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The Logic of Marx's Capital

by Richard Winfield

> "It is impossible completely to understand Marx's *Capital*, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the *whole* of Hegel's *Logic*. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!"

Introduction

So lamented Lenin in 1914, as world war began to quicken the ground for socialist unpheaval. He had turned to Hegel, annotated the *Science of Logic* and given this private exclamation to its revelation of *Capital*. Unfortunately, the nature of the new understanding was never made clear, and the only time Lenin tried to show how the *Logic* could make Marx's work more intelligible, he merely compared the commodity with Hegel's "Being."

Nonetheless, Lenin's aphorism is still valid today, because neither Marx nor his commentators provide a systematic clarification of *Capital's* methodology. Marxist discussion has accepted the authority of its classics without even being able to ground the discourse of *Capital*. One looks in vain for a remedy to legitimate the work's starting point, to critically establish the adequacy of the argument, or to at last provide the guidelines for not only *completing* Marx's *unfinished* thematization of capital, but also determining the rest of social reality.

What compounds the problem is that throughout *Capital's* unfolding, an amalgam of historical example and general commentary interweaves with the strictly "scientific" argument. Although Marx occasionally warns his reader that a certain topic can receive its *systematic* treatment only at some later point, he presents most material without explicitly discriminating between necessary and merely supplementary discussion. No standard is provided to distinguish rigorous determination from congenial reflection and secure the passage from one element of the discouse to the next. Furthermore, Marx's frequent empirical examples can easily mislead one into considering his concepts as generalizations related to the same given object. This, however, only reduces Marx's conceptual system to the usual theoretical *model*, isolating his categories so that contradictions arise between various sections.

The famous debate on the value-price transformation is a result of this confusion, to cite only one example.

Thus, to understand Marx's later writings, the well-worn claims of *dialectical* science must be elaborated. It must be shown *how* dialectical determination is immanently related to the conceptualization of capital, and *how Capital* actually does proceed dialectically. It is here that Hegel's *Logic* enters to elucidate the dialectical method, and reveal how the constitution of capital's realm is part of its specific philosophical project. For despite all the hue and cry over the specificity of the Marxist dialectic (Althusser's clamour included), Hegel's *Logic* does not stand over and against Marx's *Capital*, but *is* indeed its inseparable *logos*. This truth bares itself in the basic thrust of each work.

To begin with, Marx's thematization of capital is a *social determination* of production. The *Grundrisse* and *Capital* complete the critique of political economy originally outlined by Hegel in his discussion of the "System of Needs" in the *Philosophy of Right*, where "need" and "labor" are rescued from all reduction to an anthropological metabolism between Man and Nature or to a monological technical process. Production is instead developed as the intersubjective process of *capital's* self-constitution into that social sphere of interacting bourgeois. In this manner *Capital* accounts for production wholly through the social process of Interaction. The concept of capital is thereby a conception of modern bourgeois society precisely because only with the capitalist epoch does economic life emerge as an independent sphere of social reality, freed of all natural character just as it is freed of all subordination to the household or to feudal political designations.

Of course, Marx came to this position only in his mature systematic writings. In the *1844 Manuscripts* he had characterized labor in terms of the monological reflective categories of objectification (*Entäusserung*) and alienation (*Entfremdung*). In the *German Ideology* he retained the assumptions of classical political economy, first discussing production as a natural metabolism, and then conceiving Civil Society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) as a given, supra-historical condition of man's existence. Further, in *Wage-Labor and Capital* (1848), Marx formally distinguished forces of production from relations of production, thus implicitly reducing production to a technical process external to its social organization.[1] Not until he began the specific program of the *Grundrisse* and *Capital* could Marx discard these inadequate notions and articulate an intersubjective reality whose moments have the particular autonomy realized by the self-seeking bourgeois. Only when he became able to determine this social individuation of Interaction could Marx actually thematize capital. At that point the argument of the *Grundrisse* and *Capital* was able to emerge in its characteristic *self-developing immanence*, eschewing all reference to an external reflective standpoint for securing its advance, and thus eschewing all attempt at model-building or ideal-typical construction.

1. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 38: Philosophical Notebooks (Moscow, 1963), p. 180.

It is Hegel's *Logic* which provides the framework for such *social*, that is, *dialectical* determination. Unlike all previous inquiry, the *Logic* departs from indeterminacy to establish Intersubjectivity as the totality of determination.

Hegel realizes that Science must be presuppositionless, that all determination involves mediation, and that discourse must begin with the indeterminate immediate, Being. Yet, he is aware that such an absolute beginning is possible only if freed of the presupposition of a knowing self. For this reason, the *Logic* actually begins from the accomplished *supersession* of the standpoint of consciousness, and, therefore, of epistemology as such. The *Phenomenology of Mind*, is the "deduction of the concept of Science" because it observes the whole of experience overcoming the characteristic distinction of conscious knowing, that of in-itselfness and for-itselfness. Thereby knowing is no longer an instrument that comes to its object as to something ready-made apart from thought. Instead, determinateness is freed from the problematic limitation of a presupposed reflection. What results is nothing but the presuppositionless beginning of absolute indeterminacy with which the *Logic* must begin.[2]

On this basis the *Logic* proceeds from the thoroughgoing refutation of the primordiality of self-consciousness.[3] Unlike the major figures of German Idealism, Hegel is aware that Kant's transcendental apperception, Fichte's absolute synthesis of the *Ich* and the *Nicht-Ich*, and Schelling's Subject-Object identity of intellectual intuition, not only presuppose categorical determinations, but demand grounding in an *intersubjective*, implicitly *social* process.[4] Hegel recognizes that the ego is fundamentally a unity of universality and singularity, whose autonomy *is* only in and through its individuation over and against others. The identity of the ego comprises itself not merely by unifying immediately given determinations so as to inform them as objects of knowledge. The ego is what it is by being a structure of self-consciousness common to every subject, yet individual and excluding all others.[5] For this reason the ego is determinate only in its unity and difference

2. For a discussion of this systematic relation of the *Phenomenology* and the beginning of the *Logic*, see Kenley Dove, "Hegel's 'Deduction of the Concept of Science'," *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 23.

3. Thus, the Hegelian Dialectic moves by rejecting the Frankfurt School's empty subjective Negative Dialectic of external reflection. Again, the *Phenomenology* accomplishes the job better than Adorno, Horkheimer *et al.*, by characterizing them as that shape of consciousness described under the heading: "the law of the heart, and the frenzy of self-conceit."

4. For this reason, Bloch's and Lukács' characterization of Hegel as a philosopher of the Subject-Object Identity is false. See Bloch, *Subjekt-Objekt* (Frankfurt am Main, 1962); and Lukács, *Der junge Hegel* (Neuwied and Berlin, 1967).

5. "But the *I* is, *first*, this pure self-related unity, and it is not immediately but only as making abstraction from all determinateness and content and withdrawing into the freedom of unrestricted equality with itself. As such it is *universality*; . . . . Secondly, the *I* as self-related negativity is no less immediately *individuality* or is *absolutely determined*, opposing itself to all that is other and excluding it—*individual personality*." Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A.V. Miller (New York, 1969), p. 583. This point has been developed by Dieter Henrich in *Hegel im Kontext* (Frankfurt, 1971), p. 97, and by Jürgen Habermas in *Theory and Practice*, (Boston, 1973), pp. 145-146.

to a plurality of egos, whose own identity is a function of their dual relation to others.

