". The Maître's *grimoire* enjoins us to perturb the grammar, thereby "*giving back to the word, which can become viciously stereotyped in us, its mobility*".[20] According to the Maître, the natural tendency of language to hypostasize its abstract cuts cannot be overcome by means of an ecstatic shot out of a pistol that could tear through the symbolic order and give access to a hypothetical noumenal realm beyond language: only language can patiently – *word by word*, i.e. in the very element of language – transgress its abstract hypostasis. Specifically, we can distinguish two privileged vectors of perturbation of the "*universal report*": while the poetic treatment of language deforms the grammar, enhances the flux of equivocity, and Joyceanly fosters the amalgrammation of the different languages into a single "[im]*pure language*" (Benjamin), the mathematical-oriented formalization of language reduces equivocity by providing rigorous definitions, abstracts ideal types, and carefully controls the identifications between their tokens. Now, the pleromatic richness of experience is only preserved when language is progressively endowed with the capacity to freely move between the frontiers explored by the different gradients of perturbation of the "*universal report*", thereby becoming able to grasp both the sensuous (perceptive and affective) *n*-ary qualities and the ideal entities that coalesce within the same experiential field.

Thus far, we have pleaded in favor of a phenoumenodelic extension of the notion of experience. The exploration of the phenoumenodelic field according to the different *abstract* modalities of experience (perceptive, theoretical, etc.) is the task of the corresponding modes of thought (art, science, etc.). In turn, the *systematic* exploration of the field according to the

[20] Stéphane Mallarmé, 'Notes sur le Langage', in *Igitur, Divagations, Un coup de dès*, ed. by Bertrand Marchal (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 2003), p.74.

concrete ingression of these abstract modalities into a unique synesthetic pleroma defines the proper task of philosophy as we understand it here. Now, even if the Maître acknowledges that the modern ungrounding, rather than entailing the Karamazovian hypostasis of contingency, opens human experience to an absolute phenoumenodelic field absolved from being framed by a unique contingent transcendental structure, there is another compelling objection that fuels its hesitation to carry out eidetic acts: namely, the hypothesis according to which, in the last instance, "*nothing will have taken place*", not even the place. The *ontic contingency* of the particular transcendental structures of human beings brings forth against the backdrop provided by the *ontological contingency* regarding the very existence of human beings, a contingency that projects backwards towards its origin and forwards towards its fate. In the absence of the ornitheological guarantees and prescriptions of the pre-modern era, the actions prescribed by the eidetic orientations seem to be nothing but follies. Gauged against the background of this contingency, the subjective engagement in the corresponding infinite projects of reason might indeed be understood as nothing but a vain gesticulation of our narcissism, an irreflexive perpetuation of an ancestral madness which is probably – in the last instance – utterly inconsequential. In particular, the infinite project of science as such, performed by "*clever beasts*" condemned to a murky death "*in some out of the way corner of* [the] *universe*",[21] taking place and time in a cosmos doomed either to the "*lowly splashing*" of a thermodynamical death or to a cosmological collapse after which even space and time will not have taken place—such an act of reason seems to be nothing but a "*frenzied leap*" of nothingness pouring back into nothingness. In the last instance – and without fail – nothing will remain of us, "*nothing will have happened*"[22], we shall exit *time, space, and even number* (Hugo), everything – even abysses and epochs – will be dissolved into the original foam of nothingness. This forthcoming dissolution – as well as the correlative contingency of the very emergence of human beings – instills its nihilistic influence in every infinite human project, awakening (what Lyotard called) the "*postmodern affect*",[23] namely melancholia; and forcing us to halt the automatism of the eidetic drives for a second and seriously ask ourselves *What for? What good is it to engage in the infinite tasks of reason – rather than just focusing on the administration and the enjoyment of the available resources and the improvement of our life conditions – if in the last instance (only) nothing matters? Why should we follow the injunctions posited by the eidetic regulative poles if we are always already under the influence of the retroactive melancholic wavefront of a planetary catastrophe to come?* In order to face this existential objection to the accomplishment of deeds enacted under the aegis of infinite ideas, let's recall the Holderlinean watchword summoned by Heidegger in order to deal with the (en)framing conveyed by the essence of modern technology: "*where danger is, there the sublating power grows*". Maybe the nihilistic panorama that we have just depicted did not get deep enough into the heart of the modern abyss; maybe we have to delve further "*where danger is*" and push our situation to a further extreme, an extreme in which the hypothesis of a (scientifically updated) doomsday will assume its true tenor, that of being a