As a result, consciousness cannot stand as the irrevocable and irreducible vantagepoint of discourse. Its process of reflection is constituted in intersubjectivity, whose elementary form is reciprocal recognition. In this basic interaction self-consciousness has its actuality. Here, as Hegel writes, "Each is the mediating term to the other, through which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and each is to itself and to the other an immediate self-existing reality, which at the same time, exists thus for itself only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.[6]

This grounding of conscious knowing in Interaction indicates the possibility of social determination, and with it, the possibility of a sphere of capital realizing the individuality of the bourgeois. What has yet to be shown, however, is that intersubjectivity is the real forum of all determination. Although the *Phenomenology* frees discourse from the standpoint of consciousness, it provides only the most negative characterization of what supersedes it.

What provides the positive statement is the *Logic*. It shows how determination achieves totality by bringing the form of intersubjectivity to such concreteness that no categorial specification falls outside of it. From the Logic of Being to that of Essence and finally to that of the Concept, there is an immanent succession where interrelations of a plurality come to comprise a more and more self-informed and inclusive sphere of determinacy. Thus, in the specification emerging out of Being, Hegel shows how *something* has its proper character only in relation to other correlatively determinate entities. This identity of being-within-self (*Ansichsein*) and being-for-other (*Sein-für-Anderes*) has its corresponding development in the Logic of Essence with the identity of *inner* (*Innerlichkeit*) and *outer* (*Ausserlichkeit*), where generally positedness and its positing are each what they are only through one another. At the threshold of the Concept, dialogical relationship acquires further determinateness in the identity of universality and singularity, where being-in-and-for-itself (the pure form of the ego's self-relation) *is* in so far as it *is* positedness, as an individuality contrasted with others. Finally, in the Idea reciprocity achieves its absolute, unconditioned concreteness in the mutual adequation of the Concept and Reality.[7]

6. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, (New York, 1967), p. 231. It must be noted that this description of the concept of recognition is not itself part of the argument of the *Phenomenology*, which considers reciprocal recognition not as it is *per se*, but only as it appears *for consciousness*. Thus, within the shape of consciousness of Master and Slave the problem is described in these terms: "This pure conception of recognition, of duplication of self-consciousness within its unity, we must now consider in the way its process appears for self-consciousness." *Ibid.*, p. 231.

7. "That something also has *within it* the same character that it is *in itself*, and, conversely, that what it is as being-for-other it also is in itself—this is the identity of being-in-itself and being-for-other,.... This identity is already formally given in the sphere of determinate being, but more expressly in the consideration of *essence* and of the relation of *inner* and *outer*, and most precisely in the consideration of the Idea as the unity of the Notion and *actuality*." Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 120. "Because being that is in and for itself is immediately a *positedness*, the Notion in its simple self-relation is an absolute *determinateness*...thus the Notion is the *individual*." *Ibid.*, p. 582.

By becoming this totality of determination out of the presuppositionless starting point of indeterminacy, Hegel's *Logic* establishes intersubjectivity (*Geist*) as the real foundation and arena of discourse. Here social determination positively replaces the monological standpoint of consciousness. This result is crucial both for the *Logic*'s method and its relation to the *Realphilosophie* to which *Capital* belongs.

Since the *Logic*'s intersubjective process has eliminated all external reflection in constituting determination, form and content no longer fall asunder, but are so united that the very articulation of a specification is its own proof. Thus, the method of the *Logic* is not independently given, but must be constituted as a reiteration of the *Logic*'s entire path of determination *qua* the self-development of the whole.[8]

In fact, the final determination of the *Logic*, the "Absolute Method," is precisely this complete retrospective unfolding, and not just the process of double negation which many identify with the dialectical method. This retrospection begins with a recollection of Being as "*in itself* the *concrete totality*, though that totality is not yet posited,"[9] as thus containing an implicit contrast which does unfold through double negation. However, once a new content arises out of this operation of double negation, the new determination has been proven,[10] so that, as Hegel writes, "the *content*...now belongs to the method. The method itself by means of this moment expands itself into a system,"[11] where the Method's knowledge of the necessity of the advance is at each moment the entire system of determinations in the *Logic* confronting one of its phases.

If Hegel's *Logic* is to serve as the general foundation of *Capital* and as the methodological guide to the particular stages of Marx's argument, it is necessary to look for a correspondence with the full development of determination in the *Logic*. The entire project of the *Logic* is subverted if particular categories are individually extracted and formally applied to Marx's work. Unfortunately, this is precisely what Hans-Jürgen Krahl and Helmut Reichelt do when they take Hegel's determinations of Essence and Appearance out of their proper context, and relate them to different levels of discussion in *Capital*.[12]

Hegel's *Logic* cannot be reduced to an externally introduced tool for investigating *Capital*. In order to maintain the *Logic*'s intersubjective

8. In *Hegel im Kontext*, Dieter Henrich develops this point (pp. 102-103) only to contradict it, by discussing the thematization of double negation in a particular set of determinations of the Logic of Essence as an *externally* applicable *metalogic* for the *Logic* as a whole.

9. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 829.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 838.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 838.

12. See "Zur Wesenslogik der Marxschen Warenanalyse" in Hans-Jürgen Krahl, *Konstitution und Klassenkampf*, (Frankfurt, 1971), and Helmut Reichelt, *Zur logischen Struktur des Kapitalbegriffs bei Karl Marx*, (Frankfurt, 1970.

supersession of all egological determining, the relation between its process and that of Marx's concept of capital must be far more immanent.

In point of fact, what follows from the *Logic*'s result is precisely the required internal connection between the two sciences. The *Logic* can inform *Capital* without interfering with either of their independent self-developments because the totality with which the logical Idea consummates must be *particular* in order to be what it is.[13] Just as every determination has been shown to have an implicitly intersubjective structure, so too the entire *Logic* cannot remain alone in its universality, but must achieve its own identity as an individuality, that is, in its being-for-other. For this reason, Hegel's logical Idea necessarily develops immediately out of itself as a realm of Nature, and then, more concretely, as a self-informing world of intersubjectivity where Interaction (*objektiver Geist*) emerges to consummate itself in History.

On the basis of these further determinations, it is possible to maintain Hegel's claim that the *Logic* presents the Concept as such, and that the determinate concepts of the *Realphilosophie* are immanently related to it as specific forms of the logical oneness which must develop from itself as a totality.[14] Thus, the *Logic* is not a surrogate which permits *Capital*'s particular subject matter to unfold. The Determinate Science progresses in its own freedom, just as the logical form of dialectical reason is independent of its interactional embodiments.[15] Nevertheless, the pure articulation of a particular science such as that of capital will reveal the determinateness of what Hegel calls the *Logic*'s realm of shadows.[16] If the specification of the "Absolute Method" is definitive, then the systematic nature of any part of the Science will correspond with the full development of the *Logic*.

Thus, the following discussion attempts to demonstrate how the rigorous argument of the first section of *Capital* (and the corresponding passages within the *Grundrisse*) avoids the dilemmas of egological knowing and instead fulfills the promise of social determination. It should become apparent that Marx's concept of capital develops in the successive forms of the logical Idea without ever presupposing an independent knowing self to describe and order the determinations. For the content of Marx's discourse will turn out to be a *process* of specification in which the object of investigation comes about in the self-development that produces its realized determination. Thereby Marx overcomes the dogmatic idealism of his earlier work, where conscious reflection held sway instead of dialectical intersubjectivity.

As Hegel writes, "Quantity. . . is a stage if the Idea: and as such it must have its due, first as a logical category, and then in the world of objects, natural as

13. See Henrich, *Hegel im Kontext*, pp. 164-165.

14. ". . . a Notion is first, in its own self, *the* Notion, and this is only one and is the substantial foundation; secondly, *a* Notion is *determinate* and it is this determinateness in it which appears as content: but the determinateness of the Notion is a specific form of this substantial oneness, a moment of the form as totality, *of that same Notion* which is the foundation of the specific Notion." Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 39.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 586.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

well as spiritual."[17] The very beginning of *Capital* seizes this pure determination within the intersubjective realm of Civil Society's System of Needs,[18] proceeds to embody its process of specification up through the positing of Money, and then continues to develop in the shadow of Measure towards Capital itself.

The Logic of Commodity

Pure quantity is "being, where the mode or character is no longer taken as one with the being itself, but explicitly put as. . . indifferent."[19] This is the category with which *Capital* begins.

In its immediate determination commodity is an object of need and of will. As such, its qualitative material existence is something superseded in this its relation to need and will. As an object of specific utility the commodity is comparable to other things with similar utility, and as an object of a certain will, the commodity is likewise comparable to all other objects that exist for that will. Similarly, the specific need and specific will to which the commodity is related are respectively comparable to need in general and will in general. Commodity's quantitative determination as an object of need is use-value, and as an object of will, value.[20]

The determinations use-value and value are continuous magnitudes for they specify simple undifferentiated sameness for commodities at this stage.[21] At the same time, however, use-value and value are both discrete magnitude, since they specify the *single* commodity in its continuity with all others of like determination.

Just as "quantity contains the two moments of continuity and discreteness"[22] together, so the commodity's material existence immediately limits its dual universal specifications, posing it as a quantum of use-value and a quantum of value.[23] Commodity now has a determinate being that makes clear the distinction between its continuity and discreteness by *distinguishing* its sameness. Use-value and value here exist as a something, as *this* commodity. However, as such, these universals do not have simply one determinate being.

They rather exist as a plurality of such commodities. Each something of use-value and value is only a determinate quantity through its continuity and opposition to other similarly specified commodities. Therefore the limit on the commodity's discrete magnitude of use-value and value is not its simple

17. Hegel, *The Logic* from *The Eyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (London, 1968), p. 187.

18. See paragraphs 189-208 of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*.

19. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 8 *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* (Frankfurt, 1970), paragraph 99, p. 209.

20. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 7: *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (Frankfurt, 1970), pp. 135-136.

21. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 5, p. 212.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 228.

23. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 7, p. 137.

unity as an isolated object, but instead is constituted in its specific relation to others.

The *movement of quantum to number* is here embodied, as commodities are placed in relation to each other in the structure of simple exchange. In this meeting of need and need and will and will, the commodity sustains itself as an object having magnitude of value through its relation to another commodity. The commodities are both alienated and appropriated by two contracting wills who face each other as owner of the commodity desired by the other. Rendered socially equal thanks to the natural diversity of their particular needs, these two subjects recognize each other as free property owners. "What...remains identical throughout as the property implicit in the contract is distinct from the external things whose owners alter when the exchange is made."[24] This "universal in which the subjects of contract participate"[25] is exchange value, and it is through its agency that the moments of the number determination concretize themselves.

The limit of number is not the abstract determinateness that it was with the simple quantum. In number this limit is posited as a manifold within the quantum itself, enclosing the specific aggregate of the other discrete magnitude to which it is related. The continuity of this *amount* is the *unit*, the form in which the quantum relates back to the opposing discrete magnitude which provides it with its limit. These two moments of number, *amount* and *unit*, are respectively embodied in the simple exchange of two commodities as the equivalent and relative forms of value.

The determinate being of use-value and value has led to the exchange of some commodity A for some other commodity B. In their participation in the universal of exchange-value, A and B distinguish themselves just as number has come to consist in its two aspects. The exchange of A for B is first manifest as the alienation of A as a value and the appropriation of B as a particular use-value. Here A presents itself as the relative form, and B as the equivalent form of value. A expresses its value in B, whose bodily form has become its equivalent. B is *immediately* presented as a quantity of A, for B's material existence as a particular use-value has become the independent embodiment of the value-form of A. As Marx writes, B's own value "acquires no quantitative expression"[26] since the underlying identity of exchange value has rendered B's value at one with its use-value. The contrast of use-value and value has been made evident for A, however, because its value has manifested itself in the material existence of *another* commodity, B. The value of commodity A has here obtained "independent and definite expression,"[27] entirely apart from A's existence as a use-value.

This expression of the commodity A's value is a number that has as the

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 159-160.
25. *Ibid.*, paragraph 77, p. 160.
26. *Marx-Engels Werke* (MEW), Vol. 23: *Das Kapital—Erster Band* (Berlin, 1972), p. 70.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

aggregate magnitude within it (as the manifold of its limit) the equivalent value form that B embodies. B's material existence as particular use-value is here the *amount* in this statement of number. This equivalent form *finds its continuity* in the relative value form of A, which so to speak encloses this *amount* in itself. B is "an amount of one and the same *unit*,"[28] and this *unit* of the number determination is commodity A in its relative form of value. Here "the limit is an external one...the amount to be aggregated, is contingent, arbitrary."[29] This "accidental and purely relative"[30] nature of the exchange allows B to be any commodity whatever, and the exchange relation as a whole can only be brought about by the external act of the two contracting subjects.

However, this purely accidental character is overcome, because quantum as number actually "has *within itself* the externality, the relation to other."[31] In the self-relation of number to its amount, this moment collapses itself into the unit, and the limit of the quantum is posited as unitary and identical with the quantum itself. "Number as a one, being posited as self-reflection reflected into itself, excludes from itself the indifference and externaltiy of the amount and is self-relation *as relation through itself to an externality.*"[32]

This movement arises in simple accidental commodity exchange for the reason that what is the alienation of commodity A as a value and the appropriation of commodity B as use-value is at the same time the appropriation of commodity A as use-value and the alienation of commodity B as a value. The result is exactly the reverse of the preceding: commodity A now figures as the amount, and commodity B as the unit in this number determination of value. Commodity B appears in the relative form as a mere use-value, while commodity A shows itself in the equivalent form as an exchange value whose use-value and value remain undifferentiated in independent form.

In either case, it is the commodity whose value is being expressed which "figures directly as a mere use-value, while the commodity in which that value is to be expressed figures directly as a mere exchange value."[33]

As a whole, then, this embodiment of the number determination presents each commodity as *both* an amount and a unit, as *both* the pure use-value and independently embodied value that together comprise the relative value form, and the pure exchange value that is the equivalent form of value. Here amount and unit have immediately passed into one another, and the individual commodity has shown itself to be determined as quantum of use-value and value by being external to both these specifications as a pure exchange value. The commodity has excluded the externality of its opposition to other commodities, for now its appearance as a magnitude of use-value and value has nothing to do with the particular determinateness of the other

28. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 5, p. 251.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
30. MEW, Vol. 23, p. 51.
31. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 5, p. 251.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 252-253.
33. MEW, Vol. 23, p. 76.

commodity exchanged with it. The completely accidental nature of the value relation has been superceded. The individual commodity has its relation to others reflected into itself, and no longer is this rapport determined by the chance meeting of the commodity with a *particular* other one. The limit of the commodity's value expression no longer rests upon a relation to a specific commodity B. The determination of the commodity has now been posited as an infinite series of exchange relations with all other commodities distinct from itself.

This transition to the expanded form of value is a movement from the determinateness of number to that of degree. From being in itself multiple, the limit in the quantum has passed over to become "in itself *simple* determinateness."[34] This "*independent* indifferent limit is absolute *externality*,"[35] for the self-relation of the quantum is at the same time interrelated to its determinateness as outside itself. Degree is related "through itself to its other"[36] in a continuous uninterrupted progress of self-external determinateness.