[21] Friedrich Nietzsche, 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense' in *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870s*, ed. and trans. by Daniel Breazeale (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979), p. 79.
[22] *Ibid*., p. 79.
[23] Jean-François Lyotard, 'A Postmodern Fable', trans. by Elizabeth Constable and Thomas Cochran, *Yale Journal of Criticism*, 6:1 (1993), p. 237.

"world picture" subjected to the hyperbolic ungrounding power of modern reason. Firstly, the imaginary hypostasis of every scientific symbolization falls beneath the blows of scientific hypothetization. The very regulative infinite idea of modern science prescribes that we should not transform a successful local symbolization into a hypostatized "world picture" painted on the vacant surfaces of the umweltic vaults, a constellation in which we could read the tale of our origin and destiny, a new imaginary "paradigm" giving us the ultimate key to our true situation. The dogmatic conversion of partially successful symbolizations into updated cosmogonical and eschatological certainties also projects a sheltering sky that forecloses the abyssal uncertainty unleashed by modernity: we prefer to embrace the tomb and the certainty of (a cosmic) death rather than facing the pictureless vistas opened by the modern ungrounding. Secondly, the speculative opening of a phenoumenodelic field of experience advances one step further "*where danger is*" by post-critically risking the (environing) world, i.e. by risking the unicity of the very transcendental framing of experience, by absolving subjective existence from being an empirical token of a fixed transcendental type placed at the center of an umweltic sphere. As a result, this transumweltization of experience delivers us from the hypostasis of the eschatological tales inscribed on the underside of sheltering umbrellas: the phenoumenalization of experience "*makes a slit in the* [umweltic] *umbrella*", "*tears open the firmament itself*" [24] and decants cosmodicies into the phenoumenodelic pleroma. In order to remain faithful to the real scope of the modern crisis, we must resolve ourselves to face the absolute absence of any Ur-frame or world picture that could orient our acts and support our constructions; we must subject ourselves to the imperative that Althusser associated with the term *materialism*, namely "*not to tell ourselves stories*" (or rather, in more accurate terms, not to hypostasize the stories that we can legitimately tell). The generalized suspension of hypostasis – such as the hypostasis of a given tone (e.g. the present, the state of wakefulness, sense-certainty, substantiality) into a fundamental tone, the hypostasis of a given theoretical symbolization into an imaginary world picture, the hypostasis of an umweltic "story" into a cosmodicy – will be here called *phenoumenodelic epokhé*. In the mode of experience opened up by this suspension, "*everything takes place, by foreshortening, as an hypothesis; we avoid narrative*". [25] This absolution of experience with respect to the hypostasis of tones, grounds, and narratives gives access to an absolute experiential field in which the different phenoumenodelic data are no longer gauged with respect to any putative motionless Ur-frame, thereby achieving a *general relativization* of the field: "*each utensil, spoon, fork, knife, and plate*" in the Maître's underplasmic ark "*bore on its reverse a letter encircled by a Latin motto:* mobilis in mobili".[26] In particular, we must admit that, in the last instance, and in spite of our partially successful symbolizations, we do not know what the ultimate nature of the experiential field is, we do not know what is the real scope of our supposed "freedom" to carry out (or not) eidetic acts, we do not know whether our acts and decisions might have any consequence whatsoever, we do not know whether something will have taken place or not. We just know, since it is a phenoumenodelic datum, that the experiential field manifests itself according to a *concrete* imbrication of the multiple *abstract*