Degree manifests itself as that exchange relation where the individual commodity (let us call it A) expresses its value in the equivalent form of all other commodities. The value of A is "placed in contrast under all possible shapes with the bodily form of"[37] A, and all other commodities appear as "particular equivalents differing in kind."[38] The magnitude of A's value is an independent limit, indifferent to the determinate existence of each of the particular commodities opposing it. Its external expression is an absolute gathering of countless pure exchange values that altogether comprise an infinite expanse of "fragmentary equivalent forms, each excluding the others."[39] No contingent meeting of contracting subjects is called for to sustain the value relation. The continuous series of self-external determinateness is something that proceeds through commodity A itself. The expanded form of value posits the individual commodity as indifferent to its particular equivalent forms in their isolation, yet self-related in the continuity of their continual overcoming as fragmentary value forms.

As such, this degree determinateness is actually an immediate union of the quantitative aspect of absolute externality with the qualitative character of independence.[40] The degree is in the amounts that it has excluded "as its *own* amount,"[41] for it has revealed itself to be a "unity which is self-related through the *negation of its differences*."[42] In the expanded form of value, the determinate being of A's value is a limit which *becomes* in the continuous overcoming of the particular equivalent values related to it.[43]

This repulsion of determinateness from itself is the degree actually

34. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 8, p. 216.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 218.
36. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 5, p. 253.
37. MEW, Vol. 23, p. 80.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
39. *Ibid.*
40. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 8, p. 228.
41. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 5, p. 254.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 254-255.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 259.

producing its otherness by impelling itself beyond itself.[44] Therefore, in this progression "quantity returns to itself,"[45] and shows itself to have "its determinateness in another quantum by means of its non-being, of infinity."[46] This self-determinateness is no longer beyond and outside the quantum, for the quantum now finds itself in other quanta as the quantitative infinity. These other quanta have their determinateness in it, and their determinateness as such gives this universal quantum its quality as the element and unity of the specification of all others.

In this manner the pure determination of the expanded form of value passes over to the general form. The individual commodity A is a universal equivalent in which all other commodities differentiate their value from their particular use-value. As their values are all expressed in this same commodity, A sustains its own infinite self-relatedness by finding itself as the substance in which every single commodity shows its individual value determination. This universal equivalent is the element and unity of all value forms by its very independent being. Although any commodity can be the equivalent of the general form of value, whatever commodity *is* determined as such immediately repels all other commodities from assuming its role, just as all other commodities exclude it from appearing in the relative form of value. The qualitative character of the particular universal equivalent is inseparable from its proper role as the medium in which all other commodities are rendered commensurate exchange values. Therefore the universal equivalent becomes limited to a specific commodity, and the general form of value has made its transition to money.

When the independence and indifference of quantitative infinity have finally combined, the qualitative quantum, measure,[47] has emerged. This immediate unity of quality and quantity is a specific quantum with a specific quality belonging to it. Therefore its magnitude constitutes its specific nature. As Hegel writes, "an alteration of the magnitude would alter the quality of the something."[48] At the same time, however, the measure is also a quantum with "an indifferent limit which can be exceeded without altering the quality."[49] The qualitative quantum has this immediate distinction of being on the one hand an intrinsically determinate magnitude, and on the other, an overcoming of the indifference of its external alterations in other quantum.[50]

Specifying measure is that determination in which these two moments are explicitly expressed.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 260.
45. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 8, paragraph 110, p. 228.
46. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 5, p. 278.
47. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 8, paragraph 107, p. 224.
48. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 5, p. 395.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 398.
50. *Ibid.*

This is first the qualitative quantum that has come to be a standard by which other quanta are determined as amounts of its unit. It is the rule by which other somethings are measured according to this external comparison, where the intrinsically determinate magnitude of the specifying measure remains an arbitrary amount.

This rule is given spiritual embodiment in money which stands opposed to the world of commodities as *measure of value* and *standard of price*.[51] Commodities quit their bodily shape and present their exchange value in an imaginary amount of money which fixes their value as a particular price. Individual commodities can no longer directly confront each other as use-values or exchange values. Their price determinations make their exchangeability dependent upon the external comparison to money.

At the same time, however, this specification of price actually negates this one-sided contrast of money and commodity. In its determination as price, the individual commodity comes to embody the universal equivalent, and the money appears itself in this particular form. The individual commodity here emerges as the essential, comparing itself to the money equivalent. Yet since money *is* price in-itself, the universal form of the entire world of exchange-value, all individual commodities are equally *its* particular substances.[52]

What is manifest is that in the price determination of exchange value, money and the commodity, each exist in and through the other, and their difference is merely formal.[53] Money has shown itself to be intrinsically related to the individual commodity that it measures. In its determinate being as standard of price and measure of value, money *is* for itself the measure that the opposing commodity has given itself in price.

The determinateness of money has passed from that of the rule to that specifying measure which is not an external standard, but as qualitative quantum that is related to its own self in the specific quantum that it has measured.[54] Here, rather than the qualitative moment being determined on the side of the intrinsically determinate magnitude, it is now related to the alterable, external aspect of the amount belonging to the opposing quantum. The measure is no longer a bare quantum whose determinate being can change without upsetting its rule.

This assimilating determinateness is realized in Money's emergence as the medium of circulation. In the structure of commodity—money—commodity exchange, money comes to be a *specific* relation of exchangeability as the middle term of two commodities. Through the mediation of *this* amount of money, these two commodities are inextricably bound together. Money has assimilated the individual commodity that was its externally imposed

51. MEW, Vol. 23, p. 113.
52. Marx, *Grundrisse,* trans. Martin Nicolaus (London, 1973), p. 229.
53. *Ibid.,* p. 301.
54. Hegel, *Werke,* Vol. 5, p. 399.

amount, and specified itself in this otherness by relating this commodity to another through the agency of *this* money's specific magnitude.

The immediate determinateness of this process has two moments: the exchange of the first commodity (C_1) with the money, C_1-M, and the exchange of this money with the second commodity (C_2), M-C_2. Although both commodities "are . . . qualitatively related . . . each is on its own account a qualitative determinate being."[55] Just as the pure determinateness of measure has become "the *immanent* quantitative relationship of *two* qualities to each other,"[56] so these two commodities express their determination both as particular substances assimilated in money's self-determination and as determinate beings in their *individual* relation with the money.

Each of the two metamorphoses distinguishes itself in a dual way.

First, in both C_1-M and M-C_2, the commodities C_1 and C_2 each realize their price in M, which appears as the identical equivalent form of the two exchange values. In this way M allows each commodity to realize its price by posing its own exchange value in that of the other.[57]

Secondly, C_1-M and M-C_2 distinguish themselves *from* each other. In the first metamorphosis, it is the substance of the exchange value, C_1, that leaves the circulation to be consumed. On the other hand, when M is exchanged for C_2, "exchange value disappears,"[58] since it is the money that is replaced by C_2 in its bodily use-value form.

In this second case the direct identity of the value determinations of C_1 and C_2 is broken. Sale and purchase are no longer identical, and money appears as a transient equivalent form.[59]

With this differentiation it has become evident that either moment C-M or M-C is the reverse of itself for another commodity. The stable identity of the first contrast (in which each commodity realized its price by posing its own exchange value in that of the other) is now ruptured. Instead, it is apparent that the exchange of a particular commodity A for its equivalent M is equally the exchange of some other commodity B's exchange value (also expressed in M) for commodity A as a use-value. The closed unity of the C-M-C exchange is overcome, and money has emerged as a specific magnitude related to an entire series of measure relations that form an ever-extending web of exchange circuits. In this "circulation of commodities"[60] money's determinateness is no longer limited to its bind with the two particular commodities of the former C_1-M-C_2 specification.