[24] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, p. 203.
[25] Stéphane Mallarmé, Preface to 'A Dice Throw Will Never Abolish Chance', in *Mallarmé*, ed. Anthony Hartley (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1965), p. 210.
[26] Jules Verne, *20000 Leagues Under the Seas*, trans. by F.P. Walter (Project Gutenberg Etext), p. 41.

modalities of experience (theoretical, affective, perceptive, social, etc.). And we know that the configurations of these modalities that, on each particular occasion, are the case, can be mediated by the different modes of thought (science, arts, existential practices, politics, etc.): we can always understand, thanks to the patient effort of the concept, more than we do at present; we can widen the doors of perception and affect in order to gain access to a whole spectrum of qualitative sensuoscapes; we can perturb the very existentials that frame our existence; we can attune ourselves to the different (cosmological, astrophysical, geological, biological, and historical) durations that pulse through the temporal scales characteristic of the "natural attitude". Thanks to the *epokhé*, every phenoumenon – captains, sirens, storms – becomes a phenoumenodelic *datum* drifting through the experiential flood: *permeating every garden, infusing every subject, suspending every substance, the plasmic ocean always glitters* (Solaris). Even the sublime *pathos* of an effective catastrophe is forbidden to those who "*by a breath risk more*"; even the ship(wreck) becomes an uncertain phantasmagoria made of the suspended insubstance of the experiential field. Rather than a *reduction* that would allow us to gain a firm and definitive foothold on a hypothetical pre-phenoumenal last instance, the *phenoumenodelic epokhé* is a *suspension* of every hypostasis that surpasses the pure impersonal givenness of the phenoumenodelic data. The limitation of the Husserlian *epoché* understood as a *reduction* to the ultimate subjective source of transcendental *constitution* is that the transcendental ego, far from being a pre-phenoumenal last instance, is itself an instituted product, a local sentient and expressive fold of the experiential field itself.[27] The *resulting* subject of experience is not the ultimate source of the phenoumenalization, but rather a local subjective vortex – an enduring wave – of an impersonal phenoumenodelic field entailing a new umweltization of the latter. Hence the phenoumenodelic stream cannot be understood here as an ego trip, but rather as the impersonal, ungrounded, and navigable flood upon which any form of transcendental ego must be borne. In his late philosophy, Husserl himself recognized the limits of his idealistic egology.[28] However, the characterization of the pre-subjective stratum that underpins the transcendental constitution of objectivity and envelops the different environing worlds as an Ur-Earth "*which does not move*" – aside from the charm of its provocation regarding the first-order Copernicanism of pre-critical modern science – does foster an unnecessary pre-Copernican (and pre-Einsteinian) regression.[29] Husserl's attempt to overcome the idealism of a monadic egology is vitiated by the fact that

[27] Regarding Husserl's phenomenological *epokhé*, see Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Mediations. An Introduction to Phenomenology*, trans. by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1960), §8, pp. 18-21, and § 11, pp. 25-26; and Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. by F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), § 49-50, pp. 109-114.

[28] Regarding this point, see the commentary proposed by Merleau-Ponty of Husserl's last philosophy in 'The Philosopher and his Shadow', in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*.

[29] See Edmund Husserl, "Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum phänmenologischen Ursprung der Räumlichkeit der Natur," in *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl*, ed. by Marvin Farber (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1940), 305–325; trans. by Fred Kersten and Leonard Lawlor as "Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature: The Originary Ark, the Earth, Does Not Move," in *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, ed. by Leonard Lawlor and Bettina Bergo (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2002). For the characterization of the *lifeworld* – understood as the common envelop of the different environing worlds – as an *earth*, see Edmund Husserl, *Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic*, trans. by James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), § 38, p. 163.