Here money "first shows itself to be a real measure; for it now appears as a determinate being which is both one and the same . . . and also quantitatively varied."[61] Its determination has passed from specifying quantity to real measure.

55. Hegel, *Werke,* Vol. 5, p. 402.
56. *Ibid.,* p. 403.
57. Marx, *Grundrisse,* p. 212.
58. *Ibid.,* p. 260.
59. MEW, Vol. 23, p. 125.
60. *Ibid.,* p. 126.
61. Hegel, *Werke,* Vol. 5, p. 403.

When money showed itself as the medium that let each commodity realize its price by posing its own exchange value in that of the other, it manifested being-for-self by negating the distinction between its qualitatively determined sides, C_1 and C_2.[62]

However, in so doing, the self-determination of the relation was also superseded in this negative unity. As Hegel writes, "a self-subsistent whole of this kind, just because it is a real being-for-self, is at the same time a repulsion into *distinct self-subsistent* somethings."[63] When C_1-M and M-C_2 distinguished themselves from each other, money became placed into relation with an entire network of commodity exchange, which replaced its own single measure determination with a whole series of measures. Here, "measure itself. . .has shown that it is unstable in its own self, and like the quantum as such, has its determinateness in other measures relations."[64] The circulation of commodities is this web of measures that "have become in themselves relations of measures which are themselves specified."[65]

The qualitative quantum is therefore reduced to an element of this sphere of exchange, and "it preserves itself through the presence of its indifferent, quantitative character and at the same time functions as a specifying moment of a new measure relation."[66] Money thus assumes a negative relation to the individual commodities facing it in each of its manifold exchange determinations. Now it seems always ready to remove commodities from circulation according to the M-C circuit. The path of circulation has become a constant movement of money away from its starting point. Money functions as "a transient and objective reflex of the price of commodities,"[67] always within circulation. As such, money's quality becomes masked in its quantitative element,[68] sublating its character as a material object of human need. The bodily form of money collapses into its exchange value, and money has become a symbol of itself, a mere symbol of value. As this *currency*, money *posits* its use-value as exchange value, and instead of being a means of exchange, money has become a means of payment. "Its qualitative side falls and its *relationship to its other* becomes that quantitative mode of relationship which constitutes the specific determination of this self-subsistent measure."[69]

Money as means of payment embodies the determinateness of the self-subsistent measure which is related to a plurality of other measures that it excludes from itself. Since this relation remains quantitative, the self-subsistent measure also continues itself into these opposed quanta, and their overcoming is separable into the two moments which united to produce it. "This measure, based on such a relation, is thus infected with its own indifference; it is in its own self something external and alterable in its

62. *Ibid.*, p. 409.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 412.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 416.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 413.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 417.
67. MEW, Vol. 23, p. 143.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 417.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 419.

relation to itself."[70]

What this means with respect to money is that first, money stands as an *ideal* means of purchase which allows commodities to realize themselves as use-values *before* realizing their price in their actual exchange with money. Secondly, money converts itself into the material form of the commodity before this use-value has undergone the exchange metamorphosis that presents it in the value form.

Together, these two moments reveal a pattern of circulation that has become money-commodity-money. Instead of being a transient value form, money poses itself in the commodity to then return to itself in this its other. Whereas previously it had served as the mediation of the extremes of commodities' exchange value and use-value, money now makes this relation the mediation of its very own self.[71]

Money is first only advanced, rather than being spent as the converted value form of the commodity. The commodity appears as a particular use-value which directly embodies the particular exchange-value specified by its price. When the commodity actually changes places with the money (the commodity-money moment of money-commodity-money), this commodity has already realized both its use and exchange values, leaving the money as a self-subsistent general exchange value without any enduring reference to this opposing article. Here "money and the commodity represent only different modes of the existence of value itself, the money its general mode, and the commodity its particular. . .mode."[72] With this determinateness, money has become the universal commodity which is in its own self this beyond where it becomes differentiated into general and particular forms whose relation once again posits money as the independent form of exchange value.

This persistent presence of money is "an affirmatively present, qualitative foundation which, as also the continuity of the measure *with itself* in its externality, must contain in its quality the principle of the specification of this externality."[73] The determinateness that this M-C-M exchange embodies is an exclusive measure which is for itself in its beyond as both "another measure relation and also as another merely quantitative relation; it is determined as in itself a specifying unity which produces measure relations within itself."[74] However, this exclusive measure contains within it the moment of quantitative determinate being that is open to alteration. The magnitude of the relation is variable, and this *indifference* to the qualitative substratum is also the negation of the qualitative moment and the positing of a new something. This leads the determinateness to impel itself into the *measureless*.[75]

Here the specification of the universal commodity is first a self-preservation into its beyond that surpasses itself in a manner that is indifferent to its

70. *Ibid.*, p. 436.
71. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 331.
72. MEW, Vol. 23, p. 168.
73. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 5, p. 436.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 436.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 442.

quality. In the relation M_1-C-M_2, M_1 and M_2 distinguish themselves by the difference of their magnitude. By being a greater amount of money, M_2 is the continuity of M_1 in its otherness. This alteration is an external distinction which is immediately given, and whose actual magnitude remains unspecified —the particular and general form of value emerge groundlessly from the substratum of the universal commodity. However, this quantitative progress posits "the negation of the qualitative moment contained therein and hence of the merely quantitative externality too."[76] A new measure relation emerges, for M_2 is qualitatively the same as M_1, being itself another exclusive measure that also constitutes the independent form of exchange value.

As Hegel writes, "this transition of the qualitative and the quantitative into each other proceeds on the basis of their unity, and the meaning of this process is only to *show* or to *posit* the *determinate being* of such a substrate underlying the process, a substrate which is their unity."[77]

The external differentiation of M_2 from M_1 is actually a determination of the unity of the universal commodity which conserves and maintains itself. This quantitative distinction is something that the independent form of exchange value has *in itself*. Even though this quantitative progression establishes M_2 as an independent value, opposing the circulation which produced it, its negative relation to this process is a positive moment for the essential substance that has *conserved* itself in this opposition. "The alteration is only a change of a *state*, and the *subject* of the transition is posited as remaining the *same* in the process."[78]

Money's abstract unity of quality and quantity is overcome in this infinite substance that has its moments in *both* quality and quantity. "Value is here the active factor in a process, in which, while constantly assuming the form in turn of money and commodities, it at the same time changes in magnitude, differentiating itself by throwing off surplus-value from itself"[79] and *determining* this its self-expansion.

The movement M_1-C-M_2 has emerged as a self-determined, self-subsistent process whose moments are not indifferently related, but immanently specified by the process itself. Measure is reduced "to the status of a moment"[80] and the "determinateness of exchange value itself, or the measure of price, must now itself disappear as an act of circulation."[81]

The determinateness of Essence has finally been arrived at. The sphere of commodity exchange has realized itself in "the totality in which every determination of being is sublated and contained."[82] Capital has emerged as the exchange value that conserves and perpetuates itself in and through circulation at the same time that it presupposes itself.[83] It posits itself against itself in this act of value production, all the time remaining "at one with itself

76. *Ibid.*, pp. 443-444.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 444.
78. *Ibid.*
79. MEW, Vol. 23, p. 169.
80. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 5, p. 445.
81. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 235.
82. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 5, p. 456.
83. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 262.

in this its own difference from itself." Commodity and money are simple elements in its process, and capital is in each one as its connection with its other, its opposite.[84]

The movement of determination has overcome the simple being of circulation, and now the deeper realm of the sphere of production has come to reveal itself in its necessary unfolding. The self-development of determinateness from quantity to essence is embodied in this all important transition, where the capitalist mode of production proceeds to show itself as the ground for the relations of commodity exchange.