that he repeats at the level of the "lifeworld" the same kind of argument that he uses to forbid any form of naturalization of the transcendental ego: just as the constituting condition of possibility of natural objectivity could not be itself naturalized, the ultimate instance against which every form of motion and rest is gauged must be understood as an Ur-Ground that cannot itself be in motion or at rest. [30] Now, in a post-Copernican and post-Einstenian scenario, the thesis according to which if we "*do not have a representation of a new ground as such, on the basis of which the earth can have* […] *sense as a* […] *body in motion and at rest* […], *to that extent just the earth itself is really the ground and not a body*" [31] is theoretically problematic: we have learned how to conceive motion (even accelerated motion) without requiring a fixed, a priori kinematic background with respect to which motion and rest would take place.[32] Husserl could go as far as to admit the necessity of embedding the transcendental ego in an intersubjective lifeworld, but he could not definitively overcome the foundational drive that pervades his overall project, i.e. he could not resist the pre-modern temptation to understand the lifeworld as a motionless Ur-Ground. The impossibility of sublating once and for all the pre-modern foundational motif makes him miss, in spite of the insane suspensive resources of the phenomenological *epokhé*, the immanence of the phenoumenodelic experiential field. Nonetheless, Husserl's desperate attempt to phenomenologically reduce Copernicanism has the merit of (indirectly) bringing to light the fact that the relation to the ground – whose canonical model is provided by our dwelling on the empirical Earth – structures a priori (not only our effective experience of physical space, but also) the *spatial schematization* of the diverse modalities of human experience (such as, for instance – in the particular framework provided by the theoretical interest of reason – the axiomatic-foundational motifs that pervade science and philosophy). In other words, the Copernican revolution does not by itself entail a suspension of the structuring motif of the Ur-Ground ubiquitous in all dimensions of human experience. However, this artificial limitation

[30] This point has been clearly recognized by Derrida in the following terms: "But if an objective science of earthly things is possible, an objective science of the Earth itself, the ground and foundation of these objects, is as radically impossible as that of transcendental subjectivity. The transcendental Earth is not an object and can never become one. And the possibility of a geometry strictly complements the impossibility of what could be called a "*geo-logy*," the objective science of the Earth itself. […] There is a science *of* space, insofar as its starting point is not *in* space.", Jacques Derrida in *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry*, trans. by John P. Leavey, Jr. (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), pp. 83-85.

[31] Edmund Husserl, "Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature: The Originary Ark, the Earth, Does Not Move," p. 122.

[32] A phenomenologist could argue that it is not legitimate to use scientific theories such as the general theory of relativity (which are the result of innumerable mediations that foreclose the pre-objective sedimented layers of that which is immediately given) to argue against phenomenological self-evidence. As Husserl himself puts it in the *Earth* fragment: the phenomenological reduction of the Copernican revolution does "*not even touch upon physics. But* […] *we must not forget the pregivenness and constitution belonging to the apodictic Ego or to me, to us, as the source of all actual and possible sense of being, of all possible broadening which can be further constructed in the already constituted world developing historically*". However, even the claim that every form of motion and rest *appears* as taking place against a motionless background is phenomenologically problematic, i.e. lacking immediate self-evidence: uniform motion and rest are phenomenologically indiscernible. The only type of motion that could possibly be considered as absolute is accelerated motion. Now, thanks to Einstein, we know that accelerated motion is also relative, that is, relative to the so-called *inertio-gravitational field* which, far from being absolute, is a dynamical physical entity. Even if this higher former of relativity is far from being phenomenologically self-evident to us – human beings – there is no juridical reason to prevent us from conceiving subjects (or a transcendental variation of our own subjectivity) who, being sensitive enough to the dynamics of the inertio-gravitational field, would experience the relativity of accelerated motion as phenomenologically evident.

of the scope of the Copernican revolution does not necessarily imply (as Husserl seems to believe) a juridical restriction regarding the possibility of launching every form of Ur-Ground into orbit, but can be understood instead as a call for a deepening of the Copernican revolution: the kernel of transcendental philosophy, as yet undiscovered, is – above and beyond Husserl – the thesis according to which the Copernicanism can be raised to a transcendental power, meaning that not only is the Earth as a physical body in a state of orbital freefall in cosmic space, but every fundamental tone, every possible Ur-Ground of experience (the transcendental ego, the spatiotemporal background, onto-logic, world pictures painted on umweltic spheres, etc.), are also instituted phenoumena drifting through an experiential flood that is turtleless-all-the-way-down. The "naturalization" of the transcendental ego must be followed by the relativizing "naturalization" of the grounds that support egos, of the intersubjective lifeworlds in which they live, of the *Umwelten* that surround them. We shall then assume that every empirico-transcendental support of a subjective process of pheno(u)menalization is not an *arche*, a first principle, a motionless ground, but rather (as Merleau-Ponty suggested) an *ark* carrying local subjective fluctuations of the experiential field through a phenoumenodelic deluge.[33] Here the phenoumenodelic *epokhé* denotes the conversion by means of which supposed Ur-Grounds are experienced and understood as underplasmic arks descending into the Maelstrom. Rather than being conceived of as a "*spaceship earth*" (Fuller) freefalling through (the transcendental upgraded version of) the Pascalian cosmic spaces, the ark drifts through a pleromatic and impersonal stream of manifestation.

Now, if the environing worlds are "*stopped*" (Castaneda), if the world has been "*put out of action*", "*parenthesized*" (Husserl), if "*the world has gone away*" (Celan), if even the impersonal phenomenological Ur-Grounds – such as the Husserlian lifeworld – fall before the stroke of the phenoumenodelic *epokhé*, where do we find ourselves, how can we schematize our existential situation? What kind of primordial scene could take the place of the Husserlian pre-modern arche-rooting, the disenchanted Pascalian inter-abyssal site, or the pastoral Heideggerian fourfold (*Geviert*)? Where is the ark – containing the chamber with the *grimoire* prescribing eidetic acts – on board of which the Maître, by "*threatening some destiny and the winds*", perseveres defiantly in the task of stalking the interzones and grokking the immanental experiential field? How can we schematize the worldless milieu into which the phenoumenodelic *epokhé* launches the Ur-Grounds? What is the characteristic *Stimmung* (affective tonality) distilled by being-thrown into such a milieu? The first thing to note is that the suspension of Ur-Grounds does not necessarily lead to the silent darkness of the infinite spaces and its associated *Stimmung*, namely Pascalian anxiety: the suspension of any form of privileged fundamental tonality opens existence to an atonal milieu full of unheard-of possibilities. We can imagine Pythagoras listening to the skies and wondering *Is Pascal deaf?* The suspended pleroma is pregnant with accords that – by means of a patient work of mediation – can be infinitely unfolded: "*there is no silence in the universe*",[34] only relative thresholds of perceptibility, affectability, and understandability. Beyond both the anxiety

[33] « This « earth » is an ark : it bears the possibility of all-being atop […] the deluge […]', Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *L'institution. La passivité. Notes de cours au Collège de France (1954-1955)*, (Paris: Editions Belin, 2003), p. 174.
[34] Paul Valery, *Variation sur une* Pensée, in *Variété I et II* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1924-1930), p. 118.

awoken by being-thrown into *Unzuhause* (not-at-homeness) – which could be understood as the world-picture-independent ontological version of the Pascalian, ontic description of modern existence – and the being-sheltered that results from the bucolic reterritorialization in the paternal homeland, beyond both the modern disenchantment of nature and the reactive mirage of a pastoral homecoming, the speculative *epokhé* can be understood as a *conversion* emplacing us in the midst of a phenoumenodelic pleroma. We could say that the phenoumenodelic *epokhé* opens up – beyond the oscillatory tension between the movements of modern deterritorialization and reactive reterritorializations – the possibility of a solaristic oceanification of existence. The shipwreck, far from denoting any disaster whatsoever, stands for the immersion of the ark in an atonal *daydream* in which every possible tone is a suspended phenoumenodelic *datum* made of the same impersonal hallucinescence. By putting the Maître under the influence of the field, the phenoumenodelic *epokhé* hauntologically smears the hierarchy between a supposedly fundamental tone and the tense tones that are released towards the former, such as for instance the hierarchies between waking and dream states, sense-certainty and hallucinations, living beings and haunting specters, the temporal stances of past, present, and future.[35] Of course, the Maître can navigate through the experiential field by being temporarily attuned to a given tonality – such as for instance the state of wakefulness – which is necessarily haunted by submerged – oneiric – tones. In Benjamin's words:

> As sleep – in a deeper, figurative sense – it [the phenoumenodelic ocean] bears the ship of life on its current, which is accompanied from a distance by the wind and the stars; as slumber, it arises at night like the tide breaking on the shore of life, on which it leaves dreams lying the next day.[36]

These shifts in regard to the conception of the *site* of existence – from the motionless Ur-Ground to the disenchanted Pascalian abysses, from the Heideggerian *Unzuhause* to the pleromatic phenoumenodelic draft (*Bezug*) – entails a correlative shift in the characteristic *Stimmung* that corresponds to them. In the wake of Heidegger's reading of Rilke, we shall understand the modern ungrounding as a launching that places existence in a worldless medium that, while granting "*none special cover*" in regard to "*being loose into the daring venture*"[37], provides instead a "*safety*". This safety is created just there, "*outside all caring,* […] *where the gravity of the pure forces rules*"[38], where the ventured beings no longer resist being drawn along the geodesics of the phenoumenodelic traction. The very conception of

[35] William James' "*radical empiricism*" also proceeds by flattening perceptual, conceptual, imaginary, oneiric, hallucinatory, as well as non-present (past and future) experiences onto a single plane made of the "*primal stuff*" of (impersonal) "*pure experience*" (see William James, *Does "Consciousness" exist?*, in *Essays in Radical Empiricism*). It is worth stressing that the flattening onto such a plane of "pure experience" should not be understood, as James clearly stresses, as a (presup)position of "*a universal element of which all things are made*" (*ibid*., p.14): the atonal neutrality of the suspended experiential field means precisely that there is no substantial ground state, no fundamental tone, no motionless Ur-Earth, just a non-hierarchized and ungrounded manifold of phenoumenodelic data.

[36] Walter Benjamin, *Nearness and distance (continued)*, in *Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926*, ed. by Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), p. 399.

[37] Martin Heidegger, *What are Poets for?*, in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. by A. Hofstadter (New York, Harper & Row Publishers, 1975), p. 101.

[38] Rainer Maria Rilke, quoted by Heidegger in *What are Poets for?*, p. 99.

such a milieu – which, in the framework of Heidegger's opus, would correspond (if we were forced to choose) to his reactivation of the Greek *physis* – provides an alternative to the tension between the uncanniness and the anxiety elicited by being-thrown into the *Unzuhause* of the first Heidegger and the reactive reterritorialization in the fourfoldian Earth of his last philosophy. Nature as *physis* is at once the Being that "*each time "gives" particular beings "over to venture""* [39] and the very milieu into which they venture, the carnal locale whose fluctuating being-there they are. Since nature ventures the living beings into its own depths, it does not abandon them, they are not expelled out of it: "*As ventured, those who are not protected are nevertheless not abandoned. If they were, they would be just as little ventured as if they were protected. Surrendered only to annihilation, they would no longer hang in the balance*." [40] Since living beings are just local modes of the phenoumenodelic draft, the dereliction of their being-ventured into its abyssal depths goes hand in hand with the "*safety*" provided by the fact that they are always upheld by the impersonal living flood: "*The venture sets free what is ventured* […] *Drawing this way, the venture ever and always brings the ventured towards itself in the drawing*".[41] According to Heidegger, such an unprotected safety "*exists only outside the objectifying turning away from the Open*", outside the *re-presentation of* nature as something that *objectively* exists before us; outside – we maintain here – both the reduction of the phenoumenodelic transumweltic openness into a single objectified nature and the concomitant denaturation of the transcendental ego. By risking existence "*by a breath more*" – by risking the fixity of the very system of linguistic categories that frame experience, by perturbing the existentials, by affording the "*poverty in world*" resulting from the speculative transumweltization of experience, by assuming the being-given of the transcendental ego as a local and ephemeral fluctuation of a field of impersonal experience (with the resulting destitution of the egoical narcissism in favor of an impersonal one) – by doing so, beings can venture themselves further into the phenoumenodelic pleroma, thereby gaining an unexpected safety: "*to be secure is to repose safely within the drawing of the whole draft*"[42], to turn "*unshieldedness as such into the Open*"[43], being temporarily upheld by the relentless flood of manifestation.