The process of determination of the so-called Labor Theory of Value lifts the curtain.

The Self-Development of the Labor Theory of Value

Capital has emerged from the structure of commodity exchange as the immediate unity of commodity and money that has its own mediation in their process of valorization. The entire world of commodities is contained in ideal form within it, for capital is the product of its own movement as circulation at the same time that it faces this circulation as its presupposition.

The self-development of capital here proceeds in the pure language of the determinations of Essence. As Hegel writes, Essence "*differentiates* the determinations which are *implicit* (*an sich*) in it . . . it sets itself over against itself and is infinite being-for-self only in so far as it is at one with itself in this its own difference from itself."[85] At first, Essence is this simple negativity that is indifferent to the determinateness of being whose very sublation as otherness is equally essence's being for self. Because of the coincidence of this indifference towards the determinate, and the necessary supersession of it, essence "has to posit in its *own* sphere the determinateness that is only implicit in it, in order to give itself determinate being, and then being-for-self."[86]

In just this way, capital is first an immediate identity that must abolish itself as the unity of commodity exchange so that this act of circulation becomes a simple determinate relation that emerges as an element of capital itself.[87] By way of the process of production, this self-development is made clear.

With the world of commodities and money being the appearance in which capital poses itself, there is a distinction in this identity which presents capital as an ideality of the whole sphere of exchange that is in immediate relation to it. This is found in the simple enunciation that capital is merely a different being from the totality of exchange-value from where it has emerged and in whose process it conserves itself. However, this sphere in which capital appears or shines forth is not simply distinct from the unity of capital. It is rather distinguished from it as a being that is non-capital. As the independent exchange-value that preserves and perpetuates itself in and through

84. *Ibid.*, p. 261.
85. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 6, p. 15.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
87. Marx, *Grundrisse*, pp. 332-333.

circulation at the same time that it presupposes itself,[88] capital is a reflection in itself that renders its otherness a negative posed by capital in opposition to itself.

Labor-power is precisely this otherness that is stripped of all objective existence in the totality of exchange-value. It is the non-being of independent value, which nonetheless is the beyond in which capital produces itself as universal wealth. As such, labor-power is merely the possibility of exchange value in general. In a purely negative, subjective form, labor-power reflects the same totality and abstraction of individual exchange-values that is contained in capital's ideality. Labor-power presents itself as a purely formal *capacity* to realize capital in its self-valorization.[89] "General wealth (in contrast to capital in which it exists objectively, as reality)" is the "general possibility" of labor.[90]

This positing of labor-power is an embodiment of the advance from Essence to Illusory Being in the process of pure specification. Here, the simple difference between essence and the being to which it immediately is related emerges as an indifferent relation contained in essence's own reflection. What is contrasted to essence as the unessential *is* an immediacy that is essence's own. This being is not an other, whose difference falls outside of the indeterminate relation of the essential and the unessential and into a third entity, but an "immediate that is *in and for itself* a nullity. . . *illusory* being."[91] Its otherness is precisely essence's own negation of its determinate being. It has its nullity as its very essence, while "illusory being is not. It is the negative posited as negative."[92] Furthermore, this negativity and reflected immediacy of illusory being are not only constituted *by* essence, but *are* the moments of essence itself.[93] The posited and simple determinateness of illusory being is essence's own immediacy, as the "self-subsistent, which *is* as self-mediated through its negation."[94] Illusory being is not a nullity within essence's reflection, but rather is this reflection itself where essence's *own* immediacy and negativity are in identical union.[95]

Within the discourse of Capital, this self-development is constituted by the presentation of labor-power as the non-being of capital which is also capital's immediate existence as the negativity of independent value. The nullity of labor-power is maintained only through its negative relation to capital. Since labor is the non-being of capital that is posited by capital as its negative, it is the formal possibility of exchange value in which capital also realizes itself as universal wealth. The pure subjectivity of labor power, represented as the potentiality of the totality of exchange value, is immediately a positive relation, for labor-power is only a capital's own living source of value.[96] And

88. *Ibid.*, p. 262.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 296.
90. *Ibid.*
91. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 6, p. 19.
92. *Ibid.*
93. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
94. *Ibid.*
95. *Ibid.*
96. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 296.

capital *is* only as self-mediated through its negation, labor-power. Labor-power is thus a reflection of capital within itself that must realize capital's existence.

As such, labor-power is no longer simply the non-being of capital—it has now emerged in positive relation to capital, acquiring the determination of pure use-value in its opposition to capital. Capital must bring labor-power back into relation with itself as part of its process, in order to affirm itself as capital.[97] It must face labor-power as an equivalent exchange value, equivalent in that it is sufficient to pose labor-power in opposition to itself. In this manner capital enters into an exchange with labor-power, trading what exchange value is necessary to sustain its opposite as the pure capacity to realize value. Capital presents itself as value existing for itself, just as the labor-power facing it has being for self in the laborer.[98]

This coming to be of the sale of labor-power has proceeded upon the determinateness of reflection, as it has emerged from the specification of illusory being. With the development of illusory being as a relation of essence's own reflection, the self-related negativity of essence has become the negating of its *own* self. Since essence is now "immediacy as a returning movement, as a coincidence of the negative with itself, it is equally a negative of the negative as negative. . . reflection-into-self is essentially the presupposing of that from which it is the return."[99]

In just this manner, capital relates to labor-power as its own pure use-value, grasping itself in both negation and simple equality. However, because this reflection has risen above simple difference, and acquired the determinateness of labor-power's positive relation to capital, capital faces the pure use-value labor-power both as immediately opposed to it, and as the presupposition of its own development. Labor-power opposes it as something external, determined in its own right. This is the worker, formally posed as a person existing for himself, separate from his capacity to work,[100] and stripped of all objectivity beyond his immediate existence.[101] This is labor power as self-related, yet facing capital. On its own side, capital presents itself as value existing for itself, related to the free laborer as a capitalist, such that their opposition is external to each other's self-related determination. For the worker, his labor-power is a use-value only in that it *is* exchange value, and not an element in capital's self-affirmation. For the capitalist, labor-power has an exchange value because it *is* pure use-value in its relation *with* capital.[102] The basis of these immediate self-relations is, however, capital's presupposing of labor-power. And this is concretely achieved in its opposition to labor-power as an equivalent exchange value whose determination is such that its value is sufficient to pose and maintain labor-power in opposition to itself. Because of this, the identity of labor-power and capital is posited,

97. *Ibid.*, p. 274.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
99. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 6, pp. 26-27.
100. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 289.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 296.
102. *Ibid.*, p. 306.

and through the free exchange between worker and capitalist, what was an external relation between universal wealth and labor-power is now reflected into each of these two entities. With the completion of the sale of labor-power, it is now capital that divides itself according to its form and substance, embodying each element *as well* as their relation.[103] The immediate opposition of capital and non-capital is now explicitly mediated by capital itself. With this, the actual labor process has been posited.