In order to depict the impersonal stream of manifestation in more carnal terms, we shall abstract two "elements" out of the "*primal* [or barbarian] *stuff*" [44] of pure experience, namely a connective and cohesive field – which we shall call *vision* – and a shapeless and resilient narcotic – which we shall call *plasma*. Rather than trying to construct an ontology of the experiential field (which is the proper task of the *theoretical* interest of reason), we are here addressing the field from a descriptive phenoumenodelic perspective. We shall therefore resist the monist (Fichtean and Bergsonian) *ontological* temptation to gloriously make beings out of light, and shall (gnostically) distinguish from the outset two distinct *suspended* elements: a *luminescent* one and a *substantial* one. It is worth emphasizing that the recognition of a *substantial* datum within the phenoumenodelic field does not entail an endorsing of a fundamental tone to which the whole field would be referred as to its

[39] Heidegger, *What are Poets for?*, p. 101.
[40] *Ibid*., p. 103.
[41] *Ibid*., p. 105.
[42] *Ibid*., p. 120.
[43] *Ibid*., p. 136.
[44] William James, *Does "Consciousness" exist?*, in *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 2.

"material" presupposition: this substantial datum is itself abstracted from a scene which has been phenoumenodelically suspended.[45] In Sartre's terms, we could say that the phenoumenodelic recognition of this substantial stratum of experience does not "*load down*" the experiential field as such, i.e. it does not make it "*heavy and ponderable*": the "substantial" plasma is also a *suspended* phenoumenodelic datum.[46] In order to open *Lichtungen* (clearings) within the ungrounded depths of the plasma – in order to span local phenoumenodelic horizons rendering possible the bursting forth of manifestation – we shall suppose that the plasma is a *narcotic* element, i.e. an element that can be permeated by the propagation of a vision. Conversely, in order to disseminate unconscious opacities within the luminescent element, i.e. in order to dim the absolute (trans)lucidity and the seamless self-consciousness of the pure vision – which we could associate with a pre-Freudian model of impersonal subjectivity – we shall lachrymally humidify the vision by coupling it to substantial element apt to plasmate the disincarnated apparitions.[47] We shall therefore maintain that the phenoumenodelic suspended scene containing the sinking ark arises from the coalescence of a *connective vision* and *narcotic plasma*: a cohesive element apt to counteract the dispersion of the ungrounded extensions and "*clarify the* [day]*dream where we are*" (Igitur) and an atonal narcotic whose local excitations can reflect – and thereby reveal – the propagating modes of the vision while retaining, embodying, and enduring the resulting vibrations. This coalescence of the elements – the phosphenic enlightening of the plasma – produces a *pneumatic* and *iridescent tissue* that we shall call – taking up Merleau-Ponty's term anew – *flesh*. We could say that *flesh* is a narcotic *plasma* mesmerized by a *vision*, a resilient element which – stoned on its own narcotic virtues – is permeated by the inner propagation of the daydream. The trinity of elements defined by *vision*, *plasma*, and *flesh* can be understood as the constellation that orients the disciplinary correspondences between *transcendental philosophy*, *philosophy of nature*, and what we have called *immanental phenoumenology* (or *philosophy of identity*, in Schelling's terms).

Being atonal, i.e. lacking a ground state toward which its excitations could be released, the plasma is bursting with vibrating and resonating local patterns, reflecting and refracting carnal germs of subjectivation, experience-able and response-able "*waves of a calm narcotic whose vibratory circles*",[48] moving outward and inward, scan the field at different spatial and temporal scales. The being-made-out-of-flesh of a local subjective fluctuation accounts for both the plasmatic force that – by acting in its bodily background – asserts its impersonal sovereignty on the subject and narcotizes it (i.e. it makes it susceptible to the infusion of the daydream), and for the phenoumenodelic visions thereby unfolded in its foreground. Thanks to the *pneumatic* character of the flesh, its local excitations can contract the iridescent vibrations into perceived qualities (receptive inspiration), embody the resulting rhythmic

[45] In an analogous way, Deleuze and Guattari write: "Immanence does not refer back to the Spinozist substance and modes but, on the contrary, the Spinozist concepts of substance and modes refer back to the plane of immanence as their presupposition.", Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, p. 48.
[46] Sartre, *The transcendence of the ego. An existentialist theory of consciousness*, p. 44.
[47] A striking description of a lachrymal humidification of a translucid field of self-consciousness supposedly deprived of unconscious opacities can be found in Paul Valery, *L'Ange*, in *La Jeune Parque et poèmes en prose* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1974), p. 39; trans. as *The Angel* in The Partisan Review, November 1948.
[48] Stéphane Mallarmé, *Igitur ou la Folie d'Elbehnon*, in *Igitur, Divagations, Un coup de dès*, ed. by Bertrand Marchal (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 2003), p. 61.

duration (temporal retention), and send back dehiscent information (expressive expiration). Accordingly, the pneumatic flesh is an autotelic element capable of *locally* enduring the *expressive flow* and the *sentient ebb* of its self-experience: to be there in the midst of the pneumatic flesh is to *breathe*, to undergo the rhythmic conversion between the inner spaces produced by local subjective foldings on the one hand, and ob-jected "transcendences" on the other.[49]

In this primordial scene – "*far from everything, Nature* [the constellations under the sea] *prepares her Theater*" – the Maître enacts "*the Play par excellence*": methodically "*mad on the outside and flagellated by the contradictory demands of* [eidetic] *duty*"[50] he is inwardly "*the character who, believing in the existence of the sole Absolute, imagines he is everywhere in a* [day]*dream. He acts from the Absolute point of view*".[51] In particular – and among other visitations – the pneumatic flesh might infold in the form of a siren which – before dissolving back into the liquid sky – immediately evaporates in mist – by means of a slap of her tail – the mirage of an Ur-Ground ("*faux manoir*") capable of imparting an edge to the phenoumenodelic draft. The Maître – local and ephemeral dehiscence of the pneumatic flesh dwelling on an ark that is endlessly shipwrecked – remains faithful to the foolhardy task passed down to him by the haunting specters of his ancestors: that of enduring both the *dereliction* of his *being-flung-loose* into the venture and the *safety* of his *being-upheld* by the impersonal flowing flesh by potentializing the phenoumenodelic degrees of freedom of which he is capable: by living, perceiving, feeling, and understanding the existentials, the percepts, the affects and the concepts he can afford. Ek-sistence is tuning in a state of pneumatic suspension.

[49] According to (what we could call) James' transcendental principle of pneumatic apperception: "[…] the stream of thinking (which I recognize emphatically as a phenomenon) is only a careless name for what, when scrutinized, reveals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my breathing. The "I think" which Kant said must be able to accompany all my objects, is the "I breathe" which actually does accompany them.", William James, *Does "consciousness" exist?*, in *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 19.
[50] Stéphane Mallarmé, *Hamlet*, in *Igitur, Divagations, Un coup de dès*, ed. by Bertrand Marchal (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 2003), pp. 194-199.
[51] Stéphane Mallarmé, *Igitur ou la Folie d'Elbehnon*, in *Igitur, Divagations, Un coup de dès*, p. 32.