Here the embodiment of external reflection has passed into the determinateness of determining reflection, to culminate its self-development of determinate essence. As the outcome of illusory being, external reflection presupposed its opposing being as a self-related immediacy whose determinateness was only an external moment to its act of reflection.[104] In so doing, however, the externally reflecting essence and the self-related being were both established as identical in the same indifference of their content to the form of the relation. Since the external reflection was the basis of their opposition, its identification is nothing other than the immanent reflection of the self-related determinateness of the essence and its being.[105]

This is just how the opposition of worker and capitalist, presupposed by capital in its appearance as the equivalent exchange value of labor-power, is an identity which emerges from the very content of worker and capitalist, whose existence for themselves is based on meeting and recognizing each other's will in the free exchange of labor-power. So is expressed the process of determining reflection which emerges when the positedness of external reflection has shown itself to be "*only* a positedness with respect to essence."[106] Here what were external self-related determinations have shown themselves to be in perfect unity with the external reflection that actually had absolutely presupposed them as determinations of its own return-to-self. Through the exchange of labor-power, capital is this determining reflection that really posits the character of worker and capitalist as well as their relation of contract. This is reflection that *is* as "the relation to its otherness within itself."[107] Both the content of reflection and the form in which this content is determinate are contained within essence itself. Essence is related to an other such that the related term and its relation are no longer distinct.[108] Determining reflection really overcomes the distinguishing it is based upon. essence has emerged as a determinate essence, or *an essentiality*, where otherness and relation-to-other have collapsed into each other within essence's pure equality-with-self.[109]

Within such process of determinateness, the exchange of labor-power with capital has now posited capital as a determinate essence distinguishing itself in function of its content as a simple process of production, and, in function of its form, as a process of autovalorization.[110] However, although capital has

103. *Ibid.*, pp. 301-302.
104. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 6, pp. 28-29.
105. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
106. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
107. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
108. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
109. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.
110. Marx, *Grundrisse*, pp. 310-311.

emerged as the substantial relation of its differentiation as form and content, it is at first merely a unilateral relation within this distinction. Capital has appropriated its opposite, labor-power, and made it one of its constituent elements, but it has done so only by absorbing it as an *activity* that conserves and augments capital as its finality.[111]

As a result, capital has immediately realized its substance of self-subsistent exchange value and its form of self-expansion as distinct elements of its content alone. Labor concretely embodies capital as formal process, and what opposes it is capital as pure passive object of this process, material.[112] Capital's substantial aspect here appears as a function of labor.[113] It has been reduced to its pure substance, and all relation to its form has disappeared. The work process has become the activity of labor itself, and capital finds itself as raw material and instrument of labor, as abstraction of itself in movement.[114]

In the language of pure specification, what is before us is that equality-with-self that is *essential* identity, having brought itself to unity.[115] Determinate essence, or essentiality, differentiates itself such that what is distinguished is "a non-being which is the non-being of itself."[116] Reflection has become an internal repulsion that is identity by immediately drawing itself inward, collapsing within itself, and distinguishing nothing. The contrast of labor as a formal activity facing capital as the pure passive object of its process is just this determinateness of an essentiality whose self-equality "is the passage beyond itself into the dissolution of itself."[117] With capital doubling itself as labor and simple object of labor, it is presenting itself as its own non-being, distinguishing itself so as to reduce itself to a bare substance negated by its own non-being, labor.

This relation of essential identity is nothing other than absolute difference, for it presents an absolute negativity that is self-related through this very identity.[118] This difference gathers together essentiality and the identity through which it asserted itself. Because here identity is immediately self-reflection, and the other element is difference in itself, "The distinguished terms *subsist* as indifferently different towards one another because each is self-identical."[119] The resulting diversity consists of self-related moments, indifferent to each other, as well as to their own determinations.

This self-development of determinateness becomes the unfolding of capital within itself as simple substance abolishing the opposition active worker—passive object of labor,[120] reuniting the passive substance of capital with the pure form of labor. Here absolute difference manifests itself in *labor*'s active relation with itself as a process of production. As difference in

111. *Ibid.*, p. 209
112. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 298.
114. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
115. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 6, p. 39.
116. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
117. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
119. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
120. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 298.

and for itself, labor consumes the bare stuff that is capital, impressing it with form, discarding its own pure subjectivity, and objectifying itself in this substance that it works upon.[121] In so doing, however, labor has united the difference in itself of its negating work with the essential identity that a passive capital embodied. This unity has taken place within labor's own act of determination, and the self-relatedness of each moment subsists indifferent to the other as distinct objective forms that embody for labor its own aspect of identity and difference.

The labor process now develops under two aspects. On the one hand, raw materials are impressed with the substance of labor, objectifying the finality of its activity as reaffirmation of capital. On the other hand, the instrument of labor as subjective activity, becoming "the objective means which subjective activity inserts between itself as an object, as its conductor."[122] In other words, the raw material is that substance consumed by labor and the instrument of labor is that substance consuming the pure subjectivity of labor itself.

The raw material and the instrument of labor stand respectively as external identity and external difference, or as likeness and unlikeness, in relation to labor's reflection-into-self. In the raw material labor finds identity by negating the inert formlessness of its object; through the instrument of labor, labor is related to itself negatively, passing its own reflection into this tool.

Nonetheless, in both moments, the reflection-into-self of labor is the negative unity of both, for "The independent self-reference which each of them is, is in fact the self-reference that sublates their distinctiveness and so, too, themselves."[123] This being the case, these indifferent sides of diversity are in *opposition* as moments of this single negative unity.[124]

Labor in process, working on its raw material through the instrument of labor, contains these two aspects within the unity of its act, and each of these aspects *is*, as concomintant elements of a single activity absorbing them both. This relation realizes the determinateness of "positive and negative. . . self-subsistent in that they are the reflection of the *whole* into themselves."[125] And this specification renders each moment positive and negative in its own self, since each maintains itself in so far as its opposite *is*, and in so far as it itself is in identical relation with this its opposite.[126]

However, since determinateness is here a positing of positive and of negative as a single reflection, there is the contradiction of a positing of self-identity that is in opposition to identity.[127] As embodied in the reality of the labor process, this specification comes into being in labor's active engagement with its instrument of labor and raw material. In this movement each aspect asserts itself in helping absorb and eliminate the other relation.

121. *Ibid.*
122. *Ibid.*, pp. 298-299.
123. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 6, p. 51.
124. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
125. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
126. *Ibid.*
127. *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

Labor's negative relation to the raw material is also the consuming use of its relation to the instrument of labor and vice versa. Here the labor process actually pushes beyond labor and the two concrete recipients of its self-relation. Their unity in labor's activity has them vanish in an identity that is their destruction as self-subsistent relations.

The pure specification of such contradiction, however, does not halt at a unity that is the null. What perishes is only "the *positedness* of the self-subsistence"[128] which positive and negative constituted. What remains and perseveres is a self-subsistent unity that has returned to itself through the negation of its own posited form as the opposition of positive and negative.[129] This unity is itself posited, excluding itself from itself as the unity of positive and negative.

The product of the labor process emerges within this pure determinateness, thrust forward by the self-annulling relation of labor to itself in its transformation of the raw material through the agency of the instrument of labor. Here is incorporated the given form impressed by the labor, as well as the substance materializing the labor itself. This result is indeed a material object that has been created, and yet no empty thing. The product has emerged as an excluding unity of reflection, that is capital reinstating itself as an active essential relation, now determining itself as *Ground*.

Capital has immediately restored itself as the positor of its own determinateness in the *created* use-value that is the result and sublation of the labor porcess. The elements of this labor process have had their use-value *determined* as substance of exchange value, and their former mode of existence (as capital reduced to pure content) has now been consumed.[130] In the product, capital has reflected itself back into its bare content, and reaffirmed itself as value that is subject, and for whom the labor process as a whole is the form of its self.[131]

This is essence determining itself as ground, posing a self-sublating positedness as its reflection of self-identity. Here reflection determines itself as the negative that is essence's *in itself*.[132] An immediate has emerged as the restored identity of essence that is just as much determined by essence's self-excluding reflection.[133] In this manner, immediate determinate being essentially *presupposes* a ground, and as such, essence has a two-fold determinateness—that of *ground* and the *grounded*. Essence is first *not-positedness*, setting itself over against positedness. Secondly essence is positedness *qua* positedness. Thus essence as ground is an identity of positedness with itself, just as the grounded's "reflection-into-self is the identity of the ground."[134] Here is united the ground's determinate self-identity with the negative identity of the grounded.

128. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
129. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
130. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 316.
131. *Ibid.*, p. 311.
132. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 6, p. 80.
133. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
134. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

In this unity essence is distinguished from its mediation, for the two reflections are both determinate, and different from their simple identity. Together they constitute *form* that faces essence, being "the indeterminate, which, in its determinations, is indifferent towards them."[135] Here form's determinations subsist in a dissolution that is the ground of the subsistence they give to themselves. At the same time, essence constitutes itself "as the *simple substrate* which is the *subsisting* of form."[136]

Thus form is just as much related to the "other" in which form subsists as sublated, and simple essence is only an "*inactive* substrate in which the form-determinations subsist and are reflected into themselves."[137] In this *determining* form, sublated positedness has become self-related, *presupposing* its identity in the indeterminate, formless essence to which it is an other. Essence is thus "*determined* as formless identity; it is *matter*."[138]

As embodied in the discourse of capital, this self-development emerges from the material product of the labor process, which is a created use-value that presupposes capital, the process of valorization, at the same time that it sublates the immediate labor process. On the one hand, capital sets itself over against this object as self-expanding value. On the other hand, capital has here developed as the becoming of exchange value whose substance is now constituted by such created use-value.

In uniting its self-identity as process of reproduction of exchange-value with the negative identity of created use-value, capital emerges as a process of production whose elements are themselves the results of its own formative process. This unity of product and elements of production renders capital distinct from its own ground-grounded mediation. There now emerges a simple identification of capital with itself where capital's material constituents appear as self-identical embodiments of invariable value that realize their simple sum in the final product which is their result.

Altogether, these elements comprise a form facing capital. They subsist as indifferently related quantities of value in the very process of production that transforms and negates their determinate existence.

On its own side, capital is the presupposed indipendent value that has now become its own result, in an unchanged form.[139] It is simply the bare inactive substrate of its own decomposition into quantitative values.

Thus the product and the elements of production actually presuppose this empty formless substance that capital has become. In effect, they determine capital as the simple *matter* of their *formal* existence as an equation of equivalent quantitative sums. As Marx writes: "The only process, as regards value, [is] that it sometimes appears as a whole, a unity; then as a division of this unity into certain amounts; finally, as sum."[140] The process of production has emerged as the constitution of the value of capital in its simple sum.

135. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
136. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
137. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
138. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
139. Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 315.
140. *Ibid.*, p. 314.

This relation of the addition of self-identical quantitative elements of value and the formless capital that is their substrate proceeds as a self-development of determinateness that emerges out of this distinguishing of form and its matter to become the new relation of form and content. With the appearance of matter as an absolute susceptibility to the form that is posed relating itself to this other as its subsistence, the illusory indifference of form and matter is removed. Now the whole relation is a unity of form and matter wherein each reciprocally presupposes the other. In this manner form sublates its own formless self-subsistence by rendering matter as something posited. At the same time, however, it has overcome its own relation to matter as a posited form, and it produces its subsistence on its own account.[141] This movement is no less a transformation taken on by matter itself. For when form has "sublated itself, the determinateness which matter has as against form also disappears, namely, to be an indeterminate subsistence."[142] Matter no longer relates to form in an indeterminate self-identity. Matter is now self-determined in a posited unity with form. In this unity form and matter withdraw, overcoming the subsistence they maintained externally in each other. Here form *is* a material subsistence, and matter *has* a necessary form.[143] Their unity is the *determinate basis* of formed matter "which is at the same time indifferent to form and matter, these being sublated and unessential determinations."[144] This posited unity of form and matter is *content*.

The formal division of capital into elements of value whose simple sum achieves their unity develops itself within the just described process of determination by realizing a union in the determination of abstract labor time. The indifferently related quantities of value that are the elements of capital's process of identification take up into themselves their presupposition of capital's acti y, and acquire a determinate existence as specific quanta of abstract labor time, individual coagulations of capital's bare motion. Alongside this development, capital is no longer a formless substrate, but a whole that embodies and poses a definite sum of values that are inherently related to its own process by finding their measure in amounts of abstract labor time. The product and the elements of production no longer subsist in a formless matter whose simple presence as self-identical independent value grants them life. And nor is capital a formless subsistence in relation to the independent values constituting its process. The specific measures of abstract labor time pose themselves the determinate value of capital as a whole, just as capital posits itself in unity with the product and elements of production by having the expression of its bare activity of valorization, abstract labor time, inform these individual values in a particular manner. In values of abstract labor time the formal moments of capital find material subsistence, and capital itself acquires a necessary form. The determination of abstract labor

141. Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 6, p. 90.
142. *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92.
143. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
144. *Ibid.*, p. 94.

additional determination of an unessential form, that is free from the ground and is an immediate manifoldness.[155] This latter element, the non-ground aspect of the relation, is "an external bond which does not contain the unessential manifold content as *posited*; it is therefore likewise only a *substrate*."[156] Thus the immediate identity of ground and the grounded, and the something which relates their distinct content, is the emergence of two different substrates. They in turn present a new relation of an external ground which is related to an immediate content that it has not posited, but whose diversified determinations it does bring into combination, determining "which is ground and which is posited by the ground."[157]

Thus real ground has withdrawn into *another* ground, making itself a positedness. This new ground is the complete ground, which is identical with the real ground that it now is grounding. This "new ground into which that merely posited, external 'togetherness' has sublated itself is, as its reflection-into-self, the *absolute relation* of the two determinations of the content."[158]

This process of pure specification becomes capital's self-development through the emergence of the productive process as a creation of a surplus value contained in the resultant product.

The coincidence of ground and grounded in living labor's informing of materialized abstract labor time as value that creates new value is a determinateness of content that is really external to the form of this whole relation. Living labor's process and capital's auto-valorization are the immediate self-identical determinations that, as such, make up the empty difference in their identity as ground and grounded... The thing that combines them in their diversity is simply the surplus value to be found through the created product. Both elements, living labor's process and capital's auto-valorization, are in continuity with themselves in this posited value that *is* their additional specification whose immediate particular measure is first unrelated to the ground. This indifference leaves surplus value merely a bare substrate of the relation of labor's expenditure as capital's means of valorization. However, this leaves both the realization of labor and surplus value as different contents related to a ground which has not posited them, but does bring their specifications into a combination in which the surplus value is now posited by the expenditure of labor.

This new ground is the restoration of the immediate labor process, here incorporated in capital's determinate auto-valorization. Here are joined the two aspects of the entire movement of production, grasped in their immediate unity: on the one hand, the simple process of production in which the activity of labor conserved the use-value quality of past labor by transforming the material substance of the passive capital facing it, and giving it a new form; on the other hand, the process of valorization which has just emerged when

155. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
156. *Ibid.*
157. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
158. *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

capital's identification with itself through the absorption of living labor had conserved the quantity of objectified abstract labor time found in its elements of production.

The contrasting unity of these two moments reveals that the newly created product contains a specific surplus value, whose quantitative determination derives from the difference between the exchange value that capital has paid to the worker for his labor-power, and the exchange value that the abstract labor time of his work has realized. The relation of living labor to surplus value is now concretely posed in this determinateness of complete ground. The identity contained in this contrast of the two aspects of capital's process of production complete the self-development of the so-called "Labor Theory of Value."

